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Abstract
Humans are presented daily with decisions that require solving complex problems.
In many cases, solving these problems is computationally hard. This raises a ten-
sion between the computational capacity of the agent and the computational re-
quirements of a task. Whilst the underlying invariants of this mechanism remain
unclear in cognition, they have been widely studied in computer science. I build
on theoretical and empirical work in computational complexity, which characterizes
the intrinsic computational hardness of problems. I first present an adaptation of
this theoretical framework for the study of human cognition by introducing a set
of metrics of hardness of instances of problems. I do this in a way that is inde-
pendent of any algorithm or computational model and that can be generalized to
other problems. Based on this, I explore empirically, in a set of lab experiments,
how these task-independent metrics of hardness affect human problem-solving. I
do this at two levels of analysis. Firstly, I study how these metrics affect human
performance at the behavioral level in three canonical computational problems: the
knapsack problem, the traveling salesperson problem and the Boolean satisfiability
problem. Secondly, I examine the relation between computational hardness and the
neural processes associated with problem-solving, employing ultra-high field func-
tional MRI. I find that the metrics of intrinsic hardness put forward here predict
human performance and time-on-task across the three computational problems in a
similar way. Moreover, I identify the neural correlates of computational hardness in
the knapsack task, a complex problem-solving task. I show that this framework can
be used for the study of the neural underpinnings of problem-solving by providing a
generic definition of cognitive demand. The results of these studies provide support
for the conceptual premise that the quantification of intrinsic hardness is fundamen-
tal in the development of more refined theories of human decision-making and its
neural underpinnings. Critically, they provide a framework to study how humans
adapt to computational complexity and how intrinsic hardness of tasks affect the
reliability of human decision-making. This could inform public policy by identifying
which decisions over products involve solving problems that require computational
resources beyond those available to an agent, and how this affects decisions.
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su inagotable poder de motivación. A Tin porque eres una inspiración
(¡a pesar de que hayas ganado la carrera!) y a Du, porque tu cariño
incondicional me motiva a ser una mejor persona a cada instante.
Finally, I cannot begin to express my thanks to my partner, Lee, without whom
I would have lost my mind midway through this PhD (especially during COVID
lock-downs). Your unwavering support and patience has been truly invaluable at so
many levels. Thank you!
vi
Contents
List of Figures ix
List of Tables xi
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Computational hardness and behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.2 Computational hardness and the brain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.3 Theory: Quantifying intrinsic computational hardness . . . . . . . . . 13
1.3.1 Computing theory for the study human cognition? . . . . . . . 13
1.3.2 Computational-complexity theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2 Theory 24
2.1 TCC Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.2 Instance complexity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.3 TCC, IC and asymptotic definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.4 A pipeline for new computational problems in this framework . . . . 31
3 The Knapsack Case 33
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
3.2 Materials and Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.2.1 Computational complexity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
3.2.2 Experiment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
3.2.3 Statistical analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
3.2.4 Data and Code Availability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
3.3 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
3.3.1 Knapsack decision task . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
3.3.2 Knapsack optimization task . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
3.3.3 Computational capacity and performance . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3.4 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3.4.1 Intrinsic hardness of cognitive tasks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
3.4.2 Hardness and decision-making: Adaptation of strategies . . . . 54
3.4.3 Directions for future research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
Appendices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
A Instance sampling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
A.1 Knapsack decision problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
A.2 Knapsack optimization problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
B CANTAB tasks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
C Extension of TCC to the knapsack optimization problem . . . . . . . 60
vii
CONTENTS
D Expected number of solution witnesses and the constrainedness of the
solution space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
D.1 Defining the knapsack problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
D.2 Sampling instances: The Dirichlet distribution . . . . . . . . . 62
D.3 Expected number of witnesses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
D.4 Constrainedness, satisfiability probability and computational
requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
E Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
4 Generality of the Hardness Metrics 82
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
4.2 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
4.2.1 Summary statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
4.2.2 Feature-space complexity metrics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
4.2.3 Solution-space complexity metrics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
4.3 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
4.3.1 Computational complexity in cognition . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
4.3.2 Future directions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
4.4 Materials and Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
4.4.1 Ethics statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
4.4.2 Participants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
4.4.3 Experimental tasks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
4.4.4 Derivation of metrics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
4.4.5 Statistical analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
4.4.6 Data and code availability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
Appendices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
A Satisfiability and TCC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
B Search strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
C Summary statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
C.1 Boolean satisfiability task . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
C.2 Traveling salesperson task . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
C.3 Knapsack decision task . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
D TCC and the number of witnesses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
E Instance complexity in 3SAT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
F Supplementary Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
5 Neural Correlates of Computational Hardness 124
5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
5.2 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
5.2.1 Behavioral results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
5.2.2 Imaging results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
5.3 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
5.3.1 Neural correlates of cognitive demand . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
5.3.2 Task-related neural markers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
5.3.3 Computational hardness and cognitive control in
problem-solving . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
5.3.4 Directions for future research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
viii
CONTENTS
5.4 Materials and methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
5.4.1 Ethics statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
5.4.2 Participants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
5.4.3 Knapsack decision task . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
5.4.4 Instance sampling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
5.4.5 Complementary tasks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
5.4.6 Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
5.4.7 Behavioral statistical analyses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
5.4.8 MRI data acquisition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
5.4.9 Imaging statistical analyses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
5.4.10 Data and code availability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
Appendices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
A Complementary tasks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
A.1 The knapsack optimization task . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
A.2 Cognitive function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162
B fMRI analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
B.1 fMRI preprocessing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
B.2 DCM specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
C Tables and Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
6 General Discussion 179
6.1 Future directions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180
6.1.1 Dimensions of computational hardness . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180
6.1.2 Approximating optimality: Linking efficiency and reliability . 181
6.1.3 Allocation of cognitive resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181
6.1.4 Fixed-parameter tractability (FPT) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182
6.1.5 TCC vs. IC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183




1.1 Computational tasks. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.2 0-1 Knapsack problem. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.3 Computational problem-complexity classes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1.4 Constrainedness, computational requirements and phase transitions
in the thermodynamic limit. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3 The Knapsack Case
3.1 Typical-case complexity and performance in the knapsack decision task. 38
3.2 Knapsack tasks. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
3.3 Properties of sampled instances and human performance. . . . . . . . 47
3.4 Relation between computational complexity and human performance
in the knapsack optimization task. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
D.1 Expected number of witnesses in the knapsack decision problem for
different numbers of items (n). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
D.2 κ for the knapsack decision problem with 50 items. . . . . . . . . . . 67
4 Generality of the Hardness Metrics
4.2.1 3SAT problem, complexity metrics and experimental design. . . . . . 87
4.2.2 Typical-case complexity (TCC). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
4.2.3 Number of solution witnesses. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
4.2.4 Instance complexity. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
4.4.1 Experimental Tasks. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
B.1 Number of Clicks. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
5 Neural Correlates of Computational Hardness
5.2.1 Knapsack decision task. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
5.2.2 Human performance in the knapsack decision task. . . . . . . . . . . 132
5.2.3 Neural correlates of TCC. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
5.2.4 Neural correlates of satisfiability. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
5.2.5 Neural correlates of accuracy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
5.2.6 Temporal dynamics of regions of interest. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
5.2.7 PPI results. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
5.2.8 Granger causality results. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
A.1 Knapsack optimization task. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
B.1 fMRI data preprocessing pipeline. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
x
LIST OF FIGURES
C.1 PPI supplementary results. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170
xi
List of Tables
3 The Knapsack Case
E.1 Pearson correlation between knapsack task performance and cognitive
abilities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
E.2 Mixed effects linear regressions on other performance measures in the
knapsack optimization task. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
E.3 Effect of the number of item-subsets that perform better than the
current selection of items on time before the next click. . . . . . . . . 70
E.4 Model fit of alternative models relating human accuracy and instance
complexity (IC) in the knapsack decision task. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
E.5 Gecode solver: algorithm-specific complexity measures in the knap-
sack problem. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
E.6 Human performance in the knapsack decision task. . . . . . . . . . . 73
E.7 Computational performance in the knapsack optimization task. . . . . 74
E.8 Effort in the knapsack optimization task. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
4 Generality of the Hardness Metrics
F.1 Human performance in the Boolean satisfiability task. . . . . . . . . . 112
F.2 Human performance in the traveling salesperson task. . . . . . . . . . 113
F.3 Time-on-task in the Boolean satisfiability task. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
F.4 Time-on-task in the traveling salesperson task. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
F.5 Human performance an the number of solution witnesses. . . . . . . . 116
F.6 Human performance in the knapsack task. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
F.7 Number of clicks in the Boolean satisfiability task. . . . . . . . . . . . 118
F.8 Number of clicks in the traveling salesperson task. . . . . . . . . . . . 119
5 Neural Correlates of Computational Hardness
5.2.1 TCC clusters. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
5.2.2 Satisfiability clusters. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
5.2.3 Accuracy clusters. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
5.2.4 PPI clusters. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
A.1 Computational performance and time-on-task in the knapsack opti-
mization task. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
A.2 Pearson correlations between performance in the knapsack tasks and
cognitive abilities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165





Humans are presented daily with a plethora of decisions. In many cases, these involve
performing cognitive tasks that are computationally demanding. This generates a
tension between the demands of a task and the computational capabilities of an
agent. In cases in which computational demands exceeds the agent’s capacities, their
ability to perform a task would likely be affected. Not only would the performance
of the task be hindered by computational demands, it is also likely that humans
would adapt to this constraint. To date, however, very little is known about the
effect of this computational constraint on human behavior, and cognition in general.
Many, if not most, theories of decision-making assume (either implicitly or explic-
itly) that limits of computational capabilities are never a binding constraint during
decision-making and can therefore be ignored in the theory. These theories include
rational choice theory (Samuelson 1938) and game theory (Nash 1950). Although a
large amount of evidence has registered deviations from this notion of rationality in
the form of cognitive biases (Chernev, Böckenholt, and J. Goodman 2015; Shefrin
and Statman 1985; Tversky and Kahneman 1981), several of the models proposed to
account for these biases still would require agents to solve computationally expen-
sive optimization problems. These include prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky
1979; Tversky and Kahneman 1992) and social utility models (Fehr and Schmidt
1999).
In order to incorporate the difficulty of a task into a theory, models have been
constructed that incorporate computational costs into models assuming different
notions of rationality (Griffiths, Lieder, and N. D. Goodman 2015; Lewis, Howes,
and Singh 2014; Gershman, Horvitz, and Tenenbaum 2015). In one approach, the
computational costs of a problem are incorporated as an attribute to be considered
when making a decision. These models incorporate additional parameters into al-
ready computationally demanding models without analyzing the plausibility of the
required computations.
Overall, these models propose a theory at Marr’s computational-level of analy-
sis1 by characterizing a task as a mathematical problem. The assumption here is
that agents are able to solve these mathematical problems “reliably”, and that their
behavior can be successfully captured by the proposed computational-level model2.
1Marr’s computational-level refers to the specification of the goal of the computation, that is,
the problem that needs to be solved. I refer the reader to McClamrock 1991 for a description of
Marr’s levels embedded in an insightful critical discussion of the limits of this categorization.
2The notion of reliability here alludes to the ‘as-if’ assumption by which these models are
supported. For a thorough dissection of this ambiguous assumption, together with the relevant
1
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
The veracity of this assumption, however, is far from obvious. Indeed several of the
problems implied by these theories have been shown to be intractable (Frixione 2001;
van Rooij, Blokpoel, et al. 2019). Therefore, these computational models might not
resemble human behavior because in some cases the computational requirements
of solving the mathematical problem (e.g., an optimization problem) exceeds the
capacities of the agent. The question then arises on how to determine the cases in
which this happens and how to model the effect this interaction (between computa-
tional capacities and the requirements of a task) has on behavior and cognition in
general.
Alternative approaches have put forward theories that model the agent at Marr’s
algorithmic-level of analysis3. They suggest a way forward by postulating that agents
implement strategies4 that approximate the solutions of the computational problems
implied by computational-level theories. However, these models, too, fail to propose
a principled approach to characterizing the computational difficulty of strategies,
and thus, also do not address the plausibility of implementation. These theories
include the heuristic’s program (Gerd Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier 2011), including
the adaptive toolbox (Gerd. Gigerenzer and Selten 2001) and ecological rationality
(Todd and Gerd Gigerenzer 2012). Critically, the so-called ‘heuristics’ are not only
poorly defined, but might not reduce the computational requirements of a task.
Firstly, it is not clear how well heuristics approximate the solution to computational
problems and whether an approximation guarantee affects the computational re-
quirements of implementing a heuristic (van Rooij, Wright, et al. 2018). Secondly,
the hypothetical implementation of a heuristic requires the selection of one such
strategy in the first place. This implicit theoretical cornerstone of the program im-
plies that the agent would need to solve a computational problem that might be as
difficult as the original computational problem (Otworowska et al. 2018; Rich et al.
2019).
Taken together, both algorithmic-level and computational-level models of hu-
man behavior either ignore or treat rather informally the notion of computational
hardness. This raises questions about the plausibility of current models of decision-
making and casts doubt on the predictive power of these models. This is particularly
problematic when it is considered that several day-to-day problems people face are
deemed computationally hard. For instance, tasks like going to a supermarket might
involve solving the knapsack problem, which is considered to be hard for computers5.
Other examples of problems that involve computationally hard problems include
computational models of vision (John K. Tsotsos 1990), of learning (Kwisthout,
Wareham, and Van Rooij 2011) among many others (van Rooij, Blokpoel, et al.
2019). If the computational problems these theories suggest people solve are indeed
hard, then it would be expected that computational hardness would affect human
behavior and computation in ways that are currently ignored. For instance, it would
implications, I direct the reader to van Rooij, Wright, et al. 2018.
3Marr’s algorithmic-level of analysis refers to how a computational-level theory (i.e., problem) is
implemented. Specifically, it specifies the algorithm that would transform the input of the problem
to the output (i.e., solution).
4I use this term to refer to the informal notion of computation that has also been referred to
as effective procedure or effective calculation (Turing 1937). The notion of strategy will be refined
in section 1.3 based on theoretical definitions.
5A discrete version of grocery shopping can be characterized as a computational problem that
is considered intractable (NP-hard). See 1.3.
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be expected that hardness would affect behavior via a negative effect on the quality
of decisions. Moreover, computational hardness is presumably an attribute of the
task that is considered when making a decision. An attribute that would have im-
plications on the meta-decisions of choosing a strategy, choosing how much effort to
exert as well as deciding what level of ‘reliability’ to aim for. Further refinements
of models of decision-making would require an understanding of how computational
hardness affects human behavior and computation.
Importantly, computational difficulty varies significantly from one instance of a
task to the next and it is not clear what kind of computational limitations should
be incorporated into decision theory. Importantly, at present, there is no overarch-
ing theoretical framework to quantify hardness of decisions in a generic way such
that it can capture invariants of human behavior and computation across problems
and algorithmic-level implementations. In this thesis, I propose a way forward by
introducing into the study of cognition, insights from computer science and in par-
ticular computational complexity theory (CCT)6. This is a branch of computing
theory that studies the computational resource requirements of problems and the
algorithms available to solve them.
The proposal of introducing CCT into the study of cognition is not new. Some re-
searchers have advocated for the inclusion of the notion of computational complexity
into models of human behavior and cognition (Frixione 2001; John K. Tsotsos 1990;
van Rooij 2008; Bossaerts and Murawski 2017)7. The investigation documented
in this manuscript builds on these proposals and introduces to cognitive science a
closely related mathematical framework capable of quantifying hardness of tasks in
order to generate empirically testable predictions. Importantly, I experimentally
demonstrate the validity and capabilities of this framework for the study of human
computation.
In the remainder of the introduction, I offer an overview of existing studies that
investigate computational hardness from different vantage points. I first present a
brief summary of current methods for quantifying difficulty of tasks related to human
behavior. Afterwards, I introduce how metrics of computational hardness have been
employed to discover generalities in the neural processes supporting problem-solving.
Finally, I present an introduction to how hardness has been studied in CCT, focusing
on the theoretical framework that will be employed here.
Subsequent chapters apply this theoretical framework to the study of cognition.
In chapter 2, I define a set of metrics of computational hardness that will be con-
sidered, and propose a pipeline for the application of this theoretical framework to
human cognition. In chapter 3, we apply this framework to the study of human be-
havior in one ubiquitous computational problem: the knapsack problem. In chapter
4, we demonstrate the generality of the proposed framework by experimentally test-
ing and comparing the results across two additional canonical problems. Afterwards,
in chapter 5, we apply this framework to the study of the neural processes associ-
ated with problem-solving. In the last chapter, I present some concluding remarks,
6In this manuscript I use the broad definition of computational complexity to refer to the study of
computational resource requirements for solving a task (Arora and Barak 2009; Pudlák 2013; Moore
and Mertens 2011; Moser, Gheorghita, and Aleti 2017). This notion is not to be confused with
the definition of computational complexity in terms of classical complexity classes, in particular,
complexity classes based on asymptotic worst-case analysis such as P and NP (see section 1.3.2).
7The reader might have, indeed, noticed that I alluded to this already when referring to the
intractability of day-to-day tasks.
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including implications of this work and possible future directions.
1.1 Computational hardness and behavior
Several lines of research have considered the effects of computational hardness on
specific cognitive tasks. However, these studies characterize hardness in task-specific
ways and, in many cases, specify hardness based on a particular cognitive strategy.
This is problematic because of the variety of tasks that people face daily and the
many strategies people might implement to perform them. In this section, I briefly
review these approaches and highlight their limitations.
Computational hardness may vary not only from one task to another, but also
from one instance of a particular task to another instance. For instance calculating
whether a number is divisible by 3 may be hard if the number is large, but easy if it
is small. Here, I focus on approaches that have been employed to characterize the
hardness of instances of tasks.
A prominent approach for studying computational hardness is one that is built
based on a particular strategy specification. From this perspective, hardness (or
difficulty) is defined based on the computational steps (or operations) required by
a particular strategy to solve a problem. This approach can potentially capture
a significant amount of variance due to differences in strategy use. Consider, for
example, the problem of determining whether the number 11, 718 is divisible by 3.
The time (number of steps) required to solve the problem can vary depending on
the strategy implemented. For example, the agent might be aware that it is possible
to estimate divisibility by 3 by assessing the divisibility over the sum of the digits.
Using this procedure, the divisibility of 11, 718 can be assessed by adding the digits
(1+1+7+1+8 = 18) and then determining whether the sum (18) is divisible by 3.
Alternatively, the agent might solve the problem by directly dividing 11, 718 by 3.
Notably, these two methods would entail different computational requirements that
could be estimated if the strategy implemented was known. Overall, if given a strat-
egy and a problem, it would be possible to estimate the number of computational
step needed to solve the problem.
This approach has been amply used to study computational hardness and its
effects on human behavior (e.g., Murawski and Bossaerts 2016; Acuña and Parada
2010; Dry, Lee, et al. 2006; Guid and Bratko 2013; Fimbel, Lauzon, and Rainville
2009). This line of research categorizes hardness of a problem according to the
number of computational steps or amount of time a particular algorithm needs to
solve the problem. These hardness metrics can then be related to human behavior.
Consider, for example, the traveling salesperson problem (TSP). In this problem,
an agent is asked to visit a set of cities and return home while minimizing the travel
distance (Fig 1.1a). Several studies have explored how strategy-specific metrics of
hardness affect human behavior in this problem. It has been found that the per-
formance of certain algorithms or heuristics (implemented on electronic computers)
correlates with human performance (Dry, Lee, et al. 2006; MacGregor and Chu 2011;
Hill 1982). Moreover, there is evidence to suggest that these metrics are related to
how people explore the possible travel paths while solving the problem (Acuña and
Parada 2010).
In this line of research, a particularly relevant problem that has been studied is











Figure 1.1: Computational tasks. (a) The traveling salesperson task. Given
a set of cities in a map, the objective is to find a path to visit all the cities and return
to the origin whilst minimizing the distance traveled. (b) The tower of London
task. The objective is to find a sequence of moves to transform the initial state
into the target state in the minimum number of moves. Each move corresponds to
picking and dropping one disk from one rod to another.
has a specified weight capacity with predefined items that have a weight and value
(Fig 1.2). The goal is to choose those items that maximize the total value in the
backpack without exceeding the weight limit. Human performance in this problem
has been linked to strategy-specific metrics of hardness. Specifically, it has been
shown that the time people expend solving the problem and the quality of their
solutions is affected by a metric of hardness called Sahni-k (Murawski and Bossaerts
2016), which is based on the Sahni-k algorithm (Sahni and Sartaj 1975).
Overall, this approach provides a way to explore computational hardness and
its relation to human behavior at a granular level. This method can capture the
variability in the number of computational steps (and memory requirements) needed
to solve a problem depending on the strategy used. However, this approach ignores
the diversity in algorithms that different people may use across contexts. Even if the
computational problem is the same, different people might solve the problem using
different procedures and might change their procedures depending on the situation
or their level of experience with the problem (e.g., MacGregor and Chu 2011; Acuña
and Parada 2010; Hirtle and Gärling 1992; Murawski and Bossaerts 2016; Ohlsson
2012; Gerd Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier 2011; Newell, Weston, and Shanks 2003;
Payne, Bettman, and Johnson 1993). For instance, if the reader is now asked to
find whether 111, 111 is divisible by 3, they might use a different strategy to the
one they would have employed before reading this chapter. Comprehensive ways of
quantifying the amount of computational resources needed to solve a problem are
then particularly problematic given the lack of a generic strategy.
Alternative approaches have studied the computational hardness of a task in-
dependently of the strategy employed. These approaches presume the existence of
intrinsic hardness of a problem. In other words, they assume that a task is inher-
ently easy or hard and that this intrinsic feature has an effect on human performance

















Figure 1.2: 0-1 Knapsack problem. In the optimization variant of the problem
(left), the objective of the problem is to select a subset of items, each with a weight
and value, that maximizes the value packed into the knapsack (backpack) without
exceeding the capacity constraint (25g). In the decision variant of the problem
(right) the objective is to determine whether the target value ($30) can be packed
without exceeding the capacity constraint (25g). The optimization problem belongs
to the complexity class NP-hard and the decision variant belongs to the class NP-
complete (these classes are defined in section 1.3).
A prominent example derives, as well, from the study of human behavior in
the TSP. It has been shown that certain intrinsic features of the problem affect
human performance (MacGregor and Chu 2011). Notably, the layout of the cities
(for instance how clustered or regular they are) has been shown to affect human
effort and solution quality (MacGregor, Ormerod, and Chronicle 1999; Hirtle and
Gärling 1992; Dry, Preiss, and Wagemans 2012).
Another example of problem-specific metrics of hardness stems from research in
planning and the Tower of London task (Fig 1.1b). In this canonical task, the par-
ticipant is presented with a set of disks (balls) of different colors that are organized
into different stacks (rods), the subject is then asked to pick and drop disks (one at a
time) in order for the arrangement of the disks to match a target state. Participants
are asked to do this in the minimum number of moves.
Difficulty in this task is generally characterized based on the intrinsic struc-
ture of the problem. Explicitly, hardness is quantified as the number of ‘pick and
drops’ needed to reach the target state. That is, hardness is characterized based on
the properties of the solution (i.e., the sequence that reaches the target state with
minimum number of moves), an intrinsic feature of the computational problem un-
derlying the task. Importantly, this metric has been related to human performance:
the longer the optimal solution, the worse people perform (Berg et al. 2010). More-
over, this metric has also been successfully used to assess cognitive abilities across
clinical populations and age (Shallice 1982; Fimbel, Lauzon, and Rainville 2009).
Other problem-specific metrics of hardness have been studied in a number of
different tasks (Basso, Bisiacchi, et al. 2001; Chu and MacGregor 2011; Fedorenko,
Duncan, and Kanwisher 2013; G. Gratton et al. 2018). These include tasks on
insight such as the matchstick problems (Knoblich et al. 1999), as well as other
problems like mental rotation (Shepard and Metzler 1971) and the vertex cover
problem (Carruthers, Masson, and Stege 2012).
Problem-specific characterizations of hardness, however, lack generality, which
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would hinder their applicability. It is not clear how to extend these metrics to
other problems or if they are even related to underlying generic characteristics that
makes particular cases of problems computationally hard across tasks. Consider, for
example, the hardness metrics related to the TSP such as how clustered the cities
are. They are generally based on the graphical representation of the problem. This
specification of hardness is idiosyncratic to the problem and it is not clear how these
metrics could be generalized to other problems. Moreover, this characterization of
hardness could be specific to the representation of the problem. The tasks used to
study behavior in the TSP present the problem graphically (Fig 1.1a), in line with
the picturesque description of the problem via a traveling agent. However, the same
problem can be represented by a matrix of distances between cities. If participants
were to be presented with the matrix representation of the problem, it would by
no means be obvious whether the corresponding matrices of non-clustered problems
would entail better performance than instances with clustered cities. Overall, the
specificity of metrics of hardness hinder their applicability given the plethora of
problems people face everyday.
One generic metric of hardness in computational problems that has been inves-
tigated previously is problem size. Several studies have shown that human perfor-
mance worsens as the size of the problem increases (e.g., Carruthers, Masson, and
Stege 2012; MacGregor and Chu 2011; Dry, Lee, et al. 2006; van Opheusden and
Ma 2019; Stazyk, Ashcraft, and Hamann 1982; De Visscher and Noël 2014). For
instance, in the TSP, the number of cities has been shown to affect human per-
formance (Hirtle and Gärling 1992; Dry, Lee, et al. 2006). Other examples where
problem-size has been shown to affect human behavior include mental arithmetic
problems (Stazyk, Ashcraft, and Hamann 1982; De Visscher and Noël 2014) and
planning tasks (van Opheusden and Ma 2019). It is worth highlighting that the
problem size can be characterized in several ways. For example, it can be estimated
as the size of the instance of the problem, as it is usually done in the TSP (i.e.,
number of cities), or it can be characterized as the size of the state space (that is,
the number of possible combinations or paths) (van Opheusden and Ma 2019; Mu-
rawski and Bossaerts 2016). The latter might provide a way of comparing hardness
across problems since it captures a generic characteristic of the underlying structure
of the search landscape (see chapter 6).
Size captures a generic dimension of computational hardness that has been shown
to affect human behavior in several tasks. Nevertheless, there is significant variabil-
ity in human performance for a fixed problem size (e.g., MacGregor and Chu 2011;
Murawski and Bossaerts 2016), and thus, it is unlikely that this is the only generic
source of computational hardness. This issue, however, remains unexplored: it is
an open question whether there are additional generic dimensions of hardness that
affect human performance. In this thesis I address this question.
1.2 Computational hardness and the brain
The previous section introduced current approaches studying difficulty (computa-
tional hardness) of cognitive tasks. Various metrics of difficulty based on those
approaches have been shown to affect human decision quality and effort. However,
quantification of hardness can also provide insights into the neurobiological basis of
human problem-solving, that is, the characterization of the neural processes associ-
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ated with problem-solving. Firstly, it provides a framework for studying the neural
underpinnings of cognitive demand during problem-solving. Secondly, a generic
quantification of computational hardness could shed light on the allocation of lim-
ited cognitive resources by presenting a metric that could be employed by an agent
when making meta-decisions such as effort allocation.
At this point, relatively little is know about the neural processes involved in
complex problem-solving. This is not to say that the neural processes of problem-
solving are altogether unexplored. However, such work to date has focused mainly
on easy problems.
Indeed, many lines of research have studied the neural processes associated with
solving easy, or tractable8, problems. Notably, problem-solving has been studied
in relation to planning tasks (such as the Tower of London) (Ruocco et al. 2014;
Nitschke et al. 2017), mathematics problems (Matejko and Ansari 2018), and in-
sight problems (problems involving an ”Aha!” moment) (Sprugnoli et al. 2017).
Alternative lines of research have studied problem-solving in problems involving
working memory updating (e.g., N-back task), task switching (e.g., Stroop task)
and problems in which a prepotent tendency has to be withhold (e.g., inhibition
tasks, go/no-go task) (G. Gratton et al. 2018; Miyake et al. 2000).
A prominent approach in the study of (tractable) problem-solving analyzes the
neural processes involved, by studying the neural correlates of difficulty of a task
(e.g., Fedorenko, Duncan, and Kanwisher 2013; Assem et al. 2020; Duncan and Owen
2000; Duncan 2010; Crittenden, D. J. Mitchell, and Duncan 2016). This approach
allows for the study of the generic neural processes associated with problem-solving
across different problems by implicitly defining a generic neural construct: cognitive
demand. This construct can then be studied across tasks provided it reflects a real
neural substrate related to the difficulty of a task. Importantly, this procedure min-
imizes confounding effects by avoiding the need to artificially produce alternative
and arbitrary benchmark tasks. This framework has been particularly successful in
characterizing a set of brain regions that generically correlate with difficulty across
different tasks (Fedorenko, Duncan, and Kanwisher 2013; Assem et al. 2020; Duncan
and Owen 2000; Crittenden, D. J. Mitchell, and Duncan 2016): the intraparietal
sulcus (IPS), dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC), the anterior insula (AI) and
specific regions from the lateral prefrontal cortex including the inferior frontal sul-
cus and the middle frontal gyrus (MFG) (Duncan 2010; Fedorenko, Duncan, and
Kanwisher 2013; Crittenden, D. J. Mitchell, and Duncan 2016). This collection
of regions often takes the name of the multiple-demand system (MDS) (Fedorenko,
Duncan, and Kanwisher 2013; Duncan 2010; Crittenden, D. J. Mitchell, and Duncan
2016).
The MDS overlaps with the cognitive control network. This is not surprising,
given that their definitions are closely related. On one hand, MDS is characterized
by modulating cognitive demand (i.e., difficulty) of a task. For instance, in working
memory tasks, the cognitive demand of the task is generally modulated by varying
the amount of information that needs to be maintained (e.g., Fedorenko, Duncan,
and Kanwisher 2013; Assem et al. 2020; Duncan and Owen 2000). On the other
hand, a prominent way to define the cognitive control network is by characterizing
the neural correlates of ‘cognitive control’ in certain tasks. Prominent tasks used in
this regard include: task switching tasks, conflict tasks, inhibition tasks and working
8See section 1.3 for a precise definition of tractability.
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memory tasks (see G. Gratton et al. 2018; C. Gratton, Sun, and Steven E. Petersen
2018 for reviews). In working memory tasks (e.g., N-back task), cognitive load is
manipulated by increasing the length of the sequence that needs to be maintained
in working memory. In conflict paradigms, such as the Flanker task and the Stroop
task, the level of cognitive load is manipulated by adjusting the level of conflict be-
tween task-relevant and task-irrelevant properties. Relatedly, in response inhibition
paradigms, such as the go/no go task, a prepotent tendency has to be withhold.
Finally, in the task switching task, the level of cognitive control needed is manipu-
lated according to the frequency at which the objective task changes. Overall, this
definition of cognitive control requirements matches the definition of difficulty used
to characterize the MDS (Fedorenko, Duncan, and Kanwisher 2013; Camilleri et al.
2018), thus making both terms practically indistinguishable. Here I refer to these
networks as the MDS, following Duncan 2010.
Among the set of flexible processes that support problem-solving in the MDS,
two distinctive levels of processes are differentiated: processors and controllers
(Jonathan D Power and Steven E Petersen 2013; Shenhav, M. M. Botvinick, and
J. D. Cohen 2013; G. Gratton et al. 2018; C. Gratton, Sun, and Steven E. Petersen
2018; Posner and Steven E Petersen 1990; Miller and J. D. Cohen 2001). Proces-
sors, on the one hand, are units of computation that are specialized and do specific
moment-to-moment operations. Controllers, on the other hand, orchestrate proces-
sors at a higher level such that they perform successfully the task at hand. Note
that the distinction between control and processing operations is per se a nuanced
one. Concretely, under these definitions, the MDS can be viewed as a network that
supports generic problem-solving, which might encompass controllers and processors
alike. Some of the MDS regions might be associated with implementing allocation
of control (proactive control), while others might support basic processes. These
basic operations might inform the proactive allocation of control (e.g., monitoring
of counterfactual performance; Koechlin 2016) or might even be connected to other
generic processes in problem-solving (e.g., memory retrieval).
Interestingly, the two theoretical processes supporting problem-solving mirror
a network partition found in the MDS: the frontoparietal network (FPN) and the
cingulo-opercular network (CON) (Crittenden, D. J. Mitchell, and Duncan 2016;
Sadaghiani and D’Esposito 2015; Jonathan D Power and Steven E Petersen 2013;
Marek and Dosenbach 2019; Dosenbach, Fair, Miezin, et al. 2007; Dosenbach, Fair,
A. L. Cohen, et al. 2008; Nomura et al. 2010; Jonathan D. Power et al. 2011; Seeley et
al. 2007). This separation between subnetworks in the MDS stems mainly from their
functional connectivity profile. It has been identified that there is higher functional
connectivity within than between subnetworks. Importantly, this differentiation has
been found during resting state (Dosenbach, Fair, Miezin, et al. 2007; Dosenbach,
Fair, A. L. Cohen, et al. 2008; Seeley et al. 2007; Jonathan D. Power et al. 2011)
as well as in task-related connectivity during problem-solving (Crittenden, D. J.
Mitchell, and Duncan 2016).
Additionally, there is evidence to suggest that the two networks have different
characteristic temporal response profiles during problem-solving and that they are
associated with dissociable processes. FPN, on one hand, has been associated mainly
with trial-by-trial transient responses that are believed to encode error related ac-
tivity as well as control instantiation (Marek and Dosenbach 2019; Dosenbach, Fair,
Miezin, et al. 2007; Dosenbach, Visscher, et al. 2006; Dosenbach, Fair, A. L. Cohen,
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et al. 2008; Jonathan D Power and Steven E Petersen 2013). On the other hand,
it has been suggested that CON is predominantly involved in the sustained task-set
maintenance across successive trials in a task, as well as transient signals related to
task-set selection and instantiation (Marek and Dosenbach 2019; Dosenbach, Fair,
Miezin, et al. 2007; Dosenbach, Visscher, et al. 2006; Dosenbach, Fair, A. L. Cohen,
et al. 2008; Sestieri et al. 2014; Jonathan D Power and Steven E Petersen 2013).
CON has also been shown to encode a set of trial-specific signals related to the level
of conflict (M. Botvinick et al. 1999), errors (Neta, Nelson, and Steven E Petersen
2017; Neta, Schlaggar, and Steven E Petersen 2014; Dosenbach, Visscher, et al.
2006), ambiguity (Bossaerts 2018; Neta, Nelson, and Steven E Petersen 2017; Neta,
Schlaggar, and Steven E Petersen 2014), tonic alertness (Sadaghiani and D’Esposito
2015; Coste and Kleinschmidt 2016) among others.
Overall, the main distinction between sub-networks is grounded in FPN not
encoding sustained task-set maintenance signals (Jonathan D Power and Steven
E Petersen 2013; Marek and Dosenbach 2019). Critically, evidence suggests that
CON encodes both sustained signals as well as the transient signals found in FPN
(Jonathan D Power and Steven E Petersen 2013; Dosenbach, Visscher, et al. 2006).
This characteristic property of CON has led it to be denominated the ‘core’ network
of control (Dosenbach, Visscher, et al. 2006).
This core network would then be involved in the endogenous process of recruiting
task-specific processors conditional on the task at hand. A prominent view in the
investigation of this endogenous process asserts that the dACC (which is part of
CON) plays a leading role in the orchestration of this process (Shenhav, M. M.
Botvinick, and J. D. Cohen 2013; Dosenbach, Visscher, et al. 2006; Silvetti et al.
2018; Vassena, Holroyd, and Alexander 2017; Holroyd and Yeung 2012; Alexander
and Brown 2011). Evidence in this regard has shown an increase in functional
connectivity between dACC and task-relevant areas during problem-solving. This
pattern has been shown specifically in perceptual (Sestieri et al. 2014; Aben et al.
2020; Crottaz-Herbette and Menon 2006) and memory tasks (Sestieri et al. 2014).
While CON seems to be predominantly involved in generic control processes,
FPN involvement in problem-solving might be associated with a more nuanced inter-
play between generic controllers and processors. In particular, it has been suggested
that the involvement of FPN in control signals is due to its overlap with regions
associated with task-specific ‘processing’ units. For instance, IPS, which is part of
FPN, has been strongly associated with processing of numerical magnitudes (Mate-
jko and Ansari 2018; Brannon 2006; Arsalidou and M. J. Taylor 2011) and FPN,
more comprehensively, has been linked to processing in mathematical calculations
(Matejko and Ansari 2018; Grabner et al. 2009; De Smedt, Holloway, and Ansari
2011; Arsalidou and M. J. Taylor 2011).
Despite the extensive research on problem-solving and its neural underpinnings,
it remains an open question as to what are the neural processes that support com-
plex problem-solving. This is particularly troublesome because there is no obvious
way to define cognitive demand in complex problems. To date, the only studies
that have explored this set of problems have employed the map task (Basso and
Saracini 2020; Basso, Lotze, et al. 2006; Basso, Bisiacchi, et al. 2001). This task
presents a specific version of the TSP on a grid, which has been suggested to be in-
tractable (i.e., NP-hard)9. However, previous studies using this task have two main
9This task, denominated the maps task, corresponds to a restricted version of the TSP in which
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limitations. Firstly, previous work has lacked spatial resolution since these studies
have explored the neural underpinnings via a lesion study and transcranial magnetic
stimulation. Secondly, and more importantly, the approach used to study this tasks
utilizes features of the task that are highly problem-specific (Basso, Bisiacchi, et al.
2001) or that are even based on the assumption that a specific set of predetermined
strategies are being used (Basso and Saracini 2020; Basso, Lotze, et al. 2006). This
approach, as mentioned in the previous section, is difficult to generalize given the
diversity of problems and strategies to consider. Moreover, the specification of task-
specific strategies makes generalization across tasks difficult. Even extending these
results to different presentations of the TSP (e.g., non-grid TSP) is not straightfor-
ward. What would be particularly desirable is a generic framework to characterize
hardness, and thus cognitive demand, in complex problems. The framework put
forward in this thesis allows for such characterization. For instance, it allows for
the study of the TSP without the need to limit the task to a grid and without the
need of assumptions about the strategies employed by agents (see chapter 4 for an
application of this framework to the TSP).
Besides the complications that arise when quantifying cognitive demand of com-
plex problems, the exploration of these problems entail another inherent complica-
tion. Complex problems usually require more time to solve, and thus, the neural
processes that support problem-solving can no longer be modeled as a static system.
The successful characterization of the neural underpinnings of complex problem-
solving needs to take into account that this process ensues from a dynamic interplay
of neural activity that generates strategies, modulates cognitive effort, all whilst
keeping track of relevant markers of performance such as expected error (Neta, Nel-
son, and Steven E Petersen 2017; Bossaerts 2018), expected rewards (Duverne and
Koechlin 2017), the level of uncertainty (Neta, Nelson, and Steven E Petersen 2017;
Neta, Schlaggar, and Steven E Petersen 2014; Bossaerts 2018), among many other
possible markers (Yoo, Hayden, and Pearson 2021; Koechlin 2016). To date, the
neural invariants of this dynamic interplay during complex problem-solving have
not been investigated.
Although there is robust evidence to suggest that there is generic (task-independent)
involvement of FPN and CON in problem-solving (Fedorenko, Duncan, and Kan-
wisher 2013; Assem et al. 2020; Duncan and Owen 2000; Duncan 2010; Crittenden,
D. J. Mitchell, and Duncan 2016; G. Gratton et al. 2018), the precise response profile
might be contingent on the task at hand. For instance, Dubis et al. 2016 presented
results that suggest that the sustained activation of CON is not present in per-
ceptual tasks unless the task requires further cognitive processing beyond stimulus
perception. This suggests that some of the signals associated not only with FPN,
but also with CON, are task-specific. Notably, it remains an open question whether
CON is involved in proactive control during complex problem-solving.
In summary, extensive research has studied the neural processes that support
problem-solving. This program has characterized a network of regions that respond
robustly to cognitive demand regardless of the task at hand: the MDS (Duncan
2010; Fedorenko, Duncan, and Kanwisher 2013). This has been done using a num-
ber of tasks including perceptual target detection and memory retrieval, among
the locations to visit are located on a grid. Technically, the problem is a TSP on solid grid graph
with Manhattan distance. This problem has been conjectured to be NP-hard, but there is currently
no proof of it(Demaine, J. Mitchell, and O’Rouke 2004).
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many others. Notably, most of the tasks employed to date are based on tractable
problems. Moreover, many of the tasks employed modulate cognitive demand of
the task by tuning the amount of processing needed in one specific dimension of
cognitive processing, for instance, by manipulating working memory demands or
signal strength in perceptual tasks (G. Gratton et al. 2018; Fedorenko, Duncan, and
Kanwisher 2013; Crittenden and Duncan 2014).
The lack of a generic (task-independent) definition of cognitive demand prevents
the generalization of this approach to new problems. Importantly, this approach, as
it stands, is restricted to the ordinal study of cognitive demand modulation within
a task. Moreover, the level of cognitive demand might be highly related to the
strategies used. For instance, multiplication operations can be performed using
different strategies such as the standard multiplication algorithm or alternatives
such as the Japanese visual method and the Vedic method (Garain and Kumar
2018). These different strategies would predict different levels of cognitive demand in
multiplication problems depending on the algorithm used. Critically, when leaping
into tasks that are more complex and especially those that involve problems that are
intractable, the limitations of this approach become more apparent. The increase in
complexity brings along an increase in strategies available to solve complex problems
and this renders the determination of a single metric of cognitive demand even more
troublesome.
A proper quantitative (cardinal) study of the neural underpinnings of cognitive
demand requires a proper generic definition of cognitive demand that can be quan-
tified across problems and, ideally, across strategies. Such characterization would
be grounded in the assumption that hardness is, at least partially, an intrinsic char-
acteristic of the problem at hand. In this thesis, I take this approach and present
a framework able to quantify intrinsic computational hardness of tasks in a generic
way. I conjecture that with this framework it is possible to characterize neural in-
variants of complex problem-solving, that is, capture cognitive demand and neural
markers related to the structure of the task.
The generic framework put forward is particularly valuable in the study of allo-
cation of control during problem-solving given the generality of this process. The
human brain has limited cognitive resources, yet is able to reuse and reallocate re-
sources in order to successfully solve a plethora of problems. A true understanding
of the human brain and its neural processes would require a generic model capable
of generalizing across the specifics of a task. In this line, several proposals have been
put forward in which the allocation of limited cognitive resources is modeled as a
mechanism in which a generic construct of cognitive demand is estimated and effort
(or control) is consequently allocated based on this characterization (e.g., Shen-
hav, M. M. Botvinick, and J. D. Cohen 2013; Verguts, Vassena, and Silvetti 2015;
Westbrook and Braver 2015). Such a construct would presumably need to be char-
acterized from generic features of the task such that the agent is able to estimate
cognitive demand across tasks. In this thesis, I define a potential component of this
construct: computational demand.
Overall, current approaches in neuroscience and cognitive sciences have consid-
ered the computational hardness of tasks in ways that are task- or strategy-specific.
To date, there is is no theoretical framework to study computational hardness in
cognition in a generic way. Computational complexity theory might provide such a
framework. This field encompasses several approaches that have been extensively
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used to study the hardness of problems in computer science. Importantly, it allows
for the study of hardness across different problems without the need to assume a
particular procedural strategy used to solve a problem. In the next section I provide
a select overview of this theory.
1.3 Theory: Quantifying intrinsic computational
hardness
Computational complexity theory (CCT) studies the computational resource re-
quirements of problems and the algorithms available to solve them. In other words,
it studies how efficiently problems can be solved by computers. This mathematical
framework provides a principled way of studying computational hardness of cognitive
tasks by characterizing tasks as problems and agents as computers. Characteriza-
tion of cognitive tasks as computational problems allow us to build on computing
theory to operationalize computational hardness. Critically, this theory provides a
mathematical framework to examine cognition in a principled way. Under this char-
acterization, cognitive tasks are abstracted into a mathematical form that capture
the current state, the structure of the task at hand and the objective state. More-
over, the cognitive process through which the task is performed can also be explicitly
defined using this framework with the notion of computation. Overall, this theory
introduces specific terminology, definitions and results that avoid impreciseness and
can elucidate research on cognitive processes and the resulting behavior. In this
chapter, I define the terminology utilized throughout this manuscript and explicitly
state the underlying hypotheses behind the application of this framework to human
cognition. Afterwards, I give a brief overview of the CCT framework from the most
prominent approach to that which I will then employ to quantify computational
hardness.
1.3.1 Computing theory for the study human cognition?
The question that inevitably arises is whether the theory of computation can be
used as a framework to study human cognition. This would require assumptions on
how computation relates to cognition. Indeed, in this manuscript I take a compu-
tationalist approach (Rescorla 2020) to studying cognition and decision-making. I
start from the premise that humans are in fact computers.
When people think of computers, many might think of a laptop or even a smart-
phone. However, I am not suggesting that humans are electronic computers, but
rather that cognition can be studied through theoretical notions of computation.
More specifically, I adhere to a tradition of cognitive scientists that considers that it
is possible to analyze cognitive processes and behavior by characterizing the human
agent as a computer with limited computational capacities (van Rooij, Blokpoel,
et al. 2019; Bossaerts and Murawski 2017; John K Tsotsos 1988; Frixione 2001;
Blum and Vempala 2020; Aaronson 2013). Here, instead of addressing this philo-
sophical question at a conceptual level, I take an empirical perspective and test
experimentally the value of this approach in capturing invariants of cognition and
decision-making. However, in order to explain what are the precise assumptions at




The theoretical framework, and corresponding definitions, implied can be illustrated
by considering a calculator. In this computer, an input such as “4×6” will generate
an output “24”. The input in this example corresponds to the three symbols in
their order (“4”,“×” and “6”), which effectively encodes the structural definition
of the problem (multiplication) and the particular instance of the problem to be
solved (operands “4” and “6”). After receiving the input, the calculator implements
a set of basic steps that are predetermined by a list of instructions. This list of
instructions is called an algorithm.
The formal definition of a problem is then that of a mapping f : I 7→ O, and
an instance is a particular input to that mapping: i ∈ I. The effective procedure
through which i is transformed to f(i) is described by the notion of computation.
The operationalization of this notion encapsulates the set of permissible step-by-
step operations that represent an algorithm. A ubiquitous mathematical model
of computation is captured by the Turing machine. This mathematical model of
computation has been proposed to be an all-inclusive representation of computation.
The latter claim is known as the Church-Turing thesis: the conjecture that any
input-output mapping that can be computed can be also computed by a Turing
machine (Church 1936; Turing 1937). If the conjecture were to be true, it would
hold for any type of computer, including quantum computers, analog computers,
reservoir computers, and most importantly the brain. Although it is a conjecture,
the Church-Turing thesis is widely accepted as true (Pudlák 2013; Arora and Barak
2009; van Rooij, Blokpoel, et al. 2019).
Note, however, that the implicit hypothesis put forward in this manuscript is
not this conjecture, but a related one. The Church-Turing conjecture speaks to the
feasibility of computing (i.e., computability) a particular mapping (i.e., problem).
It considers the ability of any computing system on doing an input-output operation
assuming unlimited resources (e.g., unlimited memory, unlimited time). As such, it
is silent with regards to the implementation of the algorithm, despite the fact that
the Turing machines are closely related to one specific algorithm-implementation
mechanism: the von Neumann architecture. Being silent about the particular im-
plementation mechanism makes it, arguably, silent about the resource requirements
of implementing that algorithm. Since the object of analysis in this thesis is the
effect of resource requirements of tasks on human computation, the hypothesis put
forward here differs from the Church-Turing conjecture. Specifically, I hypothesize
that the cognitive procedures by which humans perform these mappings are affected
by the structure of the problem (f) and the instance (i), just like the procedures
implemented by Turing machines and related computing devices are affected by the
structure of the problem at hand10. In a way this presumes the existence of com-
putational hardness that is driven by intrinsic properties of the problem and their
instances, and which affect computing procedures across computational models.
Since computational hardness of problems (and instances) are ultimately as-
10It is worth highlighting that this hypothesis differs from the so-called invariance thesis (Frix-
ione 2001), which conjectures that any two reasonable (i.e., realistic) computational implementa-
tion mechanisms vary in time-requirements in at-most polynomial-time. The invariance thesis is
an asymptotic notion which makes predictions about the problem complexity (see section 1.3.2)
associated with different computing machines, but does not make granular predictions about the
relative computational requirements of instances of a problem.
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sessed based on the computational resource requirements of computing procedures,
it then becomes critical to understand the alternative procedures to which cogni-
tive procedures will be compared. These alternative procedures are encapsulated
in the notion of algorithms. I turn now to describing different characterizations of
algorithms. This will allow me to avoid vagueness when describing characteristics
of cognitive procedures by referring to their algorithmic counterpart, which have
explicit mathematical definitions.
There are many types of algorithms. To illustrate this, consider again the pre-
vious example. If the calculator always generates the correct solution (“24”) then
the algorithm is called an exact algorithm. If the algorithm does not guarantee the
solution, but does guarantee to not deviate ‘too much’ from the solution, then it
is called an approximation algorithm. Note that the approximation guarantee can
be defined in many ways, but the overarching definition still holds. For instance,
an approximation dimension can be defined based on a maximum distance (ε) be-
tween the output (f(i) = o) and the correct solution (24); that is, |24 − o| < ε.
Another reasonable addendum to approximation algorithms are those that have an
approximation guarantee that is stochastic. Specifically, these types of approxima-
tion algorithms would guarantee a minimum likelihood that the algorithm reaches
the correct solution (e.g., P (o 6= 24) < ε). A related notion, which is worth high-
lighting due to its prevalence in models of cognition are those algorithms that do
not have an approximation guarantee. These are commonly referred to as heuristics.
Is is important to note that the term heuristics in cognition usually connotes that
the output will not deviate ‘too much’ from the solution, but without any formal
definition of the approximation guarantee11.
It is worth highlighting that both the algorithm type and the problem speci-
fication are intertwined. Specifically, we can incorporate the distinction between
exact and approximation algorithms directly into the algorithm or into the prob-
lem. For instance, in the calculator example a new problem specification, call it
ε-multiplication, can be generated based on standard multiplication such that the
solution of ε-multiplication is defined as any number o that is at most ε-away from
the standard multiplication solution. In this case every approximation algorithm
for the standard multiplication problem could be described as an exact algorithm
for the ε-multiplication problem. This entails that the approximation characteristic
can be ascribed to the problem or the algorithm in an analogous fashion. Here I will
focus my attention on exact algorithms, but this equivalence will allow me to make
generalizations at a later stage (see section 6.1.2).
1.3.2 Computational-complexity theory
CCT studies the amount of computational resources needed to solve a problem or
an instance of the problem. The amount of computational resource requirements
characterizes the computational complexity (computational hardness)12. This can be
done with or without reference to a particular algorithm. On one hand, CCT stud-
ies the intrinsic computational requirements implied by a problem independently of
the algorithm used. On the other hand, this theory explores the computational re-
11See van Rooij, Wright, et al. 2018 and van Rooij, Blokpoel, et al. 2019, (chapters. 8 and 9)
for a discussion on this.
12I will refer to these two terms interchangeably.
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sources needed by a particular algorithm to solve a specific problem. These different
approaches to study computational hardness represent different levels of analysis.
Computational hardness can, thus, be studied at the level of the agent (com-
puter) or at the level of the structural properties of the task (problem or instance).
I take the latter approach. This is not to say that the the study of the computa-
tional requirements of an algorithm is not relevant in the investigation of human
cognition, but rather represents a specific decision made on the object of analysis 13.
Explicitly, I aim at characterizing invariants of human computation (Simon 1990)
that relate directly to the intrinsic computational hardness of a task. Critically, the
existence of such invariants is an empirically testable hypothesis that, if true, would
imply the existence of intrinsic hardness of tasks that have effects across different
models of computation (Aaronson 2005; Yadav et al. 2020; Blakey 2011).
In this section, I present a set of alternative approaches to those introduced
in previous sections. These capture intrinsic hardness of tasks in a generic (task-
independent) fashion. Among the approaches in CCT that study the intrinsic com-
putational hardness of tasks in a generic way, the most prominent one investigates
the computational requirements of problems. In the following sections I start with
a description of this canonical approach and then move to alternative approaches
that have studied the computational hardness of instances of problems, which are
the foundations of the framework that is employed here.
Problem complexity
The main branch of CCT has studied the computational hardness at the level of
problems (e.g., multiplication). Here, computational requirements are analyzed from
an asymptotic perspective, that is, how fast resource requirements increase as the
size of the input of the problem increases. This means that resource requirements
are characterized in terms of their growth as a function of the input size of the
problem (e.g., the number of digits of the operands in the multiplication problem).
Problems with similar resource requirements, thus defined, are then grouped into
complexity classes (Arora and Barak 2009).
The most widely used approach from this asymptotic perspective, categorizes
problems according to the computational time required to solve the most difficult
problem given an input size (Pudlák 2013; Moore and Mertens 2011; Arora and
Barak 2009). Other approaches include average-case complexity analysis (Bogdanov
and Trevisan 2006) and space complexity analysis, which studies memory require-
ments instead of time (Arora and Barak 2009). Note that time and space here
are defined based on the notion of computation characterized by the Turing ma-
chine. Time is then defined as the number of operations performed by the Turing
machine, while memory is defined as the amount of memory space (i.e., length of
tape) required by the Turing machine to solve the problem. Overall, these spe-
cific characterizations of computational requirements imply an assumption about
the computational model, which is generally the Turing machine.
In one of these approaches lies the theoretical framework from which the more
common complexity classes arise (Fig 1.3). Explicitly, the asymptotic worst-case
time-complexity is the framework employed to define complexity classes such as P




as the set of problems that can be solved by a Turing machine in polynomial time.
In other words, given an input of size n, the number of computational steps needed
by a Turing machine to guarantee reaching the solution scales at a lower rate than a
polynomial function of n. Similarly, class NP is defined as those problems for which
an algorithm exists that could be solved in polynomial time by a non-deterministic
Turing machine. Non-deterministic Turing machines are defined as Turing machines
that can be in multiple states at the same time. Put simply, when this machine is
searching for a solution it can simultaneously explore multiple search paths and
return a solution whenever any of the paths finds the solution14. In contrast, a
standard (deterministic) Turing-machine can only search one path at a time. Given
these definitions, it follows that P ⊆ NP ; moreover, it is conjectured that P 6= NP ,









Figure 1.3: Computational problem-complexity classes. The classes depict
the asymptotic worst-case time-complexity classes. Tractable problems are generally
considered to be in class P, while NP-hard problems are deemed to be intractable.
The dashed lines indicate the open question of P vs. NP. If P = NP , then all NP
and NP-complete problems would collapse into P.
The notion of tractability is usually based on these complexity classes. Specifi-
cally, tractable problems are commonly defined as those problems belonging to the
class P. In contrast, the class of problems that are considered to be intractable are
those belonging to the class NP-hard. This class includes all those problems that are
at least as difficult as all problems in NP. Cook 1971 and Levin 1973 were the first
to define this class; explicitly, they proved that the Boolean satisfiability problem
(SAT) is NP-hard. From that result, any other NP-hard problem can be proven
to belong to this class by showing that it is harder than SAT; or more specifically,
that it can be reduced in polynomial time to SAT. Put simply, this entails that the
problem under consideration can be solved by solving a corresponding instance of
the SAT with the help of a transformation algorithm, which is in P. An additional
sub-class of NP-hard problems which will be widely alluded to in this manuscript
14These machines are entirely hypothetical.
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is the class NP-complete. This class is composed of those problems that belong to
both class NP and class NP-hard.
Many problems have been shown to belong to class NP-hard, including the 0-1
knapsack optimization problem (Kellerer, Pferschy, and Pisinger 2004) and the trav-
eling salesperson problem (Arora and Barak 2009). Importantly, these and several
other optimization problems of class NP-hard have a corresponding problem in class
NP-complete. Consider for instance the 0-1 knapsack optimization problem. This
problem consists of filling a knapsack (backpack) that has a specified weight capacity
with predefined items that have a weight and value (Fig 1.2). The goal is to choose
those items that maximize the total value in the backpack without exceeding the
weight limit. A corresponding NP-complete problem is the knapsack decision prob-
lem. In the structure of the problem is the same as before, except that the objective
is not to find the maximum value that can be packed, but to determine whether a
specific target profit can be packed without exceeding the capacity (Fig 1.2). While
the first problem is an optimization problem, the latter is a decision problem, that is,
a problem whose answer is either ‘yes’ or ‘no’. Note that the knapsack optimization
problem would be considered harder than the decision problem because solving the
optimization variant effectively solves the decision variant (with any target profit).
It has been proposed that problem-complexity classes can be used to shed light
on models of cognition. Specifically, it has been proposed that models of cognition
ought to be tractable. According to this conjecture, human cognitive capacities are
insufficient to solve intractable problems reliably (Frixione 2001; John K. Tsotsos
1990; John K Tsotsos 1988). However, this conjecture, which was later coined the
P-Cognition thesis, is considered too restrictive (van Rooij 2008).
A refinement of this framework that addresses this issue is known as the FPT-
cognition thesis (van Rooij 2008; van Rooij, Blokpoel, et al. 2019). This thesis states
that the notion of tractability in the classical sense (i.e., P class) is too limiting and
that an alternative notion should be considered, namely, fixed parameter tractability.
This approach proposes that in many real-life scenarios, the problems faced might be
small in the size of certain parameters of the problem. In turn, these parameters can
potentially be the source of hardness of the problem and thus, when constraining
the size of these parameters of the problem, the problem becomes tractable. In
other words, the intractability is constrained to this specific parameter, and thus
can potentially be computed by a human agent when this parameter is small.
Both the P-cognition and the FPT-cognition proposal allow for the theoretical
study of feasibility of computational-level models of cognition based on their com-
putational hardness. Specifically, they specify for which models there could exist
strategies (i.e., effective procedures) that always solve the problem within a rea-
sonable time. This program, however, can not be used to explain differences in
performance on different instances of the same problem. It categorizes problems
based on the computational resources needed to solve the most difficult instance of
the problem and according to the resources’ asymptotic behavior. That is, prob-
lems are categorized based on how fast the computational resources increase as the
size of the problem increases to infinity. They study computational requirements
of problems based on their asymptotic worst-case time complexity. Admittedly, the
FPT approach can be used to find features that are sources of worst-case asymptotic
complexity of a problem. However, this approach does not consider if and how the
features of particular instances of a problem affect human behavior and computation
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on a single instance.
In order to make empirically testable predictions of human behavior based on
metrics of intrinsic hardness, one must consider the computational hardness of indi-
vidual instances. Consider for example the divisibility-by-3 problem. If a problem-
complexity approach were to be used, all the instances of the problem would have
the same complexity. Determining whether 9 is divisible by 3 and whether 1733 is
divisible by 3 would have the same computational hardness. This raises the issue
of whether there are more finely grained metrics of complexity that can be used to
study human decision-making and cognition in general.
This section attempted to provide a brief summary of the literature on prob-
lem complexity. This framework encompasses the well-known approach based on
which notions of tractability (P) and intractability (NP-hard) are defined. This is
done, specifically, by categorizing problems into classes according to their asymp-
totic worst-case time complexity, employing a notion of computation encapsulated
by the Turing machine. This approach can be applied to assess models of cogni-
tion, but is not amenable to the study of human behavior directly. Critically, this
approach is limited by its lack of granularity. That is, it can categorize problems
into classes of complexity, but it is unable to characterize differences in hardness
across instances of these problems. Moreover, it characterizes hardness based on
the growth rate (e.g., polynomial) as a function of the input-size. It is silent about
the level of hardness of instances of problems with small size. Therefore, this theory
is not suitable for the aim of this manuscript: characterizing empirically testable
predictions from metrics of intrinsic hardness of individual instances. An alterna-
tive theoretical framework has studied hardness of instances of problems by using
insights from statistical physics. I introduce this theory in the following section.
Typical-case complexity
A prominent framework in computer science investigates the drivers of computa-
tional hardness in computational problems by studying the difficulty of randomly
generated instances of those problems. This line of research has revealed that there
is substantial variance in the computational resource requirements for solving in-
stances with the same input length. Importantly, this variability in hardness has
been related to various structural properties of instances (Remi Monasson et al.
1999; Cheeseman, Kanefsky, and W. M. Taylor 1991; Ian P. Gent et al. 1996). The
link between structural properties of an instance and the expected computationally
complexity is commonly referred to as typical-case complexity (TCC). In this section
I present an overview of this literature.
Definition of TCC
TCC maps a set of features of an instance of a problem to the expected computa-
tional requirements:
TCC : α 7→ Computational Requirements
In order to introduce this mapping, I need to describe both the properties of
the instances that predict computational requirements (hardness) as well as the
approaches used to estimate these requirements. First, I describe the canonical
structural properties of the task that have been considered for this mapping and,
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afterwards, I introduce how computational requirements are characterized in this
framework.
Structural properties: Constrainedness and thresholds
The framework has been employed to characterize the computational hardness of
constraint satisfaction problems. These problems involve a mathematical question in
which a set of objects, which can take one of several states, is presented together with
a set of constraints. The objective in these problems is to determine whether there
exists at least one state in which all of the constraints are satisfied. Examples of these
problems include the knapsack decision problem, the Boolean satisfiability problem
and the traveling salesperson decision problem. Note that constraint satisfaction
problems are a type of decision problem, and thus, their answer is either ‘yes’ or
‘no’.
This research has characterized a structural parameter that is closely related to
computational requirements. Specifically, it has been found that a so-called con-
strainedness parameter (α)15 predicts the expected computational requirements of
a typical instance of the problem. In other words, this parameter captures the av-
erage hardness of a random ensemble (i.e., a random sample) of instances. Note
that this involves defining a specific random instance generation process, and thus,
the parameter is determined not only by the instance properties, but also by the
instance generation process.
The constrainedness parameter (α) captures how lenient or restricted the con-
straints are for a fixed input size n. The parameter determines the satisfiability
probability (that is, the probability that the solution of the instance is yes), as well
as the expected number of solution witnesses, that is, the expected number of vari-
able configurations (e.g., combinations, paths) that satisfy the constraints (Ian P.
Gent et al. 1996; Zweig, Palla, and Vicsek 2010; Rémi Monasson and Zecchina 1996;
Ian P Gent and Walsh 1996; Cheeseman, Kanefsky, and W. M. Taylor 1991). Con-
sider for example the knapsack decision problem. The constrainedness parameter
can be characterized based on how restricting the target profit constraint is. If the
target profit (αp) is high, the instance is overconstrained and the chances of there
being a combination of items that satisfy the constraints will be low. If, on the
contrary, the target profit is low, the instance is underconstrained and the chances
of finding a witness will be high. Indeed, in an underconstrained instance there
might be many solution witnesses, that is, many combinations of items that satisfy
the constraints (Fig 1.4).
Recent studies have found a plethora of asymptotic thresholds on the α parameter
that are related to the hardness of an instance. Importantly, a phase transition has
been identified in the satisfiability probability of many problems (Remi Monasson
et al. 1999; Ian P Gent and Walsh 1996; Achlioptas, Naor, and Peres 2005; Yadav
et al. 2020). In other words, this probability exhibits a discontinuity at a threshold
(αsat) at which the probability jumps from 0 to 1. The constrainedness value at
which this phase transition occurs has been related to an increase (on average) in
the computational requirements of solving an instance (Cheeseman, Kanefsky, and
W. M. Taylor 1991; Ian P Gent and Walsh 1996; Selman and Kirkpatrick 1996;
15This parameter is usually referred to as the order parameter. I diverge from this terminology
in order to highlight the specific dimension of hardness that I am referring to, that is, the level of







































Figure 1.4: Constrainedness, phase transitions and computational require-
ments in the thermodynamic limit. Illustration of the transitions in the struc-
tural properties of an instance as the level of constrainedness (α) increases. (a)
The satisfiability probability shows a jump from 1 to 0 in a narrow range of the α
parameter. Around this narrow range of values of α the expected computational
requirements of solving the instance is highest. However, there are several other
values of α that have been related to increased computational requirements. These
thresholds represent changes in the structural properties of the solution space. (b)
At low values of constrainedness, witnesses are in a single cluster. This cluster starts
gradually splitting until the dynamic threshold (αd) is reached. Here, the solution
space breaks into an exponential number of clusters. The number of clusters then
collapses to a few clusters at the condensation threshold (αc). Then, after the rigid-
ity threshold αr most of the witnesses belong to clusters with frozen variables. The
clusters containing frozen variables are peach-colored and those that do not contain
frozen variables are green. Finally, at the satisfiability threshold αsat witnesses cease
to exist, and thus, instances are unsatisfiable. It is worth noting that the order of
these thresholds might differ across problems. Markedly, αr might occur before or
after αc.
Yadav et al. 2020) (Fig 1.4a).
Note that the satisfiability threshold (αsat) is defined in the limit as the location
of the phase transition as n → ∞. However, the exact definition of this phase
transition is not agreed upon. There is evidence to suggest that the steep jump in
the probability curve does in fact represent a phase transition in the structure of the
instance (Rémi Monasson and Zecchina 1996). Indeed, different problems have been
shown to have different levels of curve steepness, and the rate at which the steepness
increases as n→∞ has been found to have an effect on the complexity class of the
problem (Remi Monasson et al. 1999). However, there is also evidence to suggest
that the so-called phase transition in the satisfiability probability represents instead
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a sharp threshold related to the law of large numbers (Zweig, Palla, and Vicsek
2010). Irregardless of the terminology and underlying structural changes, the fact
remains that instances around this threshold are on average harder to solve.
Besides the satisfiability threshold, several other thresholds have been associated
with increased computational requirements. These, in general, represent locations
of α at which a measure µ of a particular property of the instance undergoes a phase
transition in the thermodynamic limit (n→∞ with α held fixed). The satisfiability
probability is one such measure; however, many others have been studied. Many
of them capture asymptotic properties of the solution space of random ensembles.
That is, they capture topological properties of the set of solution witnesses of an
instance (Fig 1.4b). This set is generally given a topological structure by defining
nodes as witnesses and edges that connect the witnesses that differ in only one
variable assignment. For instance, in the knapsack problem a witness is a packing
combination of items that satisfy the constraints. In this example, two solution
witnesses are connected by an edge if a single operation of including or excluding an
item from the knapsack transforms one witness into the other. From this definitions
several thresholds have been identified in many problems. For example, a dynamic
(clustering) threshold αd has been characterized where the solution space splits
into multiple clusters (Krzakala, Montanari, et al. 2006; Krzakala and Zdeborová
2007). Another relevant threshold identified is the condensation threshold αc, which
marks a shift in the number of number of clusters in the solutions space (Krzakala,
Montanari, et al. 2006; Krzakala and Zdeborová 2007; Zdeborová and Mézard 2008).
Other thresholds include the freezing (αf ) and the rigidity (αr) threshold (Krzakala
and Zdeborová 2007; Semerjian 2008; Zdeborová and Krzakala 2007; Ardelius and
Zdeborová 2008).
Hardness: Computational requirements
So far, I have focused on how the constrainedness parameter (α) is defined and the
corresponding thresholds that determine computational hardness. I now turn my
attention to how computational requirements have been studied. In other words, I
present what TCC maps into. In this framework, the requirements are studied by
considering the average computational requirements of solving a random ensemble
of instances. This involves defining a specific random instance generation process,
and thus, does not characterize computational hardness of a specific instance, but
instead the expected hardness of a random ensemble.
Computational requirements have been predominately studied by looking at the
average time-complexity of instances (Cheeseman, Kanefsky, and W. M. Taylor 1991;
D. Mitchell, Selman, and Levesque 1992; Ian P Gent and Walsh 1996; Nudelman
et al. 2004; Selman and Kirkpatrick 1996; Ian P. Gent et al. 1996). Two general
approaches have been used in this regard. One considers exact algorithms and the
other considers heuristics. Firstly, the time-complexity has been experimentally
studied by implementing exact algorithms and estimating the solve time or number
of computational steps of different algorithms. This has been applied to the Boolean
satisfiability problem (D. Mitchell, Selman, and Levesque 1992; Selman and Kirk-
patrick 1996), the TSP (Ian P Gent and Walsh 1996), the knapsack problem (Yadav
et al. 2020) among many others (Cheeseman, Kanefsky, and W. M. Taylor 1991;
Zdeborová and Mézard 2008). Secondly, the computational requirements have been
calculated by analyzing how well particular heuristics perform on instances with
22
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
varying levels of constrainedness (Zdeborová and Mézard 2008; Krzakala and Zde-
borová 2007).
Overall, the objective has been to characterize levels of constrainedness (α) at
which the hardest instances might be found independent of the solver. This ap-
proach allows for the estimation of the average hardness of an algorithm (or a set of
them) for instances with the same level of constrainedness (α). Critically, however,
the values of α at with heuristics typically break, and at which exact algorithms re-
quire more computational resources, has been shown to be consistent across solvers.
Therefore, it has been suggested that computational hardness as characterized here
is an intrinsic property of an instance.
* * *
In summary, the line of research just presented has identified a set of structural
properties of the problem that predict computational hardness across problems and
algorithms. The mathematical properties are characterized by the constrainedness
parameter (α) and the related threshold values at which the structure of the problem
changes. Both constrainedness and thresholds have been shown to be linked to the
computational requirements (or reliability) of a plethora of algorithms implemented
by electronic computers. It remains an open question whether this framework can
be applied to the study of human computation. In the next chapter, I present a
proposal for how to operationalize this mathematical framework so that it can be





Typical-case complexity (TCC) maps a set of mathematical properties of an instance
of a problem (α) to the expected computational hardness of solving a randomly
sampled instance. This mapping, however, is theoretically defined in the limit as the
size of the instance tends to infinity (n→∞). This is problematic for the application
of this theory to human cognition because the size of the instances humans solve
might be small enough so that the asymptotic properties do not apply.
In this chapter, I present an explicit definition of TCC based on how computa-
tional hardness has been studied in the literature, but that is capable of character-
izing hardness for finite values of n. Afterwards, I define instance complexity (IC), a
related metric that captures the computational hardness of a single instance without
reference to a random ensemble (that is, a collection of randomly sampled instances).
I show that both metrics indeed converge to the canonical asymptotic definition of
computational hardness from the literature on random ensembles. Finally, I propose
a pipeline to apply this framework to new computational problems.
2.1 TCC Definition
TCC has been defined for constraint satisfaction problems. These problems are
ubiquitous in real life, including problems such as the knapsack decision problem
(Fig 1.2) as well as variants of the traveling salesperson problem and the tower of
London problem. Overall, these problems are defined as those in which the aim is
to determine whether there exists a state for which a set of objects satisfy a number
of constraints. Formally,
Definition 2.1. Constraint satisfaction problem. A constraint satisfaction problem
consists of a triplet {X,D,C} where X = {X1, . . . Xn} is a set of variables and
D = {D1, . . . , Dn} is a set of domains of values that the respective variables can
take.
C = {C1, . . . , Cm} is a set of constraints. Each constraint Ci is a pair (X̄i, Ri)
where X̄i ⊆ X is a subset of k variables in X and Ri is a k-ary relation on the
corresponding subset of domains D̄i.
The objective is to find whether there exists a value assignment g : X 7→ D that




To illustrate, in the 0-1 knapsack decision problem the variables correspond to
the items and the constraints correspond to the capacity and the target profit. The
domain of each variable is Di = {0, 1} since each item can only be either in (1) or
out (0) of the knapsack. The question in this problem is then to assess whether
there exists an assignment of items X to be in or out of the backpack such that all
constraints (C) are satisfied.
Constraint satisfaction problems are a type of decision problem and, as such,
their answer is either ‘yes’ or ‘no’. Instances whose answer is ‘yes’ are called satisfi-
able instances, otherwise they are called unsatisfiable. Note that to verify that the
instance is satisfiable, it suffices to find a single value assignment (g) that satisfies
the constraints (C). These assignments are denoted witnesses of the solution since
they verify the solution. Importantly, there might be many such assignments:
Definition 2.2. Number of witnesses. The number of witnesses η of a particular
instance I of a constraint satisfaction problem is defined as the number of assign-
ments g that satisfy the constraints C.
This mathematical property of an instance is the basis from which to define
constrainedness (α). This parameter is set to capture how lenient or restrictive the
constraints are for a fixed input size n. Importantly, this is done in expectation.
That is, constrainedness characterizes the leniency of the constraints for a random
ensemble of instances. This random ensemble is generated by a random process
ψ that generates a specification of an instance I(ψ) of a problem under certain
overarching structural boundaries Π, such that I ∈ Π. Π characterizes the problem.
In the case of the knapsack problem, the structural boundaries Π of the problem
stem from the definition of the problem, which includes the definition of the domains
of the variables Xi ∈ {0, 1} as well as the constraint definitions with regards to the
target profit and the knapsack capacity. On the other hand, an instance can be
defined as the particular weights and values of the items together with the specific
target capacity and profit values.
Constrainedness is defined based on the underlying stochastic properties of a
random ensemble. Explicitly, it has been defined as a function of the properties of
the instance that determine the satisfiability probability (Cheeseman, Kanefsky, and
W. M. Taylor 1991) and the expected number of solution witnesses (Ian P. Gent et
al. 1996). Here, I define constrainedness based on the expected number of solutions,
which is defined as the stochastic counterpart of the number of solution witnesses
for a random ensemble.
Definition 2.3. Constrainedness (α). Let I(ψ) ∈ Π be a random instance of a
problem Π and a random sampling process ψ. Let ηψ : Π → N be a function that
maps an instance I of a problem to the expected number of witnesses ηψ(I), given
a random sampling process ψ. The constrainedness parameter(s) α corresponds to
a mapping (α : Π → Rk) from instances of a problem to k parameters (α(I) ∈ Rk)
such that there exists a mapping η̄ψ : Rk 7→ N that satisfies
η̄ψ(α(I)) = ηψ(I) ∀I(ψ) ∈ Π
In other words, α is a mapping that generates a set of parameters that encode all
the relevant information of the instance needed to determine the expected number
of solutions. Note that α is a mapping from instances, which might depend on
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the random generation process. However, to simplify notation, I will refer to this
parameter as α(I) or even α.
Based on the definition of constrainedness, I now turn to defining the TCC
mapping:
Definition 2.4. TCC. Let I(ψ) ∈ Π be a random instance of a problem Π and
a random sampling process ψ. Let α(I) ∈ Rk be the constrainedness parameter(s).
TCC is defined as a mapping TCC : Rk → R from the constrainedness of an instance
α(I) to its expected hardness:
TCCψ(α(I)) = d(α(I), α
thr(ψ))
where d(·) is a distance function and αthr is a threshold value(s) of α.
Recent studies have found a number of asymptotic thresholds that are related to
the hardness of an instance (Krzakala and Zdeborová 2007; Ardelius and Zdeborová
2008; Remi Monasson et al. 1999). Prominently, a satisfiability threshold (αsat) has
been related to an increase in the computational requirements of solving an instance
(Cheeseman, Kanefsky, and W. M. Taylor 1991; D. Mitchell, Selman, and Levesque
1992; Ian P Gent and Walsh 1996; Nudelman et al. 2004; Selman and Kirkpatrick
1996; Ian P. Gent et al. 1996). This threshold, however, is defined asymptotically
as n→∞ and it is not clear how this definition can be extended to finite values of
the input size. Here, I present one such generalization.
Definition 2.5. Satisfiability threshold. αsat is defined as the value(s) of α at




In this chapter, and in this thesis more generally, I focus my attention on the
satisfiability threshold. Explicitly, I define TCCψ(α) with regards to the distance
between α and the satisfiability threshold (αsat). Here, I also define the distance
function as euclidean distance (i.e., absolute value for k = 1) between α and αsat(ψ).
Definition 2.6. TCCsat‖·‖ . In this thesis, TCC is defined as the TCC(α) metric for
which
αthr(ψ) = αsat(ψ)
d(α, αthr) = ‖α− αthr‖2
2.2 Instance complexity
The previous section presented a metric of expected hardness of a random instance
based on the theoretical framework encompassing typical-case complexity (TCC).
It remains an open question whether this framework can be extended to capture
hardness of a particular instance of the problem. In this section, I introduce an
alternative extension of TCC to finite values of the input size (n <<∞). This new
metric can capture hardness at a more granular level and avoid the need for the
specification of a random sampling process.
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As mentioned before, TCC has been canonically studied as n → ∞. Under the
assumption of a phase transition in the limit, there are at least two alternative ex-
planations of how constrainedness maps into hardness at finite values of the input
size while coinciding with the work on asymptotic properties. Firstly, as with the
definition of TCC, the expected hardness of an instance could be related to the
proximity of the constrainedness of an instance to the satisfiability threshold. Al-
ternatively, hardness could be driven by how far an instance’s constrainedness is to
the maximum level of constrainedness for which the instance would be satisfiable.
The previous section explored the former alternative, while this section introduces
the latter.
I first define the maximum satisfiable constrainedness for a single instance and
then use this concept to define instance complexity (IC).
Definition 2.7. Maximum satisfiable constrainedness (α∗). Let Let I ∈ Π be an
instance of a problem Π. Let I ′(x) be the same instance as I except that the con-
straints of the problem are modified in such way that α(I ′(x)) = x. The maximum
satisfiable constrainedness of I is defined as
α∗(I) = max x
s.t.
I ′(x) is satisfiable
I ′(x+ ε) is NOT satisfiable ∀ε > 0
The definition of α∗ is for a single instance and does not require the definition
of a random sampling process. This provides a natural way to define a metric of
instance hardness that is specific to a single instance:
Definition 2.8. Instance Complexity (IC). Let I ∈ Π be an instance of a problem Π.
Let α(I) ∈ Rk be the constrainedness parameter(s) and α∗ the maximum satisfiable
constrainedness. IC : Π→ R is defined as
ICα(I) = d(α(I), α
∗(I))
where d(·) is a distance function.
Note that IC might depend indirectly on the sampling procedure because it is
defined for a particular α(·). In this chapter and, overall in this manuscript, I refer
to this mapping as IC(I) and restrict my analysis to the cases in which the distance
function is defined as the Euclidean distance and α ∈ R.
2.3 TCC, IC and asymptotic definitions
In this section, I explore the link between the definitions presented here of TCC
and IC, with previous definitions of typical-case complexity based on the study of
random ensembles. To do this, I define the expected instance complexity (EIC), the
stochastic counterpart of IC for random ensembles. Employing this definition, I
show that EIC and TCC both converge to the standard asymptotic definition of
average hardness from the literature on random ensembles (T̃CC∞).
The classical definition of hardness in this framework presumes the existence of
a phase transition in the satisfiability probability as n→∞. Explicitly, this phase
transition can be defined as follows:
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Definition 2.9. Phase Transition. A satisfiability probability that undergoes a phase
transition is defined as a convergence in distribution in which
lim
n→∞
Pψn(satisfiable|α) = Pψ∞(sat|α) =
{
1 if α ≤ αsatψ∞
0 otherwise
where ψ∞ represents the latent random generation process limn→∞ψn that is repre-
sented by the satisfiability probability described.
The classical definition of hardness with respect to this phase transition can then
be described as:
Definition 2.10. T̃CC∞. Assuming the existence of a phase transition in the sat-
isfiability probability, the mapping T̃CC∞ : R→ R is defined as
T̃CC∞(α) = |α− αsatψ∞|
This definition differs from the previous definition of TCC in that the threshold
in T̃CC∞ is considered to be a constant value regardless of the value of n. This
hinders its applicability to small values of n where the satisfiability probability does




Note that T̃CC∞ and TCC are defined over random ensembles while IC is not.
In order to compare the different definitions, I present first an extension of IC to
random ensembles.
Definition 2.11. Expected Instance Complexity (EIC). Let I(ψ) ∈ Π be a random
instance of a problem Π generated by a random sampling process ψ. Let α(I) ∈ Rk be
the constrainedness parameter(s) and α∗ the maximum satisfiable constrainedness.
EIC : Rk → R is defined as
EICψ(α(I)) = Eψ[d(α(I), α
∗
ψ)]
where d(·) is a distance function and α∗ψ is the expected maximum satisfiable con-
strainedness for the sampling process ψ.
As stated before, I assume k = 1 and that d(x, y) = |x − y|. In what follows, I
explore the relation between these alternative definitions of computational hardness
over random ensembles. To do this, I start by estimating the expected maximum
satisfiable constrainedness E(α∗) in the limit.
Lemma 2.1. E∞(α
∗). Let ψ be random generation process of instances I(ψ) of a
problem Π. Let the satisfiability probability undergo a phase transition as n → ∞
and let limn→∞ α
sat
ψn




Proof. This follows directly from the definition of α∗. Under the probability dis-
tribution Pψ∞(satisfiable|α), the only value of α for which I ′(α) is satisfiable and
I ′(α + ε) is NOT satisfiable ∀ε > 0 is αsat∞ .
28
CHAPTER 2. THEORY
Lemma 2.2. T̃CC∞, TCC∞ and EIC∞. Let ψn be a random generation process
of instances I(ψn) of a problem Π. Let d(a, b) = |a − b| be the Euclidean metric.






Proof. The asymptotic value of TCC can be readily estimated based on the assump-










I now turn my attention to the asymptotic value of EIC. Let M(α) be the
cumulative distribution function of the maximum satisfiable constrainedness. This
can be related to the satisfiability probability as follows:
M(α) = P (α∗ ≤ α) = P (unsatisfiable|α(I) = α)
= 1− P (satisfiable|α(I) = α)
(2.1)
By this equation, it is possible to conclude that the distribution of the random




∗) = 1− lim
n→∞
Pψn(sat|α = α∗) = 1− Pψ∞(sat|α = α∗) = Mψ∞
Under the additional assumption that the sequence of random variables {αn}n∈N are







= Eψ∞(α− α∗|α∗ < α)Pψ∞(α∗ < α) + Eψ∞(α∗ − α|α∗ ≥ α)Pψ∞(α∗ ≥ α)
= (α− α∗ψ∞)Pψ∞(α




α− α∗ψ∞ if α > α
∗
ψ∞




Note that the assumption of uniform integrability can be met by verifying any
single one of the following conditions1:
1. lima→∞ supnE(|α∗ψn|1|α∗ψn |>a) = 0
2. ∃b,N s.t. Pψn(|α∗| ≥ b) = 1 ∀n ≥ N
3. ∃c < d and N s.t. Pψn(sat|α = c) = 1 and Pψn(sat|α = d) = 0 ∀n ≥ N
1These conditions, and especially condition 3, are fulfilled and easily verified on many problems.




Alternatively, the uniform integrability assumption is not necessary if the dis-
tance metric is transformed to a bounded function such that ∃M ∈ R s.t. d(a, b) <
M ∀a, b ∈ R.
Finally, by Lemma 2.1, it follows that if the satisfiability probability undergoes
a phase transition then
lim
n→∞
EICψn(α) = |α− α∗ψ∞| = |α− α
sat
ψ∞| = limn→∞TCCψn(α)
Note that, although IC is not defined on a random ensemble, it is possible to
analyze its asymptotic behavior by considering a sequence of instances randomly
generated with a fixed value of ᾱ and increasing size:
{In}n∈N s.t. α(In) = ᾱ




IC(In) = |α− α∗ψ∞|
The results presented so far in this section suggest that asymptotic typical-case
complexity as it is canonically studied in computer science, can stem from (at least)
two different sources, namely from EIC and/or TCC. However, these convergence
results hold only asymptotically and under the assumption that the satisfiability
probability undergoes a phase transition. This raises the question about how TCC
and EIC are linked to each other for a finite values of n where the satisfiability
probability does not undergo a phase transition. In what follows, I link EIC to the
satisfiability probability and compare these results to the definition of TCC.
EIC derivation for smooth satisfiability probabilities
Recall from equation 2.1 that
M(α) = 1− P (satisfiable|α(I) = α)
where M(α) is the cumulative distribution function of the maximum satisfiable
constrainedness. This implies that the probability of the maximum satisfiable con-
strainedness lying in a range of values of α is directly related to the slope of the
satisfiability probability:
P (a ≤ α∗ ≤ b) = P (satisfiable|α(I) = a)− P (satisfiable|α(I) = b)
If the satisfiability probability is continuously differentiable with respect to α,
then the probability density function of the maximum satisfiable constrainedness








Therefore, the expected maximum satisfiable constrainedness EICψ(α) will di-








(ᾱ− α∗) m(α∗)dα∗ +
∫ ∞
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The results from this section suggest a set of different predictions from EIC and
TCC. Critically, while TCC does not predict an effect of the slope of the satisfiability
probability on hardness, EIC does.
* * *
Overall, TCC and IC might jointly provide a valuable framework for the study
of cognition. Firstly, both can be employed to investigate the effect of computa-
tional hardness on human performance and effort. Secondly, TCC can be used to
characterize subjective beliefs of task difficulty. Indeed, TCC is a metric that can
be potentially employed by agents to generate subjective beliefs of hardness of a
task given that it can be estimated from the features of the task without the need
to solve the problem. In the next section, I propose a pipeline to generate these
metrics for new problems for the study of human computation.
2.4 A pipeline for new computational problems
in this framework
In the previous section, I introduced a generic approach, based on the constrained-
ness parameter, to study hardness of instances in cognition. This approach is generic
because it presumes that problems have an intrinsic hardness, regardless of the strat-
egy used to solve the problem. Importantly, it is also generic in the sense that it is
problem-independent. It can potentially be applied to any computational decision
problem to characterize hardness of random ensembles and individual instances. I
propose the following framework as a pipeline to characterize the computational
hardness, related to constrainedness, of a computational problem:
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1. Specify a random sampling process for instances of the problem.
2. Estimate, analytically, the expected number of solution witnesses of the prob-
lem.
3. Based on the expected number of solution witnesses, characterize the con-
strainedness parameter(s) α.
4. Characterize, via simulations, the satisfiability threshold (αsat) for the relevant
input-size (n).
The pipeline can be simplified if an analytical expression for the satisfiability
probability is characterized:
1. Specify a random sampling process for instances of the problem.
2. Estimate, analytically, the satisfiability probability of the problem.
3. Based on the satisfiability probability, characterize the constrainedness param-
eter(s) α and the satisfiability threshold (αsat).
In the next chapter, I apply this pipeline to characterize hardness and test its




In this chapter I present the co-authored paper titled “Generic properties of a com-
putational task predict human effort and performance”. There we apply the proposed
framework from the previous chapter to the knapsack problem and investigate the
effect of the corresponding metrics of computational hardness on human perfor-
mance. Moreover, we provide a generalization of the TCC metric to optimization
problems (TCCO) and empirically test its ability to predict human behavior.
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Generic properties of a computational task
predict human effort and performance
Juan Pablo Franco, Nitin Yadav, Peter Bossaerts, Carsten Murawski
Abstract
It has been shown that computational hardness of cognitive tasks affects
people’s effort and ability to solve problems reliably. However, prior em-
pirical studies lack generality. They quantify computational hardness
of tasks based on particular algorithms or for specific problems. Here,
we propose a set of measures of computational hardness of individual
instances of a task in a way that is independent of any algorithm or com-
putational model and can be generalized to other problems. Specifically,
we introduce two measures, typical-case complexity (TCC), a measure of
average hardness of a random ensemble of instances, and instance com-
plexity (IC), an instance-specific metric. Both measures are related to
structural properties of instances. We then test the effect of those mea-
sures on human behavior by asking participants to solve instances of two
variants of the 0-1 knapsack problem, a canonical and ubiquitous NP-
hard problem. We find that participants spent more time on instances
with higher TCC and IC, but that decision quality was lower in those
instances. We propose that the study of mathematical properties of tasks
related to computational hardness can contribute to the development of
computationally plausible accounts of human decision-making, just like
stochastic properties have proven to be critical to our understanding of
human decisions in probabilistic tasks.
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3.1 Introduction
Life requires us to make complex decisions with limited cognitive resources. Theo-
ries of human cognition and behavior such as bounded rationality (Gerd. Gigerenzer
and Selten 2001; Gerd Gigerenzer and Brighton 2009; Herbert A Simon 1990), the
heuristics and biases approach (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Tversky and Kahne-
man 1992) and others take these cognitive limitations into account, either explicitly
or implicitly. However, a complete account of human cognition and decision-making
needs to account not only for the limited cognitive capacities of people but also for
the cognitive demands of the tasks people face. Here, we provide a framework for
studying the latter.
In this framework, the heuristics that people have been observed to use (Kah-
neman and Tversky 1979; Tversky and Kahneman 1992) may emerge as the very
strategies that a rational agent would be expected to use to overcome the compu-
tational overload imposed by some of the computational problems faced. That may
sound self-evident, but it is not once it is appreciated that the use of a particular
heuristic is not only driven by an agent’s cognitive limitations but by the interac-
tion of these limitations and the cognitive resource requirements imposed by the
particular instance of a cognitive task.
A key question in the study of the interaction between task requirements and cog-
nitive limitations is whether there exist properties of individual instances of problems
that make them computationally hard. Several approaches have studied hardness of
instances and their effect on human performance. Prominently, it has been shown
that algorithm-specific metrics of computational hardness predict human effort and
performance in cognitive tasks including decisions (e.g., Acuña and Parada 2010;
Murawski and Peter Bossaerts 2016; Guid and Bratko 2013; De Visscher and Noël
2014; MacGregor and Chu 2011). For instance, a metric of difficulty based on an ex-
tension of the greedy algorithm (Sahni-k algorithm; Sahni and Sartaj 1975) has been
suggested to quantify hardness and its effect on human performance in the knap-
sack problem (Murawski and Peter Bossaerts 2016). This approach is problematic,
though, because these metrics assume that the agent follows a specific computational
strategy. Overall, this program ignores the diversity in strategies used by humans
(e.g., MacGregor and Chu 2011; Acuña and Parada 2010; Hirtle and Gärling 1992;
Ohlsson 2012; Gerd Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier 2011; B. R. Newell, Weston, and
Shanks 2003; Payne, Bettman, and Johnson 1993) and overlooks the difficulty of
identifying such strategies.
The question that arises then is whether there exist properties of individual
instances related to their computational hardness that are independent of the al-
gorithm used. Previous research has studied the intrinsic hardness of tasks (in-
dependent of algorithms) by exploring problem-specific metrics of difficulty (e.g.,
MacGregor and Chu 2011; Hirtle and Gärling 1992; Kotovsky, Hayes, and H. A.
Simon 1985; Carruthers, Masson, and Stege 2012; Bourgin et al. 2017; Shepard and
Metzler 1971; Stazyk, Ashcraft, and Hamann 1982). However, the approaches em-
ployed in these studies are not readily generalizable to other tasks. For instance, the
traveling salesman problem has been widely studied and sources of difficulty of the
problem have been related to the graphical representation of the optimal itinerary
(e.g., convexity) and the node distribution (e.g., degrees of clustering; MacGregor
and Chu 2011). These metrics, however, are specific to the problem and it is not
35
CHAPTER 3. THE KNAPSACK CASE
clear if they can be modified to elucidate hardness in other problems. Even an
alternative representation of the same problem (e.g., numeric distance matrix of
the traveling salesman problem) might require a different set of metrics to quantify
hardness. Overall, this approach does not reveal which underlying task-independent
properties of computational problems make them hard for people to solve.
A desirable property of metrics of complexity is for them to be generic, that is,
problem and strategy independent. Just like like mean and variance characterize the
level of (stochastic) uncertainty in probabilistic tasks, generic metrics of complexity
would allow us to characterize computational hardness across tasks. This could
shed light on which strategies are employed in problem-solving tasks, similar to how
stochastic properties of a task have informed how people approach probabilistic
tasks (e.g., Payzan-Lenestour and Peter Bossaerts 2011; Averbeck 2015; Daw et al.
2006). Additionally, generic metrics of hardness could inform how time and effort
are allocated in problem-solving tasks. This is similar to how intrinsic properties
of perceptual stimuli, such as coherence or evidence strength more generally, have
played an important role in the study of effort-accuracy trade-offs in perceptual
tasks (e.g., Drugowitsch et al. 2012; Hanks and Summerfield 2017).
One generic metric of hardness in computational problems that has been inves-
tigated previously is problem size. Several studies have shown that human perfor-
mance worsens as the size of the problem increases (e.g., Carruthers, Masson, and
Stege 2012; MacGregor and Chu 2011; Dry et al. 2006; van Opheusden and Ma 2019;
Stazyk, Ashcraft, and Hamann 1982; De Visscher and Noël 2014). However, this
dimension of complexity is unable to account for differences in hardness and per-
formance across instances with the same problem size. It remains an open question
whether there are additional generic dimensions of complexity that affect human
performance.
Advances in computational complexity theory have related hardness of compu-
tational problems to generic mathematical properties of instances of those problems.
In particular, the constrainedness of an instance has been related to the amount of
computational resources algorithms need to find a solution (Arora and Barak 2009;
Monasson et al. 1999; Cheeseman, Kanefsky, and Taylor 1991; Ian P. Gent et al.
1996). Importantly, the relation between instance properties and computational
hardness is independent of the algorithm used. This work suggests that computa-
tional hardness of instances can be specified as an intrinsic property of instances.
The question addressed in the present study is to what extent these instance-
level measures of computational hardness affect human ability to solve an instance.
The answer to this question is not obvious (Blakey 2011). Firstly, we do not cur-
rently have a model of human computation and do not know in which ways human
computation differs from other models of computation, such as a Turing machine or
a quantum computer (Blum and Vempala 2020). Secondly, and relatedly, we cannot
directly observe which algorithm, if any, a person uses to solve a computational
problem.
Here, we investigated how the mathematical structure of individual instances
of the 0-1 knapsack problem affects human decision quality and time-on-task. The
knapsack problem is a canonical NP-hard computational problem that is closely
related to many theories of decision-making such as utility maximization (Von Neu-
mann and Morgenstern 1947) and satisficing (Herbert A Simon 1956). Specifically, it
describes a multi-attribute decision problem with two (conflicting) attributes (weight
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and value). However, its relevance extends beyond decision theory. The problem
manifests itself in many tasks faced in everyday life such as to choice of which stimuli
to attend to, budgeting and time management, portfolio optimization, intellectual
discovery as well as in industrial applications such as the cargo business (Kellerer,
Pferschy, and Pisinger 2004; Meloso, Copic, and Bossaerts 2009).
We propose two metrics that generically capture computational hardness of an
instance for algorithms that solve instances reliably. First, we build on the concept
of typical-case complexity (TCC), a popular approach for studying intrinsic hard-
ness of random ensembles of instances of NP-hard problems (Cheeseman, Kanefsky,
and Taylor 1991; Monasson et al. 1999; Percus, Istrate, and Moore 2006). Im-
portantly, it has been shown that there exist features of instances based on which
one can predict the average number of computations needed to compute the solu-
tion of an instance (Cheeseman, Kanefsky, and Taylor 1991; Krzakala et al. 2006;
Ricci-Tersenghi 2010; Achlioptas, Coja-Oghlan, and Ricci-Tersenghi 2011; Marino,
Parisi, and Ricci-Tersenghi 2016; Ricci-Tersenghi, Semerjian, and Zdeborová 2019;
Budzynski, Ricci-Tersenghi, and Semerjian 2019) (Fig 3.1a). We conjectured that
TCC would predict performance and time-on-task for humans. We tested this using
two variants of the knapsack problem.
In the second approach, we construct a metric of instance complexity for in-
stances of a decision problem, based on TCC, that is specific to a single instance.
We refer to this metric as instance complexity (IC). Computing this metric is more
computationally expensive than TCC since it requires solving an optimization prob-
lem. But, unlike TCC, it obviates the need to commit to an ensemble of instances
and a distribution over this ensemble.
3.2 Materials and Methods
We studied how a set of mathematical properties of random ensembles of instances
(TCC) as well as of individual instances (IC) affect human decision quality and time-
on-task in two variants of the 0-1 knapsack problem. in both variants, participants
were presented with a set of items I with different weights w and values v. In the
decision variant, participants were asked to decide whether there exists a subset A
of items from the set I for which (1) the sum of weights (
∑
i∈Awi) is lower or equal
to a given capacity c and (2) the sum of values (
∑
i∈A vi) is at least as high as a given
target profit p. In the related optimization variant, participants were asked to select
the set of items that maximizes the sum of values (
∑
i∈A vi) without exceeding the
knapsack’s capacity (
∑
i∈Awi ≤ c). Both variants are NP-hard (and the decision
variant is also NP-complete; Kellerer, Pferschy, and Pisinger 2004).
In our study, participants were asked to solve a number of random instances of
both variants of the problem. All instances in the experiment had n = 6 items.
The number of items was selected, based on pilot data, to ensure that the task was
neither too difficult nor too easy. Instances varied in their computational complexity.
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Figure 3.1: Typical-case complexity and performance in the knapsack de-
cision task. (a) Computer performance and satisfiability threshold. Prob-
ability of an instance being satisfiable as a function of αp (left axis). The values
presented correspond to the knapsack decision problem with 30 items and fixed
αc ≈ 0.44. The right axis shows a pictorial representation of typical-case com-
plexity (TCC; Yadav et al. 2020). (b) Instance sampling for the behavioral
experiment. Each point is an instance sampled as a function of the proxy for
computational requirements (number of propagations using the Gecode solver) and
normalized profit αp. (c) Human performance by typical-case complexity in
the knapsack decision task. Mean performance and standard errors. The values
presented in (b) and (c) correspond to the knapsack decision problem with 6 items
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3.2.1 Computational complexity
Typical-case complexity
Previous work has studied the connection between instance properties and compu-
tational complexity1. One prominent approach relates asymptotic characteristics of
1In this manuscript we use the broad definition of computational complexity to refer to the study
of computational resource requirements for solving a task (Arora and Barak 2009; Pudlák 2013;
Moore and Mertens 2011). This notion is not to be confused with the definition of computational
complexity in terms of complexity classes, in particular, complexity classes based on asymptotic
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random instances to typical-case complexity (TCC). This approach has led to the
discovery of phase transitions in the solution space (the set of configurations of vari-
ables that satisfy the instance’s constraints) that have been shown to be related to
average hardness (Cheeseman, Kanefsky, and Taylor 1991; Krzakala et al. 2006; Ian
P Gent and Walsh 1996; Achlioptas, Naor, and Peres 2005; Selman and Kirkpatrick
1996; Krzakala et al. 2006). Notably, it has been shown for many NP-hard problems
that there exists an asymptotic phase transition in the satisfiability probability (the
probability that the correct answer to the instance is ‘yes’), that is, an abrupt jump
from one to zero at a particular value of an order parameter. It has been shown that
instances with an order parameter closer to the phase transition tend to be harder.
Recent work studied TCC of random instances of the 0-1 knapsack problem
(Yadav et al. 2020). They demonstrated that the hardest instances in the decision
variant tend to appear in the vicinity of the so-called satisfiability threshold, where
the probability of an instance being satisfiable is close to 0.5. The satisfiability
threshold separates instances of the problem into two regions: an under-constrained
region where the constraints are lenient, and thus many solutions are likely to exist,
and an over-constrained region where the constraints are stringent, and thus the
existence of a solution is unlikely (that is, an instance is not satisfiable). Computing
the solution of instances in the proximity of the satisfiability threshold requires
on average more computational resources than for instances further away from it
(Fig 3.1a).
The probability that an instance of the knapsack decision problem is satisfiable
can be expressed in terms of a small set of instance parameters α = (αp, αc), which









where wi are the weights of the items, vi are values of the items, n is the number of
items, c is the weight capacity and p is the target profit. Similar to what has been
shown in relation to a number of other NP-hard problems (Cheeseman, Kanefsky,
and Taylor 1991; Krzakala et al. 2006; Ian P Gent and Walsh 1996; Yadav et al. 2020;
Achlioptas, Naor, and Peres 2005; Selman and Kirkpatrick 1996; Krzakala et al.
2006), there exists a mapping from instance properties (αp and αc) to computational
complexity of the instance. Explicitly, this mapping can be characterized by a
distance metric d between α = (αp, αc) and a satisfiability boundary α
s where the
satisfiabilty probability sP is 0.5; that is, αs = {α|sP (α) = 0.5}:
TCC(α) = d(α,αs). (3.2)
In order to operationalize this distance metric whilst minimizing assumptions
and maximizing power to detect an effect of TCC, we fixed ᾱc and modulated TCC
by varying only αp:
TCC(αp, ᾱc) = |αp − αsp|. (3.3)
The instances in this study were chosen, based on this definition, such that
they had different levels of TCC. This was done to remove possible sources of noise
whilst increasing the power of the experimental design to identify the effect of TCC
on performance. TCC is a metric of average hardness, and thus we expected high
worst-case analysis such as P and NP.
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variability in performance across instances with the same level of TCC (Fig 3.1b).
Given that our study is the first to study the effect of TCC on human performance,
and in order to ensure that our experimental design had maximal power to reli-
ably identify this effect, we selected instances from only two levels of TCC. To do
this, we chose instances from three discrete levels of constrainedness by varying the
normalized profit (αp) while keeping the normalized capacity fixed (αc). This al-
lowed us to test the effect of TCC, while differentiating it from a monotone relation
between constrainedness and performance. More importantly, it avoided possible
confounding effects of αc on performance.
Specifically, we set ᾱc ≈ 0.425 and estimated, via simulations, the satisfiability
threshold to be αsp ≈ 0.625. Instances were sampled at different distances from
the satisfiability threshold αsp (Fig 3.1b). Instances near the threshold are catego-
rized as having high typical-case complexity (high TCC ) whereas instances further
away from it—that is, in the under-constrained and over-constrained regions—are
categorized as having low typical-case complexity (low TCC ).
More specifically, in order to select instances for the knapsack decision task, we
first fixed the normalized capacity (αc ∈ [0.40, 0.45]). We then chose the target
profit such that the normalized profit corresponded to one of three regions: under-
constrained (αp ∈ [0.35, 0.4]), satisfiability threshold (αp ∈ [0.6, 0.65]) and over-
constrained (αp ∈ [0.85, 0.9]). We randomly selected 18 instances from the under-
constrained bin and 18 from the over-constrained bin. Additionally, we sampled 18
satisfiable instances and 18 unsatisfiable instances near the satisfiability threshold
(αp ∈ [0.6, 0.65]). Throughout, we ensured that no weight/value combinations were
sampled twice. In order to also ensure enough variability between instances in
instances near the satisfiability threshold (high TCC), we added a constraint in the
sampling. We forced half of the instances close to the satisfiability threshold to have
high computational requirements (top 50%), according to an algorithm-specific ex-
post complexity measure of a widely-used algorithm (Gecode; Gecode Team 2006).
Analogously, the other half was selected to have low computational requirements
(bottom 50%). More detail is provided in Appendix A.
The characterization of complexity using TCC is based on the satisfiability prob-
ability and, therefore, in principle only applicable to decision problems. One can
envisage, however, a way in which TCC applies to optimization problems as well, by
framing the optimization problem as a sequence of instances of the decision problem:
“Is there another set of items with a higher profit that still satisfies the capacity
constraint?” In other words, we can model the search process as selecting a subset
of items that satisfy the capacity constraint and then deciding whether there exist
other combinations that yields a higher profit while still satisfying the constraint. If
the answer is yes, then the agent chooses one such combination and asks the same
question again. This process is repeated until the answer is no, which means that
the optimum has been reached. We approximate the TCC of an optimization prob-
lem by the TCC of the implied instance of the decision problem at the optimum of
the optimization problem, that is, the instance of the decision variant with profit
threshold equal to the optimal value of the corresponding optimization variant (see
appendix C).
To generate instances for the optimization task, a sampling process similar to
the one for the decision variant was used. We first selected the same normalized
capacity bin we specified for the decision task (αc ∈ [0.4 − 0.45]). Then, in order
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to estimate the normalized profit of the optimization variant, we calculated the
optimal set of items A∗ ⊆ A for each optimization instance. We then estimated the
corresponding optimal sum of values (p∗ =
∑
i∈A∗ vi). The normalized profit was




). The optimization TCC (TCCO) was defined in the same way as the
decision problem TCC employing this newly defined α∗p as the normalized profit.
Twelve (12) instances were selected from the high TCCO region (α
∗
p ∈ [0.6− 0.65])
and six (6) were selected from the low TCCO region (α
∗
p ∈ [0.85− 0.9]). It is worth
noting that this process did not generate instances in the under-constrained region
(α∗p ∈ [0.35− 0.4]).
In order to also ensure enough variability between instances with high TCCO,
we added the same constraint as in the knapsack decision task: we forced half
of the instances with high TCCO to have high computational requirements (top
50%), according to an algorithm-specific ex-post complexity measure of a widely-
used algorithm (Gecode; Gecode Team 2006). Correspondingly, the other half was
forced to have low computational requirements (bottom 50%). We provide more
details in appendix A.
Number of witnesses
In the decision variant, an alternative metric of hardness is the number of witnesses.
This is defined as the number subsets of items that satisfy both profit and capacity
constraints.
The number of witnesses can be examined at two different levels of analysis. It
can be studied directly as a metric that captures constrainedness (and hardness)
of a single satisfiable instance. It can also be studied stochastically by computing
the expected number of witnesses, which can be interpreted as a metric of expected
hardness of a random ensemble. The latter approach would map a set of features
of instances to expected hardness. This is closely related to the computation of
TCC. Specifically, the same features (order parameters) that allow us to compute
the satisfiability probability, and thus TCC, also characterize the expected number
of witnesses. It has already been shown empirically that the order parameters that
characterize the satisfiability probability in the knapsack decision problem are αp
and αc (Yadav et al. 2020). In appendix D we complement these findings and show,
analytically, that the same two parameters characterize the expected number of
witnesses (see appendix D). This corroborates that TCC and the expected number of
witnesses are both encapsulated in our analysis of αp and αc. Moreover, this provides
further support for the premise that αp and αc fully characterize the constrainedness
of the knapsack decision problem.
We will also consider the number of witnesses of a single instance as a complex-
ity measure, which is based entirely on properties of a single instance. This metric
can explain differences in constrainedness between satisfiable instances. We would
expect instances with a lower number of witnesses to be harder, ceteris paribus.
However, this metric cannot explain differences in hardness between unsatisfiable
instances given that the number of witness for unsatisfiable instances is zero. To
address this issue, we now introduce another metric of hardness of individual in-
stances.
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Instance complexity
We define instance complexity (IC) as the distance between the level of the profit
constraint (target profit) and the maximum value attainable in the corresponding




∣∣∣ = ∣∣αp − α?p∣∣, (3.4)
where p is the target profit of the decision instance and p? is the maximum value
achievable in the corresponding optimization instance, that is, the instance of the
optimization variant with the same set of items I and the same capacity constraint
c. αp and α
?
p denote the normalized values of target profit and optimum value,
respectively. We expect IC to be inversely related to computational complexity.
3.2.2 Experiment
Ethics statement
The experimental protocol was approved by the University of Melbourne Human
Research Ethics Committee (Ethics ID 1749616). Written informed consent was
obtained from all participants prior to commencement of the experimental sessions.
Experiments were performed in accordance with all relevant guidelines and regula-
tions.
Participants
Twenty human volunteers recruited from the general population took part in the
study (14 female, 6 male; age range = 18-31 years, mean age = 22.0 years). Inclusion
was based on age (minimum = 18 years, maximum = 40 years). Each participant
performed the knapsack decision task, the knapsack optimization task, the mental
arithmetic task and a set of basic cognitive function tasks.
Knapsack decision task
In this task, participants were asked to solve a number of instances of the (0-1)
knapsack decision problem (Fig 3.2a). In each trial, they were shown a set of items
with different values and weights as well as a capacity constraint and a target profit.
Participants had to decide whether there existed a subset of those items for which
(1) the sum of weights is lower or equal to the capacity constraint and (2) the sum
of values yields at least the target profit.
Each trial had four stages. In the first stage (3 seconds), only the items were
presented. Item values, in dollars, were displayed using dollar bills and weights, in
grams, were shown inside a black weight symbol. The larger the value of an item,
the larger the dollar bill was in size. Similarly, the larger the weight of an item,
the larger its weight symbol was in size. At the center of the screen, a green circle
indicated the time remaining in this stage. In the second stage (22 seconds), target
profit and capacity constraint were added to the screen inside the green timer circle.
In the third stage (2 seconds), participants saw a ‘YES’ and a ‘NO’ button on the
screen, in addition to the timer circle, and made a response using the keyboard
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Figure 3.2: Knapsack tasks. (a) Knapsack decision task. Initially, participants
were presented with a set of items of different values and weights. The green circle
at the center of the screen indicated the time remaining in this stage of the trial.
This stage lasted 3 seconds. Then, both capacity constraint and target profit were
shown at the center of the screen. Participants had to decide whether there exists
a subset of items for which (1) the sum of weights is lower or equal to the capacity
constraint and (2) the sum of values yields at least the target profit. This stage
lasted 22 seconds. Finally, participants had 2 seconds to make either a ‘YES’ or
‘NO’ response using the keyboard. A fixation cross was shown during the inter-trial
interval (5 seconds). (b) Knapsack optimization task. Participants were presented
with a set of items of different values and weights together with a capacity constraint
shown at the center of the screen. The green circle at the center of the screen
indicated the time remaining in this stage of the trial. Participants had to find the
subset of items with the highest total value subject to the capacity constraint. This
stage lasted 60 seconds. Participants selected items by clicking on them and had
the option of submitting their solution before the time limit was reached. After the
time limit was reached or they submitted their solution, a fixation cross was shown
for 10 seconds before the next trial started.
(Fig 3.2a). A fixation cross was then shown (5 seconds) before the start of the next
trial.
Participants completed 72 trials (3 blocks of 24 trials with a rest period of 60
seconds between blocks). Each trial, a different instance of the knapsack decision
problem was presented. The order of instances was randomized across participants.
Knapsack optimization task
In this task, participants were asked to solve a number of instances of the (0-1)
knapsack optimization problem (Fig 3.2b). In each trial, they were shown a set of
items with different weights and values as well as a capacity constraint. Participants
had to find the subset of items that maximized total value subject to the capacity
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constraint. This means that while in the knapsack decision problem, participants
only needed to determine whether a solution existed, in the knapsack optimization
problem, they also needed to determine the nature of the solutions (i.e., the items
in the optimal knapsack).
The task had two stages. In the first stage (60 seconds), the items were presented
together with the capacity constraint and the timing indicator. Items were presented
in the same way as in the knapsack decision task. Unlike in the decision task,
however, participants were able to add and remove items to/from the knapsack by
clicking on the items. An item added to the knapsack was indicated by a light
around it (Fig 3.2b). Participants submitted their solution by pressing the button
‘D’ on the keyboard before the time limit was reached. If participants did not submit
within the time limit, the items selected at the end of the trial were automatically
submitted as the solution. Participants were then shown a fixation cross (10 seconds)
before the start of the next trial.
Each participant completed 18 trials (2 blocks of 9 trials with a rest period of 60
seconds between blocks). Each trial presented a different instance of the knapsack
optimization problem with varying levels of computational complexity. The order
of presentation of instances in the task was randomized for each participant.
Basic cognitive function tasks
We tested participants’ performance on five aspects of cognitive function that we
considered relevant for the knapsack tasks, namely, working memory, episodic mem-
ory, strategy use, processing and psychomotor speed, as well as mental arithmetic.
To do so, we administered a set of tasks from the Cambridge Neuropsychological
Test Automated Battery (CANTAB; see Appendix B; Cognition 2017). Specifically,
we asked participants to perform the Reaction Time (RTI), Paired Associates Learn-
ing (PAL), Spatial Working Memory (SWM) and Spatial Span (SSP). In addition,
participants were presented with 33 mental arithmetic problems (Cappelletti, But-
terworth, and Kopelman 2001). The first three trials were considered test trials and
thus were not included in the analysis. They were given 13 seconds to solve each
problem. The task involved addition and division of numbers, as well as questions
in which they were asked to round to the nearest integer the result of an addition
or division operation.
Procedure
After reading the plain language statement and providing written informed consent,
participants were instructed in the tasks and completed a practice session. Partic-
ipants first solved the CANTAB RTI task, followed by the knapsack decision task.
Then they completed the CANTAB RTI task again, followed by the knapsack opti-
mization task. Subsequently, they completed the remaining CANTAB tasks in the
following order: PAL, SWM and SSP. Finally, they performed the mental arith-
metic task and completed a set of demographic and debriefing questionnaires. Each
experimental session lasted around two hours.
Participants received a show-up fee of A$10, as well as monetary compensation
based on performance. They earned A$0.7 for a correct answer in the knapsack
decision task and A$1 for a correct answer in the knapsack optimization task.
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3.2.3 Statistical analysis
Mixed-effects models were used for the statistical analysis. All of the generalized
logistic mixed models (GLMM) and linear mixed models (LMM) included random
effects on intercept for participants. Their p-values were calculated using a two-
tailed Wald test. All statistical analyses were performed in R and mixed models
were estimated using the R package lme4 (Bates et al. 2015).
3.2.4 Data and Code Availability
The raw behavioral data, the data analysis code and the computational simulations
are all available at the Open Science Framework. The knapsack decision task, knap-
sack optimization task and mental arithmetic task are also available there (project:
https://doi.org/10.17605/OSF.IO/T2JV7).
3.3 Results
We studied how a set of mathematical properties of random ensembles of instances
(TCC) as well as of individual instances (IC) affected human decision quality and
time-on-task in the decision and optimization variants of the 0-1 knapsack problem.
3.3.1 Knapsack decision task
Summary statistics
We excluded a total of 13 trials (from 8 participants) in which no response was
made.
Mean human performance, measured as the percentage of trials in which a
correct response was made, was 83.1% (min = 0.56, max = 0.9, SD = 0.08).
On average, participants chose the ‘YES’ option in 48.1% of trials (min = 0.32,
max = 0.60, SD = 0.06). Performance did not vary during the course of the task
(P = 0.196, main effect of trial number on performance, generalized logistic mixed
model (GLMM); Table E.6 Model 1), suggesting that neither experience with the
task nor mental fatigue affected task performance.
The effect of typical-case complexity (TCC) on performance
In order to test whether participants’ ability to solve an instance was affected by
TCC, we first compared performance on instances with high TCC and low TCC.
We expected participants to perform better on instances with low TCC compared to
instances with high TCC. Performance was significantly lower on instances with high
TCC (P < 0.001, main effect of TCC on performance, GLMM; Fig 3.1c; Table E.6
Model 2).
We hypothesized that performance would be affected by the tightness of the
profit and capacity constraints. To examine this, we tested whether performance on
instances in the under-constrained region (αp ≈ 0.4) was different to performance
on instances in the over-constrained region (αp ≈ 0.9). We found no significant
difference in performance between the two regions with low TCC (P = 0.355, main
effect of region, GLMM; Table E.6 Model 5; Fig 3.1c), but confirmed a significant
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difference in performance between instances with high TCC and each of the other two
regions (P < 0.001, difference in performance between regions, GLMM; Table E.6
Model 4).
We also hypothesized that the effect of TCC on performance would be affected by
the satisfiability of an instance, that is, whether the answer to the decision problem
is ‘yes’ or ‘no’. This hypothesis is based on an asymmetry of NP problems. Proving
that an instance is satisfiable requires finding one subset of items that satisfy the
constraints. Such a set may be identified without exploring the full search space
and, additionally, there may be more than one such subset. In contrast, to conclude
that an instance is unsatisfiable requires proving that no such set exists. This
might require a full search over every possible subset of items in order to determine
that none of the subsets satisfies the constraints. We investigated the effect of
satisfiability on performance and found that the effect of TCC was still significant
when controlling for satisfiability (P < 0.001, main effect of TCC on performance,
GLMM; Table E.6 Model 3), but that there was no significant effect of satisfiability
on performance (P = 0.355 main effect of satisfiability on performance, P = 0.796
interaction effect of TCC and satisfiability on performance, GLMM; Table E.6 Model
3).
Structure of an instance and human performance
For satisfiable instances, the tightness of the constraints can be studied further by
analyzing the number of solution witnesses. The number of witnesses and TCC are
highly related, because both map constrainedness to complexity (see Section 3.2).
We tested this link empirically and found, as expected, that satisfiable instances
with high TCC tend to have a lower number of witnesses than satisfiable instances
with a low TCC (P < 0.001, unpaired t-test; Fig 3.3a).
When exploring the link between the number of witnesses and human perfor-
mance we found that (for satisfiable instances), the probability of solving an in-
stance correctly increased with the number of witnesses (combinations of items that
satisfy the constraints; P = 0.001, main effect of number of witnesses on perfor-
mance, GLMM; Table E.6 Model 6; Fig 3.3c). Interestingly, there appeared to be
an interaction effect between TCC and number of witnesses on performance: the
number of witnesses caused the frequency of correct solutions to increase faster if
the instance had high TCC (P < 0.001, interaction effect of TCC and number of
witnesses on performance; GLMM; Table E.6 Model 6).
Instance complexity (IC) and human performance
We first explored the relation between IC and TCC. Both measures map constrained-
ness to computational complexity. However, they do so at different levels. TCC
maps average constrainedness of a random ensemble of instances to their average
complexity, whereas IC maps the constrainedness of a single instance to its complex-
ity, regardless of which ensemble it was sampled from. Given that both measures
map constrainedness to complexity, we expected them to be highly correlated. As
predicted, instances in our study with low TCC had a higher average IC than in-
stances with high TCC (P < 0.001, βTCC = −0.175, observations= 70; Fig 3.3b).
We explored the relation between IC and human performance. We found a
positive non-linear relation between this measure and average accuracy per instance
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Figure 3.3: Properties of sampled instances and human performance. (a)
Properties of sampled instances. Each decision instance is plotted according
to how large the gap between the normalized profit αp and the maximum achiev-
able normalized profit α?p is, given the set of items and the capacity constraint c.
Instances become more constrained as αp − α?p increases. Instances in the negative
quadrant are satisfiable and, thus, have at least one solution witness. The number of
witnesses is defined as the number of item combinations that satisfy both capacity
and profit constraints. Instances in the positive quadrant are all unsatisfiable and
have 0 witnesses. (b) Relation between IC and human performance in the
knapsack decision task. Mean performance and IC by instance. Instances are
divided into high and low TCC. Outliers are denoted in black and excluded from the
model fit. (c) Relation between performance and number of witnesses in

































































(accuracy ∼ IC0.01; R2 = 0.542; best AIC among competing models; Table E.4;
Fig 3.3b). We also compared the model fit with respect to a model with only TCC as
explanatory variable. As would be expected, IC models performance better than the
TCC model (R2 = 0.21; AICTCC is highest among competing models; Table E.4).
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Finally, the effect of IC on performance was further corroborated using a mixed
effects model (P < 0.001, main effect of IC0.01 on performance, GLMM; Table E.6
Model 7).
3.3.2 Knapsack optimization task
Summary statistics
We excluded 2 trials (from 2 participants) because solutions were submitted after
less than 1 second into the task. Additionally, 3 participants were excluded from
the analysis of submission times because they never submitted a solution before
the time-out. This behavior suggests that these participants might have failed to
understand the submission instructions.
We first analyzed participants’ ability to find the optimal solution of an instance.
We define computational performance as a dichotomous variable that is equal to 1
if the participant obtained a value equal to the maximum value obtainable in the
instance, and 0 otherwise. Mean computational performance was 83.2% (min = 0.67,
max = 0.94, SD = 0.08). Participants spent 43.5 seconds on average on an instance
(min = 27.4, max = 60.0, SD = 8.9). Participants were allowed to select any
set of items, irrespective of the capacity constraint, which implied that they could
submit candidate solutions that exceeded the capacity constraint. However, the
capacity constraint was only violated in 3% of instances. Performance did not
change throughout the task (P = 0.683, main effect of trial number on performance,
GLMM; Table E.7 Model 1), nor did the time spent per instance (P = 0.483, main
effect of trial number on time, linear mixed model (LMM); Table E.8 Model 1),
suggesting that neither experience nor mental fatigue affected task performance.
Effect of typical-case complexity on performance
We define typical-case complexity for optimization problems (TCCO) as the TCC
of the decision problem of choosing whether the optimal value is achievable (see
appendix C). We hypothesized that computational performance in instances with
high TCCO (instances whose solutions have a corresponding decision problem with
high TCC) would be lower than in instances with low TCCO (instances whose so-
lutions have a corresponding decision problem with low TCC). We found exactly
this, mean computational performance was lower in instances with high TCCO, rel-
ative to those with low TCCO (P < 0.001, main effect of TCCO, GLMM; Fig 3.4a;
Table E.7 Model 2).
So far, we have defined computational performance as a dichotomous variable.
We now look at a finer-grained measure. To this end, we define item performance
as the minimum number of item replacements needed to reach the optimal solution.
These include both the removal of items that are not in the optimal solution and
the addition of items that are in the optimal solution (but not part of the candidate
solution). The higher the value of this measure, the further away the submitted
solution is from the optimum in item space. We found that item performance was
worse, on average, in instances with high TCCO, relative to instances with low
TCCO (P < 0.001, main effect of TCCO, LMM; Table E.2 Model 2).
Another way of defining performance is in terms of value obtained in an instance.
We define economic performance as the ratio of the total value of items in the
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Figure 3.4: Relation between computational complexity and human per-
formance in the knapsack optimization task. (a) Relation between TCCO
and computational performance. Mean computational performance and stan-
dard error of the means (SEM) in the knapsack optimization task according to
TCCO. (b) Relation between TCCO and time-on-task on an instance.
Mean time spent (and SEM) in the knapsack optimization task according to TCCO.
(c) Time spent after each click and TCC. After each click participants were
faced with the question: “Is there another set of items with a higher profit that still
satisfies the weight capacity constraint?”. Each of these decisions is a knapsack de-
cision problem with a corresponding αp and corresponding TCC. The figure shows
the amount of time people spent at each of these decisions before doing another
click. Note that the IC of the knapsack decision problem at each click is defined as
the distance between αp and the optimum α
?
p. The top panel shows instances with
low TCCO; that is, optimization instances whose optimum lies in a low TCC region.
The bottom panel shows optimization instances with a high TCCO. Note:
∗p<0.1;


























































































submitted solution to the total value of items in the optimal solution. We found that
economic performance was lower in instances with high TCCO relative to instances
with low TCCO (P < 0.001, main effect of TCCO, LMM; Table E.2 Model 1). Taken
together, these results suggest that TCCO affects performance, robustly, irregardless
of the performance metric used.
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Relation between performance in the knapsack decision task and the
knapsack optimization task
We hypothesized that participants’ performance in the two tasks would be related:
participants who performed better in the knapsack decision task were expected to
perform better in the knapsack optimization task. For this analysis we excluded
one participant whose performance in the knapsack decision task was significantly
below the performance of any other participant. We found a positive and significant
correlation between performance in the two tasks (Pearson correlation = 0.67, P =
0.002, d.f. = 17, correlation between average performance in the decision variant and
computational performance in the optimization variant). If the outlier is included,
we get qualitatively similar results (Pearson correlation = 0.49, P = 0.027, d.f. =
18).
Relation between complexity and time-on-task
The knapsack optimization task also allowed us to investigate effort. We tracked
time-on-task, since it is likely to increase in the number of computations performed
and in the time required for each computation.
We hypothesized that participants would expend more time on more difficult
instances. As expected, participants spent more time on instances with high TCCO
relative to those with low TCCO (P < 0.001, main effect of TCCO, LMM; Fig 3.4b;
Table E.8 Model 2). This effect was also present when controlling for computational
performance (P = 0.037, main effect of TCCO, LMM; Table E.8 Model 4). This
means that even when participants did not find the optimal solution, they expended
more time on instances with high TCCO.
Next, we analyzed the relation between time expended in an instance and per-
formance in the instance. We found a negative relation between time-on-task and
the probability of finding the solution (P < 0.001, main effect of time, GLMM;
Table E.7 Model 5). However, when we account for TCCO, the effect of time on
performance is no longer significant (P = 0.905, main effect of time; P = 0.352,
interaction effect of time and TCCO, GLMM; Table E.7 Model 3). Taken together
with previous results, it appears that the relation between time-on-task and compu-
tational performance is driven by TCCO. As such, the negative correlation between
time expended and performance may have been caused by the effect of TCCO on
time expended.
In order to further examine the relation between optimization instances, time
expended and complexity, we examined the amount of time participants spent after
each click at each selection of items before performing the next click. After each
click participants were faced with the question: “Is there another set of items with
a higher profit that still satisfies the weight capacity constraint?”. Previous results
in the literature suggest that, at each selection of items in the optimization task,
current TCC has an effect on the time spent (Yadav et al. 2020). We found that
the effect was driven by the constrainedness of the instance (Fig 3.4c): time spent
after each click was mainly influenced by IC (P < 0.001, main effect of IC, LMM;
Table E.3 Model 2) rather than by TCC (P = 0.206, main effect of TCC, LMM;
Table E.3 Model 2). Additionally, at each click, we estimated how many subsets
of items would yield a greater sum of values than the current selection, while still
satisfying the capacity constraint. We found that participants spent more time
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when there were fewer alternatives that yielded a more valuable solution, whilst still
satisfying the capacity constraint (P < 0.001, main effect of the number of more
valuable solutions, LMM; Table E.3 Model 1).
Problem and algorithm specific metric of hardness related to human per-
formance
Previous work studying human performance in the knapsack optimization prob-
lem identified an algorithm-specific measure of hardness, Sahni-k, that correlates
with human performance (Meloso, Copic, and Bossaerts 2009; Murawski and Peter
Bossaerts 2016). In line with those studies, we found a negative relation between
Sahni-k and human computational performance (P < 0.001, main effect of Sahni-k,
GLMM; Table E.7 Model 4), as well as a positive relation between Sahni-k and time-
on-task (P = 0.001, main effect of Sahni-k, LMM; Table E.8 Model 3). However,
when controlling for TCC, the effect of Sahni-k on time-on-task is no longer signif-
icant (P = 0.580, main effect of sahni-k, LMM; Table E.8 Model 5). Our results
replicate previous finding relating Sahni-k with human performance and time-on-
task. They also suggest that the effect of Sahni-k is, at least partially, captured by
the generic TCC metric.
3.3.3 Computational capacity and performance
Human performance stems from a tension between intrinsic computational hardness
and the computational bounds of the agent. We have focused our attention thus far
on the hardness of the task, and its effect on human performance, independently of
the computational capacity of the agent. We study now the relation between per-
formance in the knapsack tasks and computational capacity. In order to investigate
this interaction we used tests aimed at assessing different computational capacities.
Specifically, we assessed participant’s mental arithmetic, working memory, episodic
memory, strategy use as well as processing and psycho-motor speed. We correlated
performance in these tasks with performance on the knapsack tasks. Correlations
were all non-significant (see Section 3.2 and Appendix E.1 for details). These re-
sults suggest that none of the computational capacities assessed acted as a single
active constraint affecting the variability in performance across participants. It is,
of course, also possible that our study did not have sufficient statistical power to
detect individual differences.
3.4 Discussion
Many models of decision-making, implicitly or explicitly, require the decision-maker
to solve computationally intractable problems, that is, problems that are NP-hard
(van Rooij et al. 2019; Peter Bossaerts and Murawski 2017). However, little is known
about the generic effect of computational complexity on human decision-making.
Following a popular approach to studying computational complexity of instances of
NP-hard problems (Cheeseman, Kanefsky, and Taylor 1991; Krzakala et al. 2006;
Selman and Kirkpatrick 1996; Achlioptas, Naor, and Peres 2005; Monasson et al.
1999; Zdeborová and Mézard 2008; Percus, Istrate, and Moore 2006; Yadav et al.
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2020), we study which inherent properties of instances make instances computation-
ally hard for people.
Specifically, we examined the effect of intrinsic complexity of instances on perfor-
mance and time-on-task in the decision and optimization variants of the 0-1 knapsack
problem. To this end, we derived two measures of computational hardness that are
based on inherent mathematical properties of instances. The first, typical-case com-
plexity (TCC), captures the average complexity of random ensembles of instances.
The second, instance complexity (IC), is a metric of complexity of individual in-
stances.
In both variants of the knapsack problem, we found that performance was lower
in random instances with high TCC compared to instances with low TCC. Moreover,
time expended was positively correlated with TCC. Instance-specific complexity
(IC) had a strong effect on time-on-task and performance as well. Thus, we provide
evidence that human ability to solve complex computational problems is related to
mathematical properties of individual instances of such problems.
This study investigates the relation between generic structural properties of in-
stances of a computational problem and human behavior. Our results provide strong
evidence that there are inherent mathematical properties that determine hardness
for both human and digital computers. This is the case despite the fact that human
and digital computers are presumably based on different computational architec-
tures. Hence, our results can be interpreted as further evidence that computational
complexity is an inherent (or absolute) property of a computational problem (Arora
and Barak 2009; Monasson et al. 1999; Cheeseman, Kanefsky, and Taylor 1991).
Our results have two major implications for the study of human decision-making.
Firstly, they provide empirical support for the premise that computational hardness
stems from intrinsic properties of the problem and thus calls for a deeper investiga-
tion of how intrinsic properties of a task should be reflected in models of cognition.
Secondly, our approach provides a framework that lends itself to studying how the
interaction between computational hardness and cognitive capacity affects strategy
selection. In what follows, we explore each of these implications in turn.
3.4.1 Intrinsic hardness of cognitive tasks
Two different approaches stand to notice in the the study of intrinsic hardness of
tasks in cognition: a primarily theoretical approach with the aim of assessing the
a priori plausibility of models of cognition, and an empirical approach, like the one
used in the present study, whose goal is to derive empirically testable predictions
on how properties of a task affect human problem-solving capabilities, and to test
those predictions.
From a computational perspective, it has been suggested that models of decision-
making, and cognition more generally, ought to be computationally tractable in or-
der to be plausible from a computational point of view (Frixione 2001; van Rooij
2008; Peter Bossaerts and Murawski 2017; Tsotsos 1990; Levesque 1988; Blum and
Vempala 2020). This approach has led to the characterization of a set of human
computable problems based on worst-case asymptotic computational complexity. In
this context, a problem is considered intractable when the number of operations that
need to be taken to find a solution grows quickly to levels that makes solving these
problems infeasible. For instance, the P-Cognition Thesis proposes that computa-
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tional plausibility should be linked to P-time (i.e., polynomial time) computability
(Frixione 2001; Levesque 1988). However, this thesis is often considered too restric-
tive (Blum and Vempala 2020; van Rooij 2008). Recognizing that instances of hard
problems can vary substantially in computational resource requirements, the Fixed
Parameter Tractable (FPT) Cognition Thesis proposes that models of cognition may
still be computable if they are P-time computable when a parameter of the problem
(or a set of them) is restricted to a a small value (van Rooij 2008; van Rooij et al.
2019).
Our study both supports these proposals and complements them. It provides
empirical evidence relating human decision-making capacity to individual properties
of instances and shows which of those properties make individual instances hard for
people. Thus, it supports the assumption of frameworks like the P-Cognition Thesis
(Frixione 2001; van Rooij 2008; Peter Bossaerts and Murawski 2017; Tsotsos 1990;
Levesque 1988) that computational hardness stems from intrinsic properties of the
problem. Moreover, our study could provide new insights for the development of
frameworks like fixed parameter tractability (van Rooij 2008; van Rooij et al. 2019).
For instance, future research could explore whether TCC, beyond being a source of
average-case complexity (Cheeseman, Kanefsky, and Taylor 1991; Krzakala et al.
2006; Selman and Kirkpatrick 1996; Achlioptas, Naor, and Peres 2005; Monasson et
al. 1999; Zdeborová and Mézard 2008; Percus, Istrate, and Moore 2006; Yadav et al.
2020), is also a source of worst-case complexity. That is, future work could analyze
whether computational problems restricted to low TCC are solvable in polynomial
time (i.e., fixed-parameter tractable relative to TCC).
From an empirical perspective, the asymptotic worst-case complexity approach
is too broad and not suitable for generating empirically testable predictions from
metrics of intrinsic hardness of instances. This program can not be used to explain
differences in performance within a problem. It categorizes problems based on the
computational resources needed to solve the most difficult cases of the problem and
according to their asymptotic behavior.
Many studies have explored the hardness of instances from an empirical perspec-
tive. It has been shown that task-dependent and algorithm-dependent metrics of
computational complexity predict human effort and performance in cognitive tasks
including decisions (Murawski and Peter Bossaerts 2016; Bourgin et al. 2017; Shep-
ard and Metzler 1971; Dry et al. 2006; Guid and Bratko 2013; Stazyk, Ashcraft, and
Hamann 1982; De Visscher and Noël 2014). This approach is problematic, though,
because these metrics are not readily generalizable to other problems and we can-
not usually observe which algorithms people use when solving a cognitive problem.
We propose that TCC and IC are better suited to study the interaction between
computational complexity and human computational bounds.
TCC is a measure that studies complexity of “typical” instances of a problem.
Moreover, it captures complexity in a way that is independent of a particular algo-
rithm or model of computation (Cheeseman, Kanefsky, and Taylor 1991; Achlioptas,
Naor, and Peres 2005; Monasson et al. 1999) and it has been proven to be applica-
ble to a large range of problems, including the graph coloring problem (Cheeseman,
Kanefsky, and Taylor 1991; Krzakala et al. 2006), the traveling salesperson problem
(Ian P Gent and Walsh 1996) and the K-SAT problems (Boolean satisfiability prob-
lems; Cheeseman, Kanefsky, and Taylor 1991; Achlioptas, Naor, and Peres 2005;
Selman and Kirkpatrick 1996; Krzakala et al. 2006). Our findings show that TCC
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has an effect on human performance, as well as on time-on-task.
We also investigated IC as an alternative metric to capture difficulty of an in-
stance and we found a close relation between this measure and human performance.
IC complements TCC by providing a measure of difficulty at an individual instance
level. While TCC maps the constrainedness of an instances to the average com-
plexity of similar instances, IC characterizes constrainedness of a single sampled
instance regardless of the ensemble it came from. It is worth noting, however, that
in order to compute IC, the corresponding optimization problem has to be solved,
whereas TCC is a measure that can be estimated entirely based on mathematical
properties of the problem. This makes TCC not only less computationally intensive,
but perhaps also a better candidate for playing a role in human meta-decisions such
as strategy selection (Lieder and Griffiths 2017; Lieder, Shenhav, et al. 2018).
Taken together, the results reported have an important implication for the study
of human decision-making. The predictive power of current models of decision-
making is inevitably limited by the large variability in strategies deployed by hu-
mans (e.g., Murawski and Peter Bossaerts 2016; Gerd. Gigerenzer and Selten 2001;
Todd and Gerd Gigerenzer 2012). We postulated that performance and effort are
driven, at least partially, by properties of the instance at hand rather than being
a sole feature of the solver (the human), and suggesting that predictive power of
decision theoretic models can be improved by including instance properties. That
is, a key goal of decision-making research so far has been to identify the procedures
(algorithms, heuristics) that humans deploy (A. Newell and Herbert A Simon 1972;
Gerd. Gigerenzer and Selten 2001). We propose that this approach can be com-
plemented by studying, directly, how properties of an instance affect performance
and effort. There is an analogy with the study of human effort and performance in
probabilistic tasks. For instance, in the restless bandit tasks inherent (stochastic)
features of the task at hand predict effort and performance, and these features form
the core of the “filter models” that capture the essence of human learning in bandit
problems (Payzan-Lenestour and Peter Bossaerts 2011; Averbeck 2015; Daw et al.
2006).
3.4.2 Hardness and decision-making: Adaptation of strate-
gies
In order for a theory of decision-making to be plausible from a computational per-
spective, the computational requirements of a decision task need to be within the
cognitive resources available to a decision-maker. Indeed, it has been suggested
that the principle of rationality should not (only) be applied at the level of behavior
(Marr’s computational level) but (also) at the level of computation (Marr’s algorith-
mic level), an approach known as resource rationality (Lieder and Griffiths 2019).
In this framework, limited computational resources are allocated to tasks in a way
that is optimal relative to specified objective function (Lieder and Griffiths 2019).
Our approach provides a framework that lends itself to studying which strategies
are actively used. Specifically, it allows for the study of why particular heuristics
or algorithms are successful on some instances but not on others and how this ex-
plains why participants’ use of heuristics changes with instance properties (Lieder,
Plunkett, et al. 2014; Payne, Bettman, and Johnson 1988). Moreover, our proposal
presents a method to study the meta-decision of effort allocation.
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The correlation between our metrics and behavior can shed light on which strate-
gies are actually being used. The metrics of instance difficulty we employ here —
TCC and IC— correlate with two aspects of the KP, namely, constrainedness and
satisfiability. It is unsurprising then, one could argue, that performance and effort
are related to our metrics. This is not so, as the following example shows. Imag-
ine that humans used the greedy algorithm. In this case, a person would fill the
knapsack to capacity with items that are ordered in reverse of the value-to-weight
ratio. Performance is now related to satisfiability and unrelated to TCC for unsatis-
fiable instances. If an instance is satisfiable, the greedy algorithm may predict it is
not; only if an instance is unsatisfiable will the greedy algorithm always be correct.
This entails that performance in unsatisfiable instances should be 100% regardless
of TCC, while satisfiable instances should have a lower accuracy. This is not what
we find. It suggests that humans may actually search in a fundamentally different
way. This provides further insight as to how humans approach the KP.
This approach can also explain why participants’ use of heuristics changes with
instance properties. For instance, certain heuristics such as the greedy algorithm
may be an adequate strategy to solve instances with low constrainedness, but not for
instances with high constrainedness. Thus, participants could adjust their strategy
based on the level of constrainedness of an instance. It is worth noting, however,
that the problem of choosing a heuristic among a set of possible heuristics can in
itself be an NP-hard problem (Rich et al. 2019). Further research could explore how
TCC affects strategy selection, and in particular heuristic selection.
Additionally, the meta-decision of how to allocate effort can be informed by
the study of intrinsic hardness. In order to understand how limited computational
resources are allocated, it is necessary to study both the cognitive capacities of
decision-makers as well as the cognitive requirements of a task. Here we provide
a framework to study the latter in the context of effort allocation. Empirically,
evidence from the current study suggests that agents expend more time on instances
with higher TCC. Theoretically, TCC is particularly suitable as an approximation
of the expected computational requirements because of its characteristics. Firstly, it
is an ex-ante measure, that is, it is based on a set of features of the task, which could
potentially be identified and used by the agent before solving the task. Secondly, the
set of features related to TCC are intrinsic to the task, that is, they are not specific
to the particular algorithm used to solve a problem. Thirdly, TCC has been shown
to be generalizable to a large set of computational problems (Cheeseman, Kanefsky,
and Taylor 1991; Achlioptas, Naor, and Peres 2005; Selman and Kirkpatrick 1996;
Yadav et al. 2020; Ian P Gent and Walsh 1996). Further research could usefully
explore whether TCC is a relevant dimension in the multi-attribute decision problem
of effort allocation. The meta-decision of allocating effort based on a set of inherent
and generic properties of the task, such as TCC, resonates with probabilistic tasks
where agents rely on inherent properties, such as mean and variance, to make a
decision. However, it remains an open question whether humans compute TCC in
order to estimate the expected costs of performing a task and allocate effort.
3.4.3 Directions for future research
We have studied an important aspect of difficulty, for humans, of solving random
instances of the knapsack problem. Future work should explore whether our results
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can be extended to other problems. Specifically, the theoretical framework of TCC
has been shown to generalize to other NP-hard problems (Cheeseman, Kanefsky,
and Taylor 1991; Achlioptas, Naor, and Peres 2005; Selman and Kirkpatrick 1996;
Yadav et al. 2020; Ian P Gent and Walsh 1996), but it is an open question whether
the applicability of TCC and IC to human problem-solving extends to these other
problems as well. Moreover, the knapsack problem describes a multi-attribute de-
cision problem with two attributes (weight and value), which is ubiquitous in daily
life (Kellerer, Pferschy, and Pisinger 2004; Meloso, Copic, and Bossaerts 2009; Tor-
ralva et al. 2013). Future work could explore whether these metrics are extendable
to problems with more attributes such as the multidimensional knapsack problem
(Kellerer, Pferschy, and Pisinger 2004).
In our study, the optimization task involved finding the optimal solution. How-
ever, finding the exact solution might not always be required in the real-world. In
many cases, finding an approximate solution might suffice. Future research should
investigate whether the results found in this study can be extended to approxima-
tion.
Additionally, our results for TCC are based on a particular sampling distribution.
Specifically, we used the uniform distribution to sample the knapsack instances. This
approach has been used to understand hardness and to study “typical” instances of a
problem, but these instances might not necessarily be the ones we encounter outside
of the laboratory setting. Characterizing real-life distributions of instances is an
open research question in computer science (Bogdanov and Trevisan 2006). Further
research would be required to study whether this method is generalizable to other
sampling distributions and, specially, to those distributions that are encountered in
everyday life.
Our work provides a step towards understanding the effects of computational
complexity on human behavior by providing a measure of decision difficulty based
on one dimension of complexity, namely constrainedness. This dimension has been
linked to time complexity (the number of computations needed to find a solution),
but is likely not the only measure that captures difficulty of tasks for humans.
There may be many other relevant cognitive dimensions, such as memory, that are
relevant for understanding cognitive limitations (Otto et al. 2013; Schmeichel 2007;
Blum and Vempala 2020). Further research is needed in order to incorporate the full
spectrum of cognitive costs and resource limitations and link them to performance
and time-on-task in decision tasks.
We have shown that TCC and IC affect behavior through task performance and
time-on-task. Yet, it could also have an impact on behavior in other ways. For
instance, attitudes towards complexity could affect behavior. Complexity avoidance
could lead people to avoid situations that involve solving difficult tasks, whereas
complexity seeking could lead to situations in which people seek tasks that require
a high amount of effort to be solved (Inzlicht, Shenhav, and Olivola 2018). Another
way that complexity could be related to behavior is through its effect on uncertainty.
In the case of the knapsack optimization task, it is still an open question which
mechanism participants used to adjust the time-on-task. TCC could influence the
level of uncertainty of having found the solution, and in turn this uncertainty could
play a role in the decision of when to submit an answer (Ackerman and Thompson
2017). We leave it to future work to explore the effects of attitudes towards (or
preferences over) complexity in decision-making, as well as the relation between
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complexity, uncertainty and behavior.
Overall, this study provides evidence that computational complexity can be char-
acterized by inherent properties of a computational problem (Cherniak 1984). An
understanding of such properties should also benefit research on human computa-
tion within artificial intelligence. With a growing interest in AI software with the
human in-and-on the loop, understanding when a task may be difficult for a person
becomes necessary for building effective human-centric intelligent systems. This is
crucial for the design of policies that wish to improve the quality of decisions people
make and the outcomes they achieve in areas such as financial investments or the
selection of health insurance contracts, among many others. In those cases where
the task is too demanding, mechanisms could be designed to help people improve
the quality of their decisions. This could be done, for instance, through software
applications that take advantage of the computational power of electronic comput-
ers. Note, for example, that an electronic computer can correctly solve an instance
of the knapsack problem (with six items) in less than one second, whereas humans
in our study took 25 seconds, and they didn’t always find the optimum. Finally, our
results advocate for closer collaboration between decision scientists and computer
scientists. Not only can decision sciences be informed by computation theory, as
was done in this study, but research on humans could motivate the development of
new theories and algorithms.
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Appendices
Appendix A Instance sampling
A.1 Knapsack decision problem
All instances in the experiment had 6 items. The probability that a particular








these parameters, together with the satisfiability probability, characterize TCC as
well.
We made use of this property to select instances for the task, as follows. We first
sampled (with replacement) a collection of 250 combinations of weights and values
(< w1, ..., w6 >< v1, ..., v6 >) from a uniform (and discrete) distribution over the
range 1 to 50. For every weight/value combination, multiple knapsack instances were
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generated by increasing (in discrete steps) both capacity and the profit constraints
from a lower bound of 1 to an upper bound equal up to the sum of weights (
∑n
i=1 wi)
for the capacity constraint (c) and the sum of values (
∑n
i=1wi) for the target profit
(p). Target profits and capacities were rounded to the nearest integer and repeated
instances were omitted. This process generated a total of 2,496,603 instances. Using
these instances, we binned them into bins of width 0.05 × 0.05 according to their
normalized capacity (αc) and normalized profit (αp). This allowed us to estimate
for each one of these bins the probability that the instance was satisfiable.
From the instances generated we selected the normalized capacity (αc) bin of
[0.40, 0.45] and chose the normalized profit bins that corresponded to the under-
constrained (low TCC; αp ∈ [0.35, 0.4]), satisfiability threshold region (high TCC;
αp ∈ [0.6, 0.65]) and over-constrained (low TCC; αp ∈ [0.85, 0.9]) regions. We
then randomly selected 18 instances from the under-constrained bin and 18 from
the over-constrained bin. Finally, we sampled 18 satisfiable instances and 18 non-
satisfiable instances from the satisfiability threshold bin (0.4-0.45). Throughout we
ensured that no weight/value combinations were sampled twice. In order to also
ensure enough variability among instances in the satisfiability threshold region we
added an additional constraint in the sampling from each bin. We forced half of the
instances selected in each of the bins close to the satisfiability threshold (high TCC)
to be easier than the median according to an algorithm specific ex-post complexity
measure and the other half to be harder than the median.
For this, we made use of an ex-post complexity measures based on a generic off-
the-shelf solver Gecode (Gecode Team 2006). Gecode is a constraint solver that uses
a constraint propagation technique with different search methods, such as branch-
and-bound. We implemented this solver using Minizinc (Nethercote et al. 2007).
A natural algorithm-specific complexity metric would be the time required for the
algorithm to solve the problem. However, computational time was not directly
used given that instances with only 6 items are solved rapidly by a computer, and
thus the signal-to-noise ratio of this measure is low. Instead, we chose complexity
measures that provide a good proxy of the search effort. Explicitly, we explored how
different proxies correlated with computational time when solving knapsack decision
instances with 15, 20, 25 and 30 items. We found that the number of propagations
had the highest correlations to computational time in the knapsack decision problem
(table E.5). This metric is an approximation of the number of options available for
exploration after constraint implementation. We used this measure as a proxy for
ex-post complexity to ensure enough variability among instances with high TCC.
A.2 Knapsack optimization problem
To generate instances for the task, a sampling process similar to the one for the
knapsack decision task was used. Taking the same combinations of weights and
values sampled for the knapsack decision task, a series of optimization problem in-
stances were generated by increasing (in discrete steps) the capacity constraint from
a lower bound of 1 to an upper bound equal to the sum of weights (
∑n
i=1 wi). Capac-
ities were rounded to the nearest integer and repeated instances were omitted. This
resulted in 24,892 instances. To compute the optimization typical-case complexity
(TCCO) of each of these instances, we computed the normalized value of the solution
(α∗p; see appendix C for details). We selected the same normalized capacity bin as
58
CHAPTER 3. THE KNAPSACK CASE
for the knapsack decision task (αc ∈ [0.4, 0.45]) and selected the normalized profit
of the solution such that the corresponding decision problem lied in the satisfiability
threshold region (high TCCO; α
∗
p ∈ [0.6, 0.65]) and in the over-constrained region
(low TCCO; α
∗
p ∈ [0.85, 0.9]). It is worth noting that the instance generation pro-
cess did not produce instances in the under-constrained region (α∗p ∈ [0.35 − 0.4]).
Again, we forced half of the instances selected in each of the bins in the satisfiabil-
ity threshold region (high TCCO) to be easier than the median, according to the
Gecode propagations measure, and the other half to be harder than the median. We
sampled a total of 18 instances, 12 with high TCCO and 6 with low TCCO.
Even though we used again Gecode propagations as a proxy for computational
time to ensure enough variability among instances with high TCC; it is worth noting
that the Gecode solver is not entirely comparable across the two variants of the
knapsack problem. Solving different problems might involve different algorithms
within one solver. Therefore, we verified whether the number of propagations could
be used as a proxy for the optimization variant as well and found that the correlations
of the complexity measures to computational time were similar across both problems
(table E.5).
Appendix B CANTAB tasks
Four tests from the Cambridge Neuropsychological Test Automated Battery (CANTAB;
Cognition 2017) are used to measure certain aspects of cognitive function such as
working memory and strategy use.
Reaction Time (RTI) Five yellow circles are displayed at the top of the screen,
whilst the participant must press and hold down a touchscreen button at the bottom
of the screen. When a spot appears inside one of the yellow circles the participant
must respond as quickly as possible by letting go of the button and touching the
circle where the yellow spot had appeared. This is repeated for 30 trials.
Paired Associates Learning (PAL) Boxes are displayed on the screen and open
one by one in a randomized order to reveal patterns hidden inside. The patterns
are then displayed in the middle of the screen, one at a time, and the subject must
touch the box where the pattern was originally located.
Spatial Working Memory (SWM) The test begins with colored boxes being
shown on the screen. The aim of this test is that, by touching the boxes and using
a process of elimination, the subject should find one ‘token’ in each of the boxes
and use them to fill up an empty column on the right hand side of the screen. The
computer will never hide a token in the same colored box, so once a token is found
in a box the participant should not return to that box to look for another token.
Spatial Span Task (SSP) White squares briefly change color in a variable se-
quence. The participant must remember the sequence and then touch the squares
in that same order. The sequence length increases through the test. There are up to
3 attempts at each sequence length and the test terminates if all three are failed.
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Appendix C Extension of TCC to the knapsack
optimization problem
The characterization of complexity using typical-case complexity (TCC) theory is
based on the satisfiability probability and therefore is only applicable to decision
problems. However, in everyday life we are likely to encounter optimization prob-
lems. In order to generalize the TCC measure we frame the knapsack optimization
problem (KOP) as a sequence of decision problems in which the question to solve
can be reduced to a chain of questions: “Is there another set of items with a higher
profit that still satisfies the weight capacity constraint?”. In other words, we model
the decision-maker as selecting a subset of items that satisfy the capacity constraint
and then decides whether there exist another combination that would yield them a
higher profit and still satisfy the constraint. If the answer is ‘yes’, the agent chooses
one of such combinations and asks himself the same question again. This process is
repeated until the answer is no, which means that the optimum has been reached. In
order to incorporate this approach into a TCC measure for optimization problems,
we generated a mapping of each KOP instance into a knapsack decision problem
(KDP) instance in which the optimum value of the KOP was used as the capacity of
the KDP instance (Definition 3.3). The TCC for the optimization problem (TCCO)
was defined as the TCC of the corresponding KDP. Just as with the TCC of the
KDP, we expected performance of human participants to be lower in those instances
that map into KDP instances with high TCC.
Definition 3.1. 0-1 Knapsack Optimization Problem (KOP) Let n ∈ N, c ∈ R and
ψ = {(w1, v1), ..., (wn, vn)} ∈ Rn×Rn. The KOP is a mapping K̊(c)n (ψ) : Rn×Rn →
R such that:








xiwi ≤ c, xi ∈ {0, 1}, i = 1, ..., n.
Definition 3.2. Knapsack Decision Problem (KDP)
Let n ∈ N, c, p ∈ R and ψ = {(w1, v1), ..., (wn, vn)} ∈ Rn × Rn. A KDP is a
mapping K
(c,p)
n : Rn × Rn → {0, 1} such that:
K̄(c,p)n (ψ) =

1 if ∃A ⊆ ψ s.t.∑
(wi,vi)∈Awi ≤ c and
∑
(wi,vi)∈A vi ≥ p
0 otherwise
Definition 3.3. A mapping m from a KOP to a KDP. m is defined as a mapping
from a KOP instance K̊(·) to a KDP instance K̄ ′n(·) such that:
K̄ ′(c,p)n (ψ) = K̄
(c,p′)
n (ψ) where p
′ = K̊(c)n (ψ)
Definition 3.4. TCCO of a KOP K̊(·) is defined as
TCCO(K̊
(c)
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Appendix D Expected number of solution witnesses
and the constrainedness of the solu-
tion space
In this section we characterize mathematically the expected number of witnesses
(number of subsets of items that satisfy the constraints) of a random ensemble of
instances of the knapsack decision problem. We start by presenting alternative
definitions of the knapsack problem that will be useful to characterize the expected
number of witnesses. Afterwards, we introduce the Dirichlet distribution, which will
be used to model the distribution of random instances. We then characterize math-
ematically the expected number of witnesses. Finally, we show how the expected
number of witnesses can be summarized into a single constrainedness parameter and
how this is related to computational requirements.
D.1 Defining the knapsack problem
We are interested in the KDP (definition 3.2); however, to analyze the characteristics
of the problem we investigate an analogous version of the problem that relates
KDP to the normalized capacity (αc = c/
∑n
i=1wi) and normalized profit (αp =
p/
∑n
i=1 vi). We call this the normalized knapsack decision problem (NKDP), which




(x1, . . . , xm+1) ∈ Rm+1|
m∑
i=1
xi = 1 and xi ≥ 0 ∀i
}
Definition 3.6. Normalized Knapsack Decision Problem (NKDP)
Let n ∈ N and αc, αp ∈ H = {x ∈ R|0 ≤ x ≤ 1}. A NKDP is a mapping
K
(αc,αp)









(wi,vi)∈A vi ≥ αp
0 otherwise
There is a correspondence between definitions 3.2 and 3.6; by normalizing the
weights and values of the former we obtain the latter. Explicitly, if ψ = {(w1, v1), ..., (wn, vn)} ∈
Rn × Rn and c, p ∈ R, we get that:
K̄(c,p)n (ψ) = K
(αc,αp)
n (ψ̂)
where ψ̂ = {(ŵ1, v̂1), ..., (ŵn, v̂n)} with ŵi = wi/
∑n
i=1 wi, v̂i = vi/
∑n
i=1 vi, αc =
c/
∑n
i=1wi and αp = p/
∑n
i=1 vi.
To simplify notation we now introduce an alternative version of definition 3.6:
Definition 3.7. Normalized Knapsack Decision Problem (NKDP): Analogous Def-
inition
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Let n ∈ N and αc, αp ∈ H = {x ∈ R|0 ≤ x ≤ 1}. A NKDP is a mapping
K
(αc,αp)




1 if ∃S ⊆ {1, 2, ..., n} s.t.∑
i∈S wi ≤ αc and
∑
i∈S vi ≥ αp
0 otherwise
Based on Definition 3.7, we define a subset specific NKDP. This is defined as a
NKDP in which the question is whether a specific subset of items (e.g., items one and
three) satisfy the normalized profit (αp) and normalized capacity (αc) constraints.
ssNKDP is defined for every set S in the power set P({1, 2, ..., n}).
Definition 3.8. Subset Specific Normalized Knapsack Decision Problem (ssNKDP)
Let n ∈ N, αc, αp ∈ H = {x ∈ R|0 ≤ x ≤ 1} and S ∈ P({1, 2, ..., n}). A ssNKDP
is a mapping K
(αc,αp,S)
n : 4n−1 ×4n−1 → {0, 1} such that for any ψ = {(w1, v1), ...,





i∈S wi ≤ αc and
∑
i∈S vi ≥ αp
0 otherwise
D.2 Sampling instances: The Dirichlet distribution
We now turn our attention to the process of generation of random instances. We
focus our attention on the Dirichlet probability distribution, which has been widely
studied and is particularly suited to describe distributions over a simplex. This
will allow us to characterize the expected number of witnesses of the NKDP in the
following section. In this section we define the Dirichlet distribution and present
some relevant properties.
Definition 3.9. Dirichlet Distribution
A random vector (X1, . . . , Xm) ∈ 4m−1 is said to follow a Dirichlet distribution
with parameters α = (α1, . . . , αm) ∈ (R+)m
(X1, . . . , Xm) ∼ Dir(α1, . . . , αm)








Lemma 3.1. Additive Property









Lemma 3.2. Marginal Distribution
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Let us turn back now to the knapsack problem and characterize the random
generation process of instances. Let weights and values be independently sampled
from two Dirichlet distributions:
(w1, . . . , wn) ∼ Dir(α, . . . , α)
(v1, . . . , vn) ∼ Dir(β, . . . , β)
where α, β ∈ R+. For simplicity we will restrict ourselves to the case where the n
weights and n values are both sampled uniformly from the (n− 1)-simplex:
(w1, . . . , wn) ∼ Dir(1, . . . , 1)
(v1, . . . , vn) ∼ Dir(1, . . . , 1)
The uniform case can be generalized easily to any other values of α and β.
D.3 Expected number of witnesses
Our aim is to characterize the expected number of witnesses of the NKDP when we
introduce randomness in the selection of the items ψ ∈ 4n−1 ×4n−1. In order to
do this we define first the random variable that captures the number of witnesses of
a ssNKDP:
Definition 3.10. Number of Witnesses of a ssNKDP
Let X
(αc,αp,S)
n : 4n−1 ×4n−1 → N such that
X(αc,αp,S)n (ψ) = K
(αc,αp,S)
n (ψ)
We now define the random variable of the number of witnesses of the NKDP as
the sum of X
(αc,αp,S)
n (ψ) over all possible subsets S ∈ P{1, . . . , n}:
Definition 3.11. Number of Witnesses of a NKDP
Let X
(αc,αp)





In order to calculate the expected value of X
(αc,αp)
n (ψ) it suffices to find the
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Given that X
(αc,αp,S)













for an arbitrary S ⊆ {1, . . . , n} and arbitrary αc, αp ∈ H = {x ∈ R|0 ≤ x ≤ 1}.



















Additionally, by Corollary 3.1, we can conclude that∑
i∈S
wi ∼ Beta(|S|, n− |S|)
∑
i∈S
vi ∼ Beta(|S|, n− |S|)
where |S| is the cardinality of the set. Therefore, if we denote the cumulative









































1− Iαp(j, n− j)
)
We summarize the above in the following result.
Result 3.1. NKDP expected number of witnesses
Let n ∈ N and αc, αp ∈ H = {x ∈ R|0 ≤ x ≤ 1}. If weights are sampled indepen-
dently from values from the following distributions: (wi, . . . , wn) ∼ Dir(1, . . . , 1) and

















1− Iαp(j, n− j)
)
In order to relate this result to the KDP we need to find a way of mapping a
distribution of weights and values in Rn to a distribution in 4n−1 and, in partic-
ular, to the Dirichlet distribution. Fortunately, every Dirichlet distribution can be
constructed from independent Gamma distributions:
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for i = 1, . . . , n
where Yi ∼ Gamma(αi, 1) and {Yi}mi=1 are mutually independent.
This implies the following result for KDP:
Result 3.2. KDP Expected number of witnesses
Let n ∈ N and αc, αp ∈ H = {x ∈ R|0 ≤ x ≤ 1}. If wi ∼ Gamma(1, 1) and




















n (ψ) is defined for the KDP analogously to X
(αc,αp)
n (ψ) for the NKDP
(definition 3.11).
Using these results it is possible to calculate the expected number of witnesses
for each αc, αp ∈ H = {x ∈ R|0 ≤ x ≤ 1}. We plot these values for different number
of items (Fig D.1).
D.4 Constrainedness, satisfiability probability and compu-
tational requirements
The expected number of witnesses is tightly connected to the satisfiability probabil-
ity. In particular, it has been suggested that the same parameters that characterizes
the satisfiability probability (i.e αc and αp) characterize the expected number of
witnesses. This has already been shown to apply to Boolean satisfiability prob-
lem (SAT), graph coloring and number partitioning (Ian P. Gent et al. 1996). In
the previous section we showed further support for this claim by showing that, like
the satisfiability probability, the expected number of witnesses of KDP (for a fixed
number of items n) is characterized by the same parameters, namely the normalized
profit αp and the normalized capacity αc. This suggests that the parameters related
to the satisfiability probability in a computational problem can be found by deriving
the analytical expression of the expected number of witnesses.
Notably, Ian P. Gent et al. 1996 proposed that the parameter κ, which depends
on the expected number of witnesses, characterizes the constrainedness of search.
Explicitly,
κ = 1− log2(Expected number of witnesses)
log2(|states|)
where states is the total state space of the problem.
We explore how the κ-parameter is related to the satisfiability phase transition
and to computational requirements in the KDP. In order to do this, we first calculate
κ. Note that in the knapsack, the states corresponds to all of the possible subsets
of items (i.e. S ∈ P({1, . . . , n})). In particular, we have that
|states| = |P({1, . . . , n})| = 2n
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(a) n=100
(b) n=50 (c) n=20
Figure D.1: Expected number of witnesses in the knapsack decision prob-
lem for different number of items (n). Weights and values are sampled from
independent uniform Dirichlet distributions. Equivalently, each value and weight is
sampled from an independent Gamma(1, 1) distribution and then normalized with
respect to the sum of values and weights, respectively.
























1− Iαp(j, n− j)
)]
To explore how κ is related to the satisfiability phase transition and the computa-
tional requirements of solving an instance we sampled 62,500 instances of the knap-
sack decision problem with n = 50 items. We solved the instances using the Gecode
solver (Gecode Team 2006) and calculated the satisfiability probability across the
αc × αp space. Additionally, we calculated a proxy for the average computational
time required to solve instances (the number of propagations). We found that, in
66

























































Figure D.2: κ for the Knapsack Decision Problem with 50 items. Weights
and values were independently sampled from a Gamma(1, 1) distribution. (a)
Isocurves with varying levels of κ in the αc × αp space. Each isocurve rep-
resents values of (αc, αp) at which instances have the same level of constrainedness.
(b) κ, satisfiability probability and computational requirements. Satisfi-
ability probability (probability of the existence of at least one witness; left axis)
and a proxy of solve-time (number of propagations; right axis). Both curves where
estimated from empirical simulations using the Gecode solver.
line with Ian P. Gent et al. 1996, κ characterizes a phase transition in the satisfiabil-
ity probability (Fig D.2b). Furthermore, we found that the average computational
requirements peak around the same value of κ where the phase transition occurs
(Fig D.2b). These results give support to the claim that κ characterizes a phase
transition in the satisfiability probability, which is closely related to the expected
computational requirements of solving an instance of the problem.
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Appendix E Tables
Table E.1: Pearson correlation between
knapsack task performance and cogni-
tive abilities. Performance in the knap-
sack decision task is characterized by accu-
racy and in the knapsack optimization task
is characterized by computational performance.
The cognitive abilities measured used were
mental arithmetic, episodic memory (PAL-
FAMS28), working memory (SSPFSL), strat-
egy use (SWMS) and spatial working memory
(weighted SWMTE, with errors on easier tasks
being weighted more). Results are shown with-
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Table E.2: Mixed effects linear regressions on
other performance measures in the knapsack
optimization task. Other measures of perfor-
mance in the knapsack optimization task. Linear
regressions with random intercept effects for partic-
ipants relating optimization typical-case complex-













Log likelihood 685.782 -441.574
Akaike Inf. Crit. -1,363.564 891.147
Bayesian Inf. Crit. -1,348.166 906.669
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table E.3: Effect of the number of item-subsets
that perform better than the current selection of
items on time before the next click. Time spent
after each item selection in the knapsack optimization
task. Linear regressions with random intercept effects for
participants relating the time-spent at each item selection
with IC and TCC (2), and the number of item-subsets
that perform better than the current selection of items.
Each selection of items is associated with the number of
item-subsets that satisfy the capacity constraint and have
higher sum of values than the current selection (1).
Dependent Variable
Time spent at each item selection
(1) (2)
Number of item-subsets -0.460∗∗∗










p < 0.001 p < 0.001
Observations 1781 1,781
Log likelihood -6,410.726 -6,392.535
Akaike Inf. Crit. 12,829.450 12,795.070
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 12,851.390 12,822.500
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table E.4: Model fit of alternative models relat-
ing human accuracy and instance complexity
(IC) in the knapsack decision task. Human ac-
curacy and complexity in the knapsack decision task.
R2 and AIC model fit values of alternative models.
Each of the models predicts average accuracy of an
instance based on the complexity of the instance. 2
instances were identified as outliers and excluded from
the analysis. The total number of observations in each
model is n = 70.
Model R2 AIC
accuracy = β0 + βIC × IC 0.296 -84.786
accuracy = β0 + βIC × IC0.5 0.433 -99.961
accuracy = β0 + βIC × IC0.1 0.529 -112.956
accuracy = β0 + βIC × IC0.05 0.537 -114.083
accuracy = β0 + βIC × IC0.01 0.542 -114.834
accuracy = β0 + βIC × ln(IC) 0.328 -88.018
accuracy = β0 + βIC × log(IC) 0.328 -88.018
accuracy = β0 + βTCC × TCC 0.213 -77.053
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Table E.5: Gecode solver: algorithm-specific complexity measures in the
knapsack problem. Spearman’s correlations between solver time and other solver
output variables for different sizes of the knapsack problem. The correlations cor-
respond to (a) the knapsack decision problem and (b) the knapsack optimization
problem. All correlations are significant at p < 0.001.
(a) Knapsack decision problem
Number of Items
15 20 25 30
propagations 0.95 0.99 1.00 1.00
nodes 0.95 0.98 0.99 1.00
failures 0.95 0.98 0.99 1.00
peak depth 0.46 0.24 0.18 0.08
(b) Knapsack optimization problem
Number of Items
15 20 25 30
propagations 0.77 0.90 0.98 0.99
nodes 0.76 0.90 0.98 0.99
failures 0.76 0.90 0.98 0.99
peak depth -0.16 -0.27 -0.35 -0.39
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Table E.6: Human performance in the knapsack decision task. Logistic regressions with
random intercept effects for participants relating the accuracy on an instance and trial number
(1), typical-case complexity (TCC) (2), TCC and the satisfiability (3), Over-constrained and
Under-constrained regions (4), Over-constrained and satisfiability threshold regions (5), TCC,
the number of witnesses and satisfiability (6) and instance complexity (IC) (7).
Dependent variable: human performance




TCC -1.327∗∗∗ -1.285∗∗∗ -1.208∗∗∗ -1.339∗∗∗
(0.161) (0.240) (0.202) (0.225)






















Constant 1.516∗∗∗ 2.451∗∗∗ 2.584∗∗∗ 1.125∗∗∗ 2.333∗∗∗ 2.627∗∗∗ -1.117∗∗
(0.150) (0.167) (0.224) (0.130) (0.206) (0.220) (0.544)
Observations 1,427 1,427 1,427 1,427 1,427 1,427 1,427
Log likelihood -639.577 -602.372 -600.149 -601.946 -601.946 -581.201 -624.276
Akaike Inf. Crit. 1,285.153 1,210.744 1,210.299 1,211.891 1,211.891 1,174.402 1,254.552
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 1,300.943 1,226.534 1,236.615 1,232.944 1,232.944 1,205.982 1,270.342
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table E.7: Computational performance in the knapsack optimization task.
Logistic regressions with random intercept effects for participants relating computa-
tional performance on an instance and trial number (1), optimization typical-case








Time spent (scaled) -0.089
(0.735)
p = 0.905
Typical-case complexity (TCCO) -2.175
∗∗∗ -2.420∗∗∗
(0.531) (0.817)
p < 0.001 p = 0.004









Constant 1.512∗∗∗ 3.359∗∗∗ 3.914∗∗∗ 2.310∗∗∗ 4.975∗∗∗
(0.261) (0.509) (0.796) (0.219) (0.865)
Observations 358 358 305 358 305
Log likelihood -161.752 -147.622 -115.185 -135.816 -124.754
Akaike Inf. Crit. 329.504 301.245 240.369 277.633 255.509
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 341.146 312.887 258.971 289.274 266.670
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table E.8: Effort in the knapsack optimization task. Linear regressions with random
intercept effects for participants relating time spent on an instance and trial number
(1), optimization typical-case complexity (TCCO) (2), Sahni-k (3), TCCO together with
computational performance (4), and TCCO together with Sahni-k (5).
Dependent variable
Time spent







p < 0.001 p = 0.037 p < 0.001
Sahni-k 3.125∗∗∗ 1.489
(0.950) (2.687)







Computational performance : TCCO -6.784
(7.374)
p = 0.358
Constant 41.802∗∗∗ 35.749∗∗∗ 41.469∗∗∗ 36.227∗∗∗ 35.498∗∗∗
(2.210) (2.132) (1.990) (7.379) (2.178)
Observations 305 305 305 305 305
Log likelihood -1,188.894 -1,156.717 -1,181.856 -1,142.942 -1,151.532
Akaike Inf. Crit. 2,385.788 2,321.433 2,371.712 2,297.885 2,315.065
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 2,400.670 2,336.314 2,386.593 2,320.207 2,337.386
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Generality of the Hardness
Metrics
In this chapter I present the co-authored paper titled “Task-independent metrics of
computational hardness predict performance of human problem-solving”. There we
explore whether the metrics of computational hardness studied in the previous chap-
ter are indeed generic metrics of hardness that affect human behavior across tasks.
Specifically, we extend and compare the results found for the knapsack problem to
two other canonical computational problems: the traveling salesperson problem and
the Boolean satisfiability problem (3SAT).
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Task-independent metrics of computational
hardness predict performance of human
problem-solving
Juan Pablo Franco, Karlo Doroc, Nitin Yadav, Peter Bossaerts, Carsten Murawski
Abstract
The survival of human organisms depends on our ability to solve complex
tasks, which is bounded by our limited cognitive capacities. However, lit-
tle is known about the factors that drive complexity of the tasks humans
face and their effect on human decision-making. Here, using insights
from computational complexity theory, we quantify computational hard-
ness using a set of task-independent metrics related to the computational
requirements of individual instances of a task. We then examine the re-
lation between those metrics and human behavior and find that these
metrics predict both performance and effort allocation in three canoni-
cal cognitive tasks in a similar way. Our findings demonstrate that the
ability to solve complex tasks can be predicted from generic metrics of
their inherent computational hardness.
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4.1 Introduction
The adaptiveness of human organisms is bounded by their limited cognitive capac-
ities, sometimes referred to as bounded rationality (Herbert A Simon 1990). In the
words of Herbert Simon, “[h]uman rational behavior [. . . ] is shaped by a scissors
whose two blades are the structure of task environments and the computational
capabilities of the actor” (Herbert A Simon 1990).
In the past several decades, the study of human behavior has focused predom-
inantly on the latter. This work characterizes cognitive capacities and cognitive
strategies, algorithms and heuristics people use in different task environments. It
includes approaches such as the heuristics and biases program (Tversky and Kahne-
man 1974), resource and computational rationality (Griffiths, Lieder, and Goodman
2015; Gershman, Horvitz, and Tenenbaum 2015) as well as ecological rationality
(Todd and Gerd Gigerenzer 2012), among others. However, very little is known
about how properties of the task environment affects computational requirements
and how they compare to bounds of human cognitive capacities.
Several studies have explored how the task environment affects the performance
of specific algorithms or cognitive strategies (Murawski and Bossaerts 2016; Dry
et al. 2006; Guid and Bratko 2013). However, this approach ignores the diversity in
strategies implemented not only across humans, but also across situations. Even if
the task environment is the same, different people might approach a task using dif-
ferent procedures and might change their procedures depending on the situation or
their level of experience (MacGregor and Chu 2011; Hirtle and Gärling 1992; Mu-
rawski and Bossaerts 2016; Ohlsson 2012; Gerd Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier 2011;
Payne, Bettman, and E. J. Johnson 1993). Understanding the interaction between
task environment and an agent’s computational capabilities is then particularly dif-
ficult given the lack of a generic cognitive strategy.
A principled and generic way to characterize the computational requirements of
a task environment is to formalize the task as a computational problem and analyze
its problem complexity. Here, computational requirements are typically analyzed at
the level of problems, such as sorting an array of numbers. These requirements are
typically expressed in terms of asymptotic worst-case growth of a resource such as
compute time or memory. This means that resource requirements are characterized
in terms of their growth as a function of the input size of the problem, for example,
the length of the array to be sorted. Importantly, this is generally done by con-
sidering the growth in requirements in the worst-case as the input size increases.
Problems with similar resource requirements, thus defined, are then grouped into
complexity classes (Arora and Barak 2009).
As it stands, problem complexity is not amenable to modeling human behavior
directly. Critically, although this approach can shed light on the a priori plausibil-
ity of models of human behavior (van Rooij et al. 2019), it is inadequate for the
derivation of empirically testable predictions at finer detail. First, while complex-
ity classes are based on asymptotic growth of resources, in practice many instances
(that is, cases of a problem) people face are small in size (Blum and Vempala 2020).
Second, complexity classes are typically based on worst-case growth of resources.
This means that hardness is defined in terms of resources required to solve the most
difficult instance of a problem. However, in most cases, there is substantial variation
in resource requirements of instances of the same input size (Gent and Walsh 1996;
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Cheeseman, Kanefsky, and Taylor 1991), and the worst case is often far away from
typical, or average, cases and may not be encountered in the natural environment
(Bogdanov and Trevisan 2006). Third, the approach classifies problems according
to hardness, like a taxonomy, but it does not identify the sources of hardness, for ex-
ample, which properties of instances make some harder than others. What would be
desirable is a set of generic properties of individual instances of a class of problems
that are associated with computational hardness in a way that is independent of
the problem it belongs to. Similar to how properties like mean, variance and other
statistics characterize the level of uncertainty in the class of probabilistic problems.
However, there is as yet no analog for characterizing computational hardness.
There is limited research on how properties of instances of problems affect human
problem-solving. To date, most studies are based on a problem-specific approach
(MacGregor and Chu 2011; Hirtle and Gärling 1992; Kotovsky, Hayes, and H. A.
Simon 1985; Shepard and Metzler 1971). Hence, their findings may not generalize
to other problems. Recent theoretical advances in computer science and statistical
physics provide a framework, referred to as typical-case complexity (TCC), that
addresses this issue. It allows the characterization of computational hardness of in-
dividual instances of a problem. More specifically, it is concerned with the average
computational hardness of random instances of a computational problem, linking
structural properties of those instances to their computational complexity, inde-
pendent of a particular computational model (Gent and Walsh 1996; Cheeseman,
Kanefsky, and Taylor 1991; Percus, Istrate, and Moore 2006; Monasson et al. 1999;
Mézard, Parisi, and Zecchina 2002). This work has identified computational ‘phase
transitions’, which resemble phase transitions in statistical physics and which are
related to computational hardness of instances. Such phase transitions have been
found in a number of canonical NP-complete problems (i.e., problems that are both
in NP and NP-hard) (Gent and Walsh 1996; Cheeseman, Kanefsky, and Taylor
1991; Percus, Istrate, and Moore 2006; Monasson et al. 1999; Mézard, Parisi, and
Zecchina 2002), including the graph coloring problem (Cheeseman, Kanefsky, and
Taylor 1991; Krzakala et al. 2006), the traveling salesperson problem (Gent and
Walsh 1996) and the K-SAT problems (Boolean satisfiability problems) (Cheese-
man, Kanefsky, and Taylor 1991; Selman and Kirkpatrick 1996; Krzakala et al.
2006), among others. This program has led to a deeper understanding of computa-
tional hardness by relating it to structural properties of instances. Importantly, it
has identified that hardness of an instance is related to a generic instance property,
namely constrainedness (see Fig 4.2.1). The framework has also been useful for un-
derstanding patterns in the performance of algorithms (Zdeborová and Marc Mézard
2008; Krzakala et al. 2006), and subsequently, generating more efficient algorithms
(Mézard, Parisi, and Zecchina 2002).
A recent study applied this framework to study human behavior in the knapsack
problem, a (NP-hard) combinatorial optimization problem (Franco et al. 2020). The
study found that both effort (time-on-task) and ability to solve an instance were
related to computational phase transitions, with patterns similar to those exhibited
by generic constrained optimization algorithms. An important question is whether
these findings generalize to other problems. If they do, then these properties related
to computational complexity would be prime candidates for generic measures of
computational hardness of human cognition, in the way that statistics like mean,
variance and kurtosis serve as generic measures of probabilistic uncertainty in a task
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(Preuschoff, Bossaerts, and Quartz 2006).
Here, using a behavioral experiment, we study the relation between a set of
problem-independent measures of instance complexity and human performance in
two canonical NP-complete computational problems, the Boolean satisfiability prob-
lem (3SAT) and the traveling salesperson problem (TSP). We then compare those
results to results previously obtained for the 0-1 knapsack decision problem (KP)
(Franco et al. 2020), to test their generalizability across NP-complete problems.
4.2 Results
Each participant solved one of the three problems: either 72 instances of the TSP
task, 64 instances of the 3SAT or 72 instances of the KP (Figs 4.2.1,4.4.1). TSP is the
problem of determining whether a path of a particular length (or less), connecting
a set of cities, exists or not. 3SAT is the problem of determining whether a set of
variable configurations (true/false) exist that render a set of clauses true. And KP
is the problem of determining whether there exists a subset of items with differing
values and weights exceeding a minimum total value while not exceeding a maximum
total weight. All three problems are decision problems, that is, problems whose
answer is either ‘yes’ or ‘no’. If there exists a configuration of variables such that
the solution of the instance is ‘yes’, the instance is called satisfiable and unsatisfiable
otherwise.
Instances varied in their computational hardness (see Materials and Methods).
Both TSP and 3SAT were self-paced (with time limits per trial), while the KP was
not. Results for KP have previously been reported elsewhere and are included here
for comparison only (Franco et al. 2020).
4.2.1 Summary statistics
We first present summary statistics for each of the three tasks. We measured per-
formance as a binary outcome, depending on whether a participant’s response was
correct or not. Additionally, we studied effort by analyzing time-on-task. This cap-
tures another dimension of the agent’s problem-solving process that is not entirely
determined by performance because, unlike algorithms implemented by electronic
computers, humans have the option to stop working independently of the solving
strategy. It is worth noting that the effort analysis was not performed for the KP,
since this task was not self-paced.
In the TSP, all instances had 20 cities and a time limit of 40 s. The number
of cities and time limit were selected, based on pilot data, to ensure that the task
was neither too difficult nor too easy (see Materials and Methods). Mean human
performance, measured as the proportion of trials in which a correct response was
made, was 0.85 (min = 0.76, max = 0.93, SD = 0.05). Participants’ average
time spent on an instance was 32.2 s and ranged from 19.9 s to 39.2 s (SD = 5.2).
Performance did not vary during the course of the task, but time-on-task decreased
as the task progressed (Appendix C).
All instances of the 3SAT task had 5 variables and a time limit of 110 s. Similar
to TSP, the number of variables and time limit were selected, based on pilot data, to
target a specific average performance (≈ 85%; see Materials and Methods). Mean
human performance was 0.87 (min = 0.75, max = 0.98, SD = 0.06). The average
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Figure 4.2.1: 3SAT problem, complexity metrics and experimental design.
The problem. The aim is to determine whether a Boolean formula is satisfiable.
The task. The Boolean formula is represented with a set of light bulbs (clauses),
each of which has three switches underneath (literals) that are characterized by a
positive or negative number. The number on each switch represents the variable
number, which can be turned on or off (TRUE or FALSE). The aim is to deter-
mine whether there exists a way of turning on and off variables such that all the
light bulbs are turned on (formula evaluates TRUE). Instance properties. The
constrainedness of the problem (α) is captured by the ratio of clauses to variables.
This parameter characterizes the probability that a random instance of the problem
is satisfiable. In the limit this probability undergoes a phase transition around the
satisfiability threshold (αs). Complexity metrics. Instances near this threshold
are on average harder to solve than instances further away. Average hardness is
captured by the typical-case complexity metric (TCC). This metric can be esti-
mated entirely from the features of the problem (feature-space) without the need to
solve the problem. Alternatively, instance complexity (IC) can be estimated from
features of the solution-space. IC is characterized as the difference between the con-
strainedness of the instance (α) and α∗, the maximum number of clauses that can
be satisfied normalized by the number of clauses.
Does there exist {"!}!"#,…,& ∈ %&'(, *+,-( s.t.
(¬"3 ∨ ¬"4 ∨ "5) ∧ ("2 ∨ "3 ∨ ¬"4) ∧ ¬"1 ∨ "2 ∨ ¬"3
evaluates %&'(?
Boolean Satisfiability (SAT)












IC(|1 - 1 *|)TCC(|1 - 1s|)
Task

















time spent on an instance varied from a minimum of 15.9 s to a maximum of 104.3
s (mean = 60.2, SD = 18.7). Similar to TSP, performance did not vary during the
course of the task, but participants tended to spend less time on a trial as the task
progressed (Appendix C).
In the KP decision task implemented by Franco et al. 2020, all instances had
6 items. This task was not self-paced, that is, participants had exactly 25 seconds
to solve each instance and could not skip to the next screen before the time ended.
Mean human performance was 83.1% (min = 0.56, max = 0.9, SD = 0.08). Like
in the other two tasks, performance did not vary during the course of the task
(Appendix C).
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4.2.2 Feature-space complexity metrics
We now examine how generic properties of instances affect the quality of decisions
and the computational effort exerted. We study two types of properties: feature-
space and solution-space metrics. The main difference between them is that feature-
space metrics can be estimated from mathematical properties of the instance without
any knowledge of an instance’s solution, whereas the calculation of solution-space
metrics require knowledge of an instance’s solution, that is, require the solution to
be computed (Fig 4.2.1).
We first examine the effect of typical-case complexity (TCC), a feature-space
metric of complexity, on human performance and effort. This measure is based on
a framework in computer science developed to study the drivers of computational
hardness in computational problems by analyzing the difficulty of randomly gener-
ated instances of those problems. The study of random instances has revealed that
there is substantial variation in computational resource requirements for instances
with the same input length (Cheeseman, Kanefsky, and Taylor 1991; Percus, Is-
trate, and Moore 2006; Gent and Walsh 1996; Yadav et al. 2020). This variation in
computational hardness has recently been related to various structural properties of
instances. In particular, it has been shown for several intractable (specifically, NP-
complete) problems, including the KP (Yadav et al. 2020), TSP (Gent and Walsh
1996) and 3SAT (Monasson et al. 1999; Mézard, Parisi, and Zecchina 2002), that
there exists a set of parameters ᾱ that captures the constrainedness of an instance.
Moreover, it has been shown that there is a threshold αs such that random in-
stances with α  αs are mostly satisfiable whereas they are mostly unsatisfiable
if α  αs. Importantly for our study, it has been shown for each of the problems
under consideration that instances near αs are, on average, computationally harder
than instances further away from αs (Yadav et al. 2020; Gent and Walsh 1996;
Cheeseman, Kanefsky, and Taylor 1991; Percus, Istrate, and Moore 2006). In our
study, we sampled instances with varying values of α and categorize instances with
α ∼ αs as instances with a high TCC and instances with α αs or α αs as low
TCC (see Fig 4.2.2 and Materials and Methods).
We first examine the effect of TCC on human performance across problems.
We hypothesized that participants would have lower performance on instances with
high TCC compared to those with low TCC. We found that this was indeed the
case for both TSP and 3SAT as well as for KP (TSP: β0.5 = −2.10, HDI0.95 =
[−2.50,−1.73], Table F.2 Model 2; 3SAT: β0.5 = −1.58, HDI0.95 = [−1.95,−1.20],
Table F.1 Model 2; KP: β = −1.327 P < 0.001, main effect of TCC on performance,
GLMM; Fig 4.2.2a).
Instances with an α  αs or α  αs are considered to have a low TCC. How-
ever, these instances belong to two structurally different regions, namely an over-
constrained and an underconstrained region. We studied whether differences in con-
strainedness affected performance among low TCC instances. We found that for the
TSP and 3SAT, there was no difference in performance between underconstrained
and overconstrained regions (TSP: β0.5 = 0.14, HDI0.95 = [−0.58, 0.87], Table F.2
Model 3; 3SAT: β0.5 = −0.43, HDI0.95 = [−1.12, 0.28], Table F.1 Model 3; the differ-
ence in effect, overconstrained−underconstrained, on performance, GLMM). These
results are consistent with those obtained previously in relation to KP (β = 0.250,
P = 0.355, the difference in effect, overconstrained− underconstrained, on perfor-
mance, GLMM; Fig 4.2.2a). Taken together, these findings suggest that the mapping
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Figure 4.2.2: Typical-case complexity (TCC). (a) Human performance and
satisfiability probability. Each dot represents an instance of one of the three
problems considered. For each instance human performance corresponds to the
proportion of participants that solved an instance correctly. The instances are cat-
egorized according to their constrainedness region (α) and their TCC. The correct
solution (satisfiability) of an instance is represented by its color. (b) Time-on-task
and TCC. Median time spent solving an instance before submitting an answer.
Time is represented as a proportion of the maximum time allotted on each trial
(40s in the TSP and 110s in the 3SAT). (c) Satisfiability probability and con-
strainedness parameter α. Probability that a random instance is satisfiable as a
function of α (the probability is empirically estimated; see Materials and Methods).
In the underconstrained region (low TCC) the satisfiability probability is close to
one while in the overconstrained region (low TCC) the probability is close to zero.
The region with a high TCC corresponds to a region in which the probability is
close to 0.5. The box-plots represent the median, the interquartile range (IQR) and
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between α and TCC captures the effect of α on performance.
We also expected TCC to have an effect on time-on-task. We hypothesized that
participants would spend more time on instances with high TCC. We found this to be
the case for 3SAT and TSP (3SAT: β0.5 = 0.149, HDI0.95 = [0.116, 0.182], Table F.3
Model 2; TSP: β0.5 = 0.118, HDI0.95 = [0.090, 0.147], Table F.4 Model 2; effect of
TCC on time-on-task as a proportion of the maximum possible time, censored linear
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mixed-effects models (CLMM), Fig 4.2.2b). The effect was mainly driven by the con-
strainedness level (α). Specifically, participants spent less time-on-task on instances
in the underconstrained region (3SAT: β0.5 = −0.352, HDI0.95 = [−0.385,−0.318]
Table F.3 Model 3; TSP: β0.5 = −0.199, HDI0.95 = [−0.233,−0.164], Table F.4
Model 3; difference in time-on-task between instances in the underconstrained re-
gion and those with high TCC (α ∼ αs), CLMM). In the TSP, participants spent
less time on overconstrained instances compared to those instances with α ∼ αs,
but this effect was not significant (β0.5 = −0.024, HDI0.95 = [−0.059, 0.011], differ-
ence in time-on-task between instances in the overconstrained region and α ∼ αs,
CLMM; Table F.4 Model 3). In contrast, in the 3SAT participants spent more time
on overconstrained regions compared to those instances with α ∼ αs (β0.5 = 0.071,
HDI0.95 = [0.036, 0.106], difference in time-on-task between instances in the over-
constrained region and with high TCC, CLMM; Table F.3 Model 3). It is worth
noting that in 3SAT, the more constrained the problem is, the higher the amount
of clauses presented, which could have driven this effect.
Our results so far show that participants expend more effort on instances with
higher TCC and yet they perform worse on these instances. This suggests a negative
correlation between time-spent and performance (TSP: β0.5 = −0.1, HDI0.95 =
[−0.13,−0.08], Table F.2 Model 5; 3SAT: β0.5 = −0.02, HDI0.95 = [−0.02,−0.01],
Table F.1 Model 5); effect of time-spent on performance, GLMM).
4.2.3 Solution-space complexity metrics
In the previous section, we studied the effects of feature-space complexity metrics
on human performance and effort. These metrics can be estimated based on a
problem’s input, that is, without the need to solve the instance. We now turn our
attention to complexity metrics based on an instance’s solution space. We will use
the term solution space to refer to the set of solution witnesses of an instance, that
is, the set of configurations of variables (e.g., possible paths or variable assignments)
that satisfy an instance’s constraints. Note that in order to estimate solution-space
metrics, the instance, or a harder variant, has to be solved. In some cases, all
possible solution witnesses must be found.
An important difference in the structure of instances, is their satisfiability, that is,
whether the instance’s solution is ‘yes’ or ‘no’. We found that satisfiability affects
performance but that this effect varies between problems. In 3SAT, participants
performed worse on satisfiable instances (β0.5 = −1.35, HDI0.95 = [−1.73,−0.99],
main effect of satisfiability, GLMM, Table F.1 Model 8), whereas there was no
significant effect of satisfiability on performance in the TSP and the KP (TSP:
β0.5 = −0.06, HDI0.95 = [−0.34, 0.22], Table F.2 Model 6; KP: β0.5 = −0.29,
HDI0.95 = [−0.57, 0.01], Table F.6 Model 1; main effect of satisfiability, GLMM).
Turning our attention to the effect of satisfiability on time-on-task, we find
that less time was spent on satisfiable instances in both TSP and 3SAT (TSP:
β0.5 = −0.17, HDI0.95 = [−0.20,−0.15], Table F.4 Model 4; 3SAT: β0.5 = −0.32,
HDI0.95 = [−0.35,−0.29], Table F.3 Model 4; effect of satisfiability on time-on-task,
CLMM). We further explored the effect of satisfiability by studying its interaction
effect with TCC. We only found an interaction effect between satisfiability and TCC
in 3SAT, in relation to both performance and time-on-task (Fig 4.2.2; Appendix A).
In summary, we observed that participants spent less time-on-task on satisfiable
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instances in both TSP and 3SAT, yet the effect of satisfiability on performance
varied across problems. Moreover, our results suggest that satisfiability and TCC
might interact and affect performance and time-on-task on some problems.
We can analyze the drivers of hardness in satisfiable instances at a more granu-
lar level by studying the number of solution witnesses of an instance. This generic
feature of decision instances captures the constrainedness of an instance: a higher
value of witnesses is related to a lower degree of constrainedness. It is worth noting
that this metric is only informative for satisfiable instances (by definition, unsatisfi-
able instances have zero solution witnesses). Thus, we restrict our analysis to these
instances.
We found, in line with our hypothesis, a positive effect of the number of witnesses
on performance in all three problems (3SAT: β0.5 = 0.62, HDI0.95 = [0.49, 0.79];
TSP: β0.5 = 0.45, HDI0.95 = [0.37, 0.53]; KP: β0.5 = 0.26, HDI0.95 = [0.19, 0.34];
main effect of the number of witnesses on performance, GLMM; Table F.5 Mod-
els 1,4,6; Fig 4.2.3a). We further hypothesized that participants would spend less
time solving instances with a higher number of witnesses. This was indeed the
case (TSP: β0.5 = −0.02, HDI0.95 = [−0.03,−0.02], Table F.4 Model 5; 3SAT:
β0.5 = −0.041, HDI0.95 = [−0.047,−0.036], Table F.3 Model 5; effect of number of
witnesses on time-on-task, CLMM; Fig 4.2.3b)). These results suggests that, among
satisfiable instances, the more constrained an instance, the harder it is to solve.
It is worth noting that the number of witnesses is a metric conceptually similar to
TCC. After all, TCC is a mapping from expected constrainedness (α) to hardness.
We studied the link between these metrics and found that the effect of TCC on
performance on satisfiable instances is driven, at least partially, by the number of
witnesses of an instance (see Appendix D).
An alternative solution-space complexity metric that can be used to study the
difficulty of all instances (both satisfiable and unsatisfiable) is instance complexity
(IC) (Franco et al. 2020). It is related to the constrainedness of an instance and
the order parameter ᾱ. It is defined based on the distance between the decision
threshold of an instance and the maximum attainable value in the optimization
variant of the instance. For example, the optimization variant of an instance of the
TSP corresponds to finding the minimum path-length connecting all cities. For the
KP, it corresponds to finding the maximum value that can fit into the knapsack
given the weight constraint. Analogously, for the 3SAT, the optimization version
(MAX-SAT) corresponds to finding the maximum number of clauses that can be
rendered true simultaneously.
We define IC as the absolute value of the normalized difference between target
value of the decision variant and the maximum value attainable of the corresponding
optimization variant. In the KP, for example, it is the absolute value of the difference
between target profit of the decision instance and the maximum profit attainable
of the corresponding optimization instance, divided by the sum of the values of all
items, that is,
ICKP =
∣∣αp − α?p∣∣ = ∣∣∣Target profit−Maximum profit attainable∑ vi
∣∣∣,
where the decision instance and the corresponding optimization instance have
the same set of items and the same total weight (capacity) constraint. Intuitively,
IC in KP is the normalized value of the distance between the target profit of a
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Figure 4.2.3: Number of solution witnesses. The number of witnesses is defined
as the number of state-space combinations (i.e., paths, items or switch-setups) that
satisfy the constraints. On satisfiable instances, the problem becomes harder as the
number of witnesses approaches 0. Only satisfiable instances are included. (a) Hu-
man performance. Each green shape represents the mean accuracy per instance.
The blue line represents the marginal effect of the number of solution witnesses on
human performance (GLMM Table F.5 Models 1,4,6). (b) Time-on-task. Each
green shape represents the median time-on-task per instance. The blue line rep-
resents the marginal effect (and 95% credible interval) of the number of solution
witnesses on time-on-task (LMM Table F.4 Model 5 and Table F.3 Model 5). Each
black dot corresponds to the time-on-task of one participant while solving a single
instance.
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decision instance and the maximum profit that can be attained with the same set
of items and the same capacity constraint. The corresponding expressions for TSP
and 3SAT are provided in the Methods section.
We studied the effect of IC on performance and effort in each of the problems.
Note that lower values of IC indicate that the decision threshold is closer to the op-
timum, which corresponds to a higher level of computational hardness. Therefore,
we expected a positive relation between IC and performance. We found a positive
non-linear relation in all problems (KP: β0.5 = 9.05, HDI0.95 = [7.20, 11.02], Ta-
ble F.6 Model 2; TSP: β0.5 = 21.13, HDI0.95 = [17.63, 24.91], Table F.2 Model 7;
3SAT: β0.5 = 30.30, HDI0.95 = [21.95, 39.24], Table F.1 Model 6; the effect of IC
on performance, GLMM; Fig 4.2.4a).
IC is a metric at the level of individual instances and thus we expected that it
captures a substantial amount of the variability in performance between instances.
Indeed, IC was able to explain a high proportion of the variance in average instance
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Figure 4.2.4: Instance complexity. Instances become harder as IC = |αp − α?p|
approaches 0. (a) Human performance. Green and orange shapes represent the
mean accuracy for each instance. The blue lines represents the marginal effect of IC
on human performance (GLMM Table F.6 Model 2, Table F.2 Model 7, Table F.1
Model 6). (b) Time-on-task. Green and orange shapes represent the median
time-on-task for each instance of the TSP and 3SAT problems. The blue lines
represents the marginal effect (and 95% credible interval) of IC on time-on-task
(LMM Table F.4 Model 6, Table F.3 Model 6). Each black dot corresponds to the















































performance in the TSP and the KP (KP: R2 = 0.65; TSP: R2 = 0.75) but was
lower in 3SAT (3SAT: R2 = 0.16). We explore this further in the Appendix E.
Next, we explored how well IC predicted time-on-task. We expected a negative
relation between IC and the average time spent on an instance. This was the case for
TSP (β0.5 = −0.735, HDI0.95 = [−0.901,−0.581], main effect of IC on time-on-task,
CLMM; Table F.4 Model 6; Fig 4.2.4b), but for the 3SAT we found a significant
positive effect (β0.5 = 6.04, HDI0.95 = [5.41, 6.70], main effect of IC on time-on-task,
CLMM; Table F.3 Model 6; Fig 4.2.4b). Based on this result, we hypothesized that
the positive effect of IC on time-on-task in 3SAT could have been driven by the
effect of satisfiability, but we are unable to test this hypothesis directly. Therefore,
we investigated the effect of IC on time-on-task in unsatisfiable instances only and
found a non-significant negative effect (β0.5 = −0.557, HDI0.95 = [−1.912, 0.782],
main effect of IC on time-on-task for unsatisfiable instances, CLMM; Table F.3
Model 7). These results indicate a negative relation between IC and time-on-task
in the TSP, whereas in 3SAT the results are inconclusive.
We have shown that generic instance-level complexity metrics are able to ex-
plain differences in performance and time-on-task across instances and problems.
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However, it remains an open question whether these generic properties can shed
light on how humans solve those problems. To explore this question, we investi-
gated whether our metrics could explain differences in the number of clicks across
instances. The number of clicks is a useful metric in studying the algorithms im-
plemented by humans. Specifically, the number of clicks is related to the way that
the problem’s state space is explored. In the 3SAT, the state space consists of all
possible on-off switch setups (25 possible combinations) while in the TSP the state
space consists of all possible ordered path selections (2(
20
2 ) = 2190 possible combina-
tions). Arguably, participants search the state space by clicking on different state
combinations in order to decide whether an instance is satisfiable or not. Differences
in the quantity of clicks used to solve an instance can shed light into how the state
space is explored (under the assumption that the state space is explored by clicking
on elements in the task). We investigated whether generic properties of the instance
captured differences in the number of clicks.
We found that the length of search in the state space, that is, the set of paths
or variable configurations, is related to two properties of the instance, namely sat-
isfiability and complexity. Search was longer in general in the case of unsatisfiable
instances and there was a positive effect of TCC on search length. Moreover, longer
search was also related to lower values of IC and lower number of witnesses (see
Appendix B). These patterns suggest that the length of search in the state space
can be explained, at least partially, by the properties of an instance. Interestingly,
the effect of our metrics on performance can shed light on the possible strategies
used by participants (see Discussion).
4.3 Discussion
Human behavior arises as an interaction between the agent, subject to limited cog-
nitive capacities, and its environment (Herbert A Simon 1990). Much research on
this interaction to date has focused in characterizing cognitive strategies employed
by agents in a given environment (Tversky and Kahneman 1974; Todd and Gerd
Gigerenzer 2012; Gerd. Gigerenzer and Selten 2001). Comparatively little work has
investigated how properties of the task environment relate to cognitive demands
and how these interact with cognitive capacities. In the present study, we propose a
generic framework for quantifying computational hardness of cognitive tasks based
on structural properties of individual instances of the the underlying computational
problem. We find that a set of metrics based on these properties predict both
task performance and effort exerted across three cognitive tasks related to different
NP-complete computational problems.
More specifically, using a controlled experiment, we show that three generic
properties of NP-complete problems, typical-case complexity (TCC), the number
of solution witnesses, and instance complexity (IC), affect human performance and
effort exerted when performing a task. While the extent of effort increased with
higher complexity of instances, efficacy, and thus performance in those instances,
decreased. We show that the relation between the complexity metrics presented
on the one hand and task performance and effort exerted on the other, are similar
across three different NP-complete problems.
Our results complement findings from computer science and suggest that hard-
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ness stems partially from intrinsic difficulty of the problem and the instance, re-
gardless of the algorithm and the computing device used. In particular, our findings
suggest that the same intrinsic hardness metrics describe the performance of algo-
rithms executed by both electronic computers (Gent and Walsh 1996; Cheeseman,
Kanefsky, and Taylor 1991; Percus, Istrate, and Moore 2006; Monasson et al. 1999;
Mézard, Parisi, and Zecchina 2002; Yadav et al. 2020) and humans. This is particu-
larly interesting because the theory in which our analysis is based is derived without
taking into account limits on human computation. For instance, no memory con-
straints are imposed on the solving algorithms. Interestingly, our results also show
that computational hardness affects how much time an agent decides to spend on an
instance. This is far from obvious because, unlike the standard algorithms executed
by electronic computers, humans have the option to stop working independently of
the solving strategy.
Critically, our results provide support for the premise that a comprehensive and
accurate characterization of human behavior requires the study of both ‘blades’ of
the scissors: an agent’s cognitive capacities as well as the task environment. The
proposed approach can shed light on how to operationalize bounded rationality
(Herbert A Simon 1990) by shaping the canvas to which cognition must be confined
in order to model a computationally feasible agent.
4.3.1 Computational complexity in cognition
The role of computational complexity in cognition has been studied before. Prob-
lem complexity has been used to study the limits of what is potentially human
computable (van Rooij et al. 2019; Frixione 2001; Tsotsos 1990). According to this
work, many tasks we face in our lives—and corresponding computational models
of human behavior—are computationally intractable (NP-hard) (van Rooij et al.
2019), including planning, learning and many forms of reasoning (for example, anal-
ogy, abduction and Bayesian inference) (van Rooij et al. 2019). This means that
the computational requirements quickly grow to levels that make solving those tasks
infeasible within a reasonable amount of time and memory.
This analysis is, however, too coarse to explain differences in performance and
behavior across the class of human-computable problems. Such differences have
generally been ascribed to the solver or the agent (Murawski and Bossaerts 2016;
Bourgin et al. 2017; Shepard and Metzler 1971; Dry et al. 2006; Guid and Bratko
2013; Stazyk, Ashcraft, and Hamann 1982; De Visscher and Noël 2014). This ap-
proach, however, is problematic given the diversity of algorithms implemented and
their specificity to a particular problem (Ohlsson 2012).
We propose that a new level of analysis be included in the study of cognition:
instance-level complexity. This additional level of analysis describes the generic or
intrinsic complexity of problems at a more granular level. In the present study, we
show that our conceptual approach captures differences in behavior across different
NP-complete problems without reference to an algorithm or particular computa-
tional device. More specifically, we explored the effect of three generic complexity
metrics on human performance. Each of them can be used to unearth generalities
in human behavior. Typical-case complexity (TCC) captures the average hardness
of a random ensemble of instances of a problem based on its constrainedness. Criti-
cally, TCC can be computed ex-ante—without knowledge of an instance’s solution.
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Instance complexity (IC) maps constrainedness to complexity, but does this at the
level of a single instance rather than an average across instances. Finally, the num-
ber of solution witnesses captures a structural property of an instance that is related
to the hardness of search for satisfiable instances.
Our three metrics capture generalities in behavior using generic metrics of com-
putational hardness on NP-complete problems, just like metrics of uncertainty, such
as mean, variance and other statistics, capture generalities in behavior in prob-
abilistic problems. Importantly, our framework can be applied to other decision
problems in classes P or NP (Cheeseman, Kanefsky, and Taylor 1991; Percus, Is-
trate, and Moore 2006; Monasson et al. 1999), and has also been shown that it can
be extended to optimization problems (Franco et al. 2020).
The generality of TCC is limited by its dependence on a particular sampling
distribution. We sampled instances for each of the problems from a specific proce-
dure in which the components of the instances were randomly sampled from uniform
distributions. We leave it to future research to study whether TCC can be extended
to other probability distributions, and particularly, to those found in real life (Bog-
danov and Trevisan 2006).
Importantly, we provided two alternatives to TCC (IC and number of witnesses),
which do not depend on a sampling procedure. These metrics quantify the hardness
of specific instances of problems. However, they do come at a cost: these metrics
are computationally intensive. That is, in order to compute them, the decision
problem, or a harder variant, needs to be solved first. For IC to be estimated, the
optimization variant of the instance needs to be solved, whereas to compute the
number of witnesses, all of the possible witnesses of an instance need to be counted.
We argue that the computational requirements of calculating these metrics is not
prohibitive in the context of the study of human problem-solving and cognition in
general. These metrics can be used to predict generalities in human behavior with
the aid of any of the resources at hand, including electronic computers. Therefore,
since the practical instances of problems solvable by humans are relatively small
compared to those solvable by electronic computers, cognitive scientists effectively
have access to an oracle machine to estimate computationally intensive metrics.
4.3.2 Future directions
This paper focuses on generalities across problems within a well-defined class (i.e.,
NP-complete). A related question is whether intrinsic characteristics specific to
a problem can complement the generic metrics presented here. Intrinsic metrics of
complexity, specific to a problem, have been previously shown to affect performance.
Specifically, for all three problems considered in this study, measures derived from
the features of the problem have been shown to affect computational time of al-
gorithms executed on electronic computers (Smith-Miles and Lopes 2012; Hill and
Reilly 2000; Van Hemert 2005; Nudelman et al. 2004). Additionally, problem-specific
complexity metrics have been show to be related to human performance in the opti-
mization variants of the TSP (MacGregor and Chu 2011; Hirtle and Gärling 1992).
Future work should be undertaken to study how instance-complexity generic metrics
and problem-specific measures jointly affect human performance.
Importantly, our results suggest that the metrics put forward in this study are
generic as they provide both ex-ante and ex-post predictability across different prob-
96
CHAPTER 4. GENERALITY OF THE HARDNESS METRICS
lems. However, our work also highlights that certain structural properties of the
problem might have problem-specific effects that could interact with the effect of
generic metrics of hardness. This is particularly evident in the 3SAT. In this task
we find that IC explains less of the variance in performance than in the other two
tasks and that the effect of IC on time-on-task is inconclusive. This might be re-
lated to the intertwinement of satisfiability and IC in this problem. Specifically,
the structure of the 3SAT problem generates an unavoidable confounding between
these two metrics given that all satisfiable instances have IC = 0, thus rendering IC
incapable of explaining variance across satisfiable instances. This is further relevant
because in this task, unlike in the other two, satisfiability has a significant effect
on performance. Taken together, this suggests that the effect of IC on performance
in the 3SAT might be incongruously driven by satisfiability, in a way that cannot
be differentiated in our experimental design. In future studies, it should be at-
tempted to disentangle these effects, for example, by studying the related maximum
satisfiability problem (MAX-SAT). More importantly, these results warrant further
investigation of the effect of satisfiability, and other structural properties, on human
behavior. Moreover, future work could explore the differences in these effects across
classes of problems. For instance, NP-complete problems could be categorized into
finer classes based on the effect of particular properties on human problem-solving.
Our findings would suggest that more abstract logical problems might be solved
differently to other more life-pertinent problems, such as KP and TSP.
We investigated the effect of different metrics of instance-level complexity keeping
the size of instances fixed. An additional dimension in this framework that has been
shown to affect human behavior is an instance’s size (Dry et al. 2006; MacGregor
and Chu 2011) and the size of the state space (that is, the number of possible
combinations or paths) (van Opheusden and Ma 2019; Murawski and Bossaerts
2016). Additionally, the instance complexity metrics we presented are based on the
satisfiability threshold and the number of witnesses. Recently, it has been shown that
the performance of algorithms, designed for electronic computers, as α approaches
αs, is not only related to the decrease in the number of witnesses, but also to
the shattering of witnesses into distinct clusters (Budzynski, Ricci-Tersenghi, and
Semerjian 2019; Krzakala et al. 2006). Further research is needed to integrate these
different dimensions of complexity and determine their combined effect on human
problem-solving.
We have argued that the framework presented here can be used to characterize
the effect of the task environment on human performance. However, instance-level
complexity metrics can also shed light on the type of strategies employed by agents.
Note, for example, that our results suggest that participants did not predominantly
perform random search. In a random algorithm, random combinations from the
state space (i.e., paths or variable configurations) are tried and an answer (yes/no)
is selected depending on whether a solution witness is found. If participants imple-
mented such an algorithm, we would expect the length of search to be similar on
all unsatisfiable instances given that completing an exhaustive search of the state
space is unlikely because of the limits on time and number of clicks. This, however,
is not what we found. In unsatisfiable instances the length of search, time-on-
task (in TSP) and performance were affected by IC. In fact, by applying the same
argument, we can rule out other more directed search heuristics such as greedy al-
gorithms (Ausiello et al. 1999), which have been proposed to be linked to human
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behavior (Murawski and Bossaerts 2016). Overall, our results suggest that when
people solve decision problems, they implement procedures to exclude alternatives
from the witness solution set. If this was not the case, we would not find any effect
of our complexity metrics among unsatisfiable instances. Further research is needed
in order to disentangle between prospective algorithms and explore how instance-
level complexity measures can be used to inform the study of algorithm selection in
humans.
* * *
We provide empirical evidence that studying the intrinsic computational hard-
ness of the task environment predicts human cognitive effort and performance on a
task. This has important practical implications, which could help improve human
decision-making. The approach presented here could be used to quantify the compu-
tational hardness of problems people face in everyday life, such as making financial
investments or health insurance decisions. Our generic approach would provide a
rigorous method to estimate average quality of such decisions. Both designers of
products as well as regulators could use a framework like ours to identify upper
limits in the complexity of the tasks that consumers face when dealing with those
products and services.
4.4 Materials and Methods
4.4.1 Ethics statement
The experimental protocol was approved by the University of Melbourne Human
Research Ethics Committee (Ethics ID 1749594.2). Written informed consent was
obtained from all participants prior to commencement of the experimental sessions.
Experiments were performed in accordance with all relevant guidelines and regula-
tions, including the Declaration of Helsinki.
4.4.2 Participants
A total of 47 participants were recruited in two separate groups from the general
population (group 1: 24 participants; 12 female, 12 male; age range = 19-35 years,
mean age = 24.1 years; group 2: 23 participants; 13 female, 10 male; age range = 18-
32 years, mean age = 23.3 years). Inclusion criteria were based on age (minimum=18
years, maximum=35 years) and normal or corrected-to-normal vision.
Each group of participants were asked to solve a set of random instances of
a computational problem. Group 1 participants were presented with 64 instances
of the Boolean satisfiability problem (3SAT). Group 2 participants were presented
with 72 instances of the decision variant of the traveling salesperson problem (TSP).
Some trials and participants were excluded due to different issues (see section 4.4.5).
4.4.3 Experimental tasks
Boolean satisfiability task
This task is based on the 3-satisfiability problem. In this problem, the aim is to deter-
mine whether a boolean formula is satisfiable. In other words, given a propositional
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formula, the aim is to determine whether there exists at least one configuration of the
variables (which can take values TRUE or FALSE) such that the formula evaluates
to TRUE. The propositional formula in 3SAT has a specific structure. Specifically,
the formula is composed of a conjunction of clauses that must all evaluate TRUE
for the whole formula to evaluate TRUE. Each of these clauses, takes the form of
an OR logical operator of three literals (variables and their negations). An example
of a 3SAT problem is:
Does there exist xi ∈ {TRUE,FALSE} s.t.
(¬x3 ∨ ¬x4 ∨ x5) ∧ (x2 ∨ x3 ∨ ¬x4) ∧ (¬x1 ∨ x2 ∨ ¬x3)
evaluates TRUE?
In order to represent this in an accessible way to participants we developed a task
composed of switches and light bulbs (Fig 4.4.1b). Participants were presented with
a set of light bulbs (clauses), each of which had three switches underneath (literals)
that were represented by a positive or negative number. The number on each switch
represented the variable number, which could be turned on or off (TRUE or FALSE).
The aim of the task is to determine whether there exists a way of turning on and off
variables such that all the light bulbs are turned on (that is, the formula evaluates
TRUE).
At the beginning of each trial, participants were presented with a different in-
stance of the 3SAT problem. A bar in the top-right corner of the screen indicated
the time remaining in the trial. Each participant completed 64 trials (4 blocks of 16
trials with a rest period of 60 seconds between blocks). Trials were self-paced with
a time limit of 110 seconds. Participants could use the mouse to click on any of the
variables to select their value ({blue = TRUE, orange = FALSE}). A light bulb
above each clause indicated whether a clause evaluated to TRUE (light on) given
the selected values of the variables underneath it. The number of clicks in each
trial was limited to 20. The purpose of this limit was to discourage participants
from using a trial-and-error strategy to solve the instances. When participants were
ready to submit their solution, they pressed a button to advance from the screen
displaying the instance to the response screen where they responded YES or NO.
The time limit to respond was 3 seconds, and the inter-trial interval was 3 seconds
as well. The order of instances and the side of the YES/NO button on the response
screen were randomized for each participant.
Instance sampling
A random instance is a selection of clauses and literals in which M clauses of
three literals are chosen randomly. Each of the literals is associated with one of N
variables. Both numerical (Monasson et al. 1999) and analytical (Mézard, Parisi,
and Zecchina 2002) evidence suggests that in the limit N →∞, there exists a value
of the clause to variables ratio α = M/N , αSATs , such that typical instances are
satisfiable for α < αSATs , while typical instances are unsatisfiable for α > α
SAT
s .
The current best estimate for the satisfiability threshold, αSATs , as N →∞ is 4.267
(Mézard, Parisi, and Zecchina 2002) (note that the value of αs is a function of the
number of literals per clause, which was fixed at 3 in this study). As N → ∞,
instances near the threshold are on average harder to solve (Cheeseman, Kanefsky,
and Taylor 1991; Percus, Istrate, and Moore 2006). We exploit both the threshold
phenomenon in satisfiability and its link to computational hardness.
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Figure 4.4.1: Experimental Tasks. (a) Traveling salesperson task. Partici-
pants are given a list of cities displayed on a rectangular map on the screen and a
limit L on path length. The problem is to determine whether there exists a path
connecting all N cities with a distance at most L. The task was interactive. Partici-
pants could click from city to city and the corresponding path and distance traveled
would display and update automatically. This stage lasted a maximum of 40 sec-
onds. Afterwards, participants had 3 seconds to make their response. (b) Boolean
satisfiability task. In this task, the aim is to determine whether a Boolean formula
is satisfiable. The Boolean formula is represented with a set of light bulbs (clauses),
each of which has three switches underneath (literals) that are characterized by a
positive or negative number. The number on each switch represents the variable
number, which can be turned on or off (TRUE or FALSE). The aim of the task is
to determine whether there exists a way of turning on and off variables such that
all the light bulbs are turned on (the corresponding Boolean formula evaluates to
TRUE). The task was interactive. Participants could click on switches to turn them
on and the corresponding literals and light bulbs would change color automatically.
This stage had a time limit of 110 seconds. Afterwards, participants had 3 seconds
to make their response (either a ‘YES’ or ‘NO’). (c) Knapsack decision task.
Participants are presented with a set of items with different values and weights.
Additionally, a capacity constraint and target profit are shown at the center of the
screen. The aim is to ascertain whether there exists a subset of items for which (1)
the sum of weights is lower or equal to the capacity constraint and (2) the sum of
values yields at least the target profit. The task was not interactive. This stage
lasted for 25 seconds. Finally, participants had 2 seconds to make their response.
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We generated random instances with different degrees of complexity by varying
α. We picked a value of α, starting at the lower bound of its range and incrementing
in steps of 0.1 until the upper bound was reached. For each value of α, we computed
the number of clauses M by multiplying α and a fixed value of N and rounding to
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the nearest integer. N (and the time limit for the task) was determined before
hand using pilot data to ensure that the task was not too easy nor too hard for
participants (i.e. to ensure sufficient variation in performance). Importantly, N was
also restricted to values in which the corresponding number of clauses could fit in
the screen of the task. Specifically, we restricted the number of clauses to be at
most 36.
Once N was fixed, we generated 1000 random instances for each value of M .
Each random instance was generated by first selecting the literals for each clause.
Each literal is represented by a positive or negative sign (negation of a variable) and
is sampled from the set {−1,+1} with equal probability. Afterwards, three variables
were selected for each clause by sampling without replacement from the set of N
variables (Cheeseman, Kanefsky, and Taylor 1991; Monasson et al. 1999).
From the randomly generated instances we first determined the satisfiability
threshold of our finite instances (N = 5). That is, we calculated the value of α
at which half of the randomly generated instances were satisfiable and half were
unsatisfiable. This was the case for α = 4.8. Based on this we selected a subset of
random instances to use in the task.
We asked participants to solve a set of instances randomly sampled from three
different regions: an underconstrained region (α  αSATs ), a region around the
satisfiability threshold (α ∼ αSATs ) and an overconstrained region (α  αSATs ).
Instances near the satisfiability threshold are defined to have a high TCC, whereas
instances further away from the satisfiability threshold (in the under-constrained or
over-constrained regions) are defined to have a low TCC. We selected 16 instances
from the underconstrained region (α = 2) and 16 instances from the overconstrained
region (α = 7). We then sampled 32 instances near the satisfiability threshold
(α = 4.8), such that 16 of the selected instances were satisfiable and 16 were not
satisfiable.
In order to also ensure a sufficient degree of variability between instances near the
satisfiability threshold, we added an additional constraint in the sampling. For each
set of instances (satisfiable and not satisfiable) we forced half to have algorithmic
complexity less than the median algorithmic complexity at this value of α, and the
other half to be harder than the median. The algorithmic complexity was estimated
using an algorithm-specific ex-post complexity measure of a widely-used algorithm
(Gecode propagations parameter). Gecode is a generic solver for constraint satis-
faction problems that uses a constraint propagation technique with different search
methods, such as branch-and-bound. We chose an output variable, the number of
propagations, that indicates the difficulty for the algorithm of finding a solution and
whose value is highly correlated with computational time. We did not use compute
time directly as a measure of complexity because for instances of small size, like
the ones used in this study, compute time is highly confounded with overhead time.
Thus, our set of instances in the region α ∼ αs comprised 8 instances in each of the
following categories {satisfiable, unsatisfiable} × {low/high algorithmic difficulty}.
Traveling salesperson task
This task is based on the traveling salesperson problem. Given a set of N cities
displayed on a rectangular map on the screen and a limit L on path length, the
decision problem is to answer whether there exists a path connecting all N cities
with a distance of at most L (Fig 4.4.1a).
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In the TSP task, each participant completed 72 trials (3 blocks of 24 trials with
a rest period of 30 seconds between blocks). Each trial presented a different instance
of TSP. Trials were self-paced with a time limit of 40 seconds. Participants could
use the mouse to trace routes by clicking on the dots indicating the different cities.
The length of the selected route at each point in time was indicated at the top
of the screen (together with the maximum route length of the instance). When
participants were ready to submit their answer, they pressed a button to advance
from the screen displaying the cities to the response screen where they responded
YES or NO. The time limit to respond was 3 seconds, and the inter-trial interval
was 3 seconds as well. The order of instances and the sides of the YES/NO button
on the response screen were randomized for each participant.
Instance sampling
A TSP instance is a collection of N cities, a matrix of distances d between each
pair of cities, and a limit L on path length. Here, we restrict the problem to the
euclidean TSP; that is, we constraint our distance matrices d to those that can be
represented in a two-dimensional map of area M2.
Just like for 3SAT, it has been proposed that there exists a parameter αTSP
that captures the constrainedness of the problem, specifically αTSP = −L/(M
√
N)
(Gent and Walsh 1996). Evidence suggests that in the limit N → ∞, there exists
a value of α, αTSPs , such that typical instances are satisfiable for α  αTSPs , while
typical instances are unsatisfiable for α  αTSPs . αTSPs for the euclidean TSP is
estimated at −0.7124± 0.0002 in the limit N →∞ (D. S. Johnson, McGeoch, and
Rothberg 1996; Gent and Walsh 1996). As N →∞ instances near αTSPs have been
shown to be, on average, harder to solve (Gent and Walsh 1996). We use the this
insight to vary typical-case complexity of finite instances.
Instances of the TSP had N = 20 cities. This value, and the time limit for the
task, were determined using pilot data to ensure that the task was not too easy nor
too hard for participants (i.e. to ensure sufficient variation in performance). Random
instances of the euclidean TSP were then generated by choosing (x,y) coordinates
for each of the N = 20 cities, uniformly at random from a square with side length
M = 1000 (Gent and Walsh 1996). We generated 100 sets of coordinates; that is,
100 distance matrices d. For each distance matrix, we generated instances with
different values of L. We did this by varying the value of α, which was incremented
in the range [−0.25,−1.25] with step size 0.02.
To determine the location of the satisfiability threshold in our sample of random
instances (with N = 20), we determined the value of α at which half of the randomly
generated instances were satisfiable and half were unsatisfiable. The satisfiability
threshold was located at αTSP = −0.85. We randomly sampled instances at this
value of α such that half of the selected instances were satisfiable and half were not
satisfiable. We also ensured that half of the instances had a number of propaga-
tions above the median and half of them had a number of propagations below the
median (see description of 3SAT above for details). Thus, our set of of instances
in the region α ∼ αs comprised 9 instances in each of the four following categories:
{satisfiable, unsatisfiable} × {low/high algorithmic difficulty}.
For the underconstrained region, α αs, we randomly chose 18 instances from
the set of 100 randomly generated instances with αTSP = −0.99. For the over-
constrained region, α  αs, we randomly chose 18 instances from the set of 100
randomly generated instances with αTSP = −0.71. We made sure that no two
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instances in our set of selected instances had the same set of city coordinates.
Knapsack task
In this paper we report on the experimental data collected on the knapsack decision
task by Franco et al. 2020. Their statistical results were used when available.
The knapsack task is based on the 0-1 knapsack problem (KP). An instance of
this problem consists of a set of items I = {1, . . . , N} with weights 〈w1, . . . , wN〉
and values 〈v1, . . . , vN〉, and two positive numbers c and p denoting the capacity and
profit constraint (of the knapsack). The problem is to decide whether there exists
a set S ⊆ I such that
∑
i∈S
wi ≤ c, that is, the weight of the knapsack is less than or
equal to the capacity constraint; and
∑
i∈S
vi ≥ p, that is, the value of the knapsack is
greater than or equal to the profit constraint.
In their study they implemented the knapsack decision problem in the form of the
task presented in Fig 4.4.1c. In their task all instances had 6 items (N = 6) and wi,
vi, c and p were integers. In the task each participant completed 72 trials (3 blocks
of 24 trials with a rest period of 60s between blocks). Each trial presented a different
instance of the KP. Trials had a time limit of 25 seconds and were not self-paced. A
green circle at the center of the screen indicated the time remaining in each stage of
the trial. During the first 3 seconds participants were presented with a set of items
of different values and weights. Then, both capacity constraint and target profit
were shown at the center of the screen for the remainder of the trial (22 seconds).
No interactivity was incorporated into the task; that is, participants could not click
on items. When the time limit was reached, participants were presented with the
response screen where they responded YES or NO. The time limit to respond was
2 seconds, and the inter-trial interval was 5 seconds. The order of instances and
the sides of the YES/NO button on the response screen were randomized for each
participant.
Instance sampling
It has been proposed that there exists a set of parameters ᾱKP = (αKPc , α
KP
p )
that captures the constrainedness of the problem, specifically αKPp = p/
∑N
i=1 vi
and αKPc = c/
∑N
i=1 wi (Yadav et al. 2020). These parameters characterize where
typical instances are generally satisfiable (under-constrained region), where they are
unsatisfiable (over-constrained region) and where the probability of satisfiability is
close to 50% (satisfiability threshold). Instance near the satisfiability threshold have
been shown to be, on average, harder to solve (Yadav et al. 2020).
Instances in Franco et al. 2020 were selected such that αKPc was fixed (α
KP
c ∈
[0.40, 0.45]) and the instance constrainedness varied according to αKPp . 18 instances
were selected from the under-constrained region (αp ∈ [0.35, 0.4]; low TCC ) and 18
from the over-constrained region (αp ∈ [0.85, 0.9]; low TCC ). Additionally, 18 sat-
isfiable instances and 18 unsatisfiable instances were sampled near the satisfiability
threshold (αp ∈ [0.6, 0.65]; high TCC ).
Like for 3SAT and TSP, high TCC instances were selected such that they varied
according to the number of propagations (see description of 3SAT sampling for
details).
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Procedure
After reading the plain language statement and providing informed consent, partic-
ipants were instructed in the task and completed a practice session. Each experi-
mental session lasted around 110 minutes. The tasks were programmed in Unity3D
(Unity 3D 2017) and administered on a laptop.
Participants received a show-up fee of AUD 10 and additional monetary com-
pensation based on performance. In the 3SAT, they additionally received AUD 0.6
for each correct instance submitted plus a bonus of AUD 0.31 per instance if all
instances in the task were solved correctly. In the TSP, participants received 0.3
per correct instance submitted plus 0.14 per instance if all instances were solved
correctly. In the KP task (Franco et al. 2020), participants received a show-up fee
of A$10 and earned A$0.7 for each correct answer.
Note that the 3SAT and TSP tasks were self-paced (with time limits per trial),
whereas the KP was not.
4.4.4 Derivation of metrics
We estimated a collection of metrics based on the features of each instance and its
solution space. We estimated one feature-space metric and several solution-space
metrics. We first defined Typical-case complexity (TCC) according to the problem-
parameter α for each task. Estimation of this metric is tightly related to the instance
sampling procedure and its derivation is described in the previous section. Instances
were sampled such that there was an equal number of instances with low and high
TCC on each of the problems.
Once instances for the tasks were sampled, we estimated their solution-space
metrics. We estimated the number of solution witnesses for 3SAT instances using
exhaustive search and used the Gecode algorithm (Gecode Team 2006) for TSP in-
stances. For the TSP, we allowed the algorithm to stop after finding 30,000 solution
witnesses. This was done to reduce the computational requirements of solving an
instance. 15 TSP instances reached the 30,000 maximum imposed. Given the vari-
ability in the number of witnesses in the TSP, the results on number witnesses are
reported in logarithmic scale (natural logarithm).
We define the instance complexity metric (IC) as the absolute value of the nor-
malized difference between target value of the decision variant and the maximum
value attainable of the corresponding optimization variant. In the KP, the optimiza-
tion variant’s problem is to find the maximum value attainable given the weights,
values and capacity. In the TSP, the optimization variant is to minimize the path
traveled given a distance matrix. In the 3SAT, the optimization variant (MAXSAT)
is to find the maximum number of satisfiable clauses given the Boolean formula
presented. Explicitly, IC is defined as follows:
ICKP =
∣∣αp − α?p∣∣ = ∣∣∣Target profit−Maximum profit attainable∑ vi
∣∣∣
ICTSP =
∣∣α− α?∣∣ = ∣∣∣ Path limit - Minimum path√
Map area× Number of cities
∣∣∣
ICSAT =
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In order to estimate the instance complexity metric (IC), the optimization variant
of each instance needs to be solved. These optima were estimated using Gecode
(Gecode Team 2006) in TSP and using the RC2 algorithm from the ‘pysat’ python
library (Ignatiev, Morgado, and Marques-Silva 2018). For the KP we used the
metrics estimated in Franco et al. 2020.
4.4.5 Statistical analysis
Python (version 3.6) was used to sample and solve instances. The R programming
language was used to analyze the behavioral data. All of the linear mixed mod-
els (LMM), generalized logistic mixed models (GLMM) and censored linear mixed
models (CLMM) included random effects on the intercept for participants (unless
otherwise stated). Different models were selected according to the data structure.
GLMM were used for models with binary dependent variables, LMM were used
for continuous dependent variables and CLMM were used for censored continuous
dependent variables (e.g., time-on-task).
All the models were fitted using a Bayesian framework implemented using the
probabilistic programming language Stan via the R package ‘brms’ (Bürkner 2017).
Default priors were used. All population-level effects of interest had uninformative
priors; i.e., an improper flat prior over the reals. Intercepts had a student-t prior
with 3 degrees of freedom and a scale parameter that depended on the standard
deviation of the response after applying the link function. The student-t distribution
was centered around the mean of the dependent variable. Sigma values, in the case
of Gaussian-link models, had a half student-t prior (restricted to positive values)
with 3 degrees of freedom and a scale parameter that depended on the standard
deviation of the response after applying the link function. Standard deviation of the
participant-level intercept parameters had a half student-t prior that was scaled in
the same way as in the sigma prior.
Each of the models presented was estimated using four Markov chains. The
number of iterations per chain was by default set to 2000. This parameter was
adjusted to 4000 on some models to ensure convergence. Convergence was verified
using the convergence diagnostic R̂. All models presented reach an R̂ ≈ 1.
Statistical tests were performed based on the 95% credible interval estimated
using the highest density interval (HDI) of the posterior distributions calculated via
the R package ‘parameters’ (Lüdecke, Ben-Shachar, and Makowski 2020). For each
statistical test we report both the median (β0.5) of the posterior distribution and its
corresponding credible interval (HDI0.95).
For the knapsack task, we report the statistical results from Franco et al. 2020 if
available and are, here, reported as effect estimates (β) and P-Values (P ). Otherwise
we used the data available at the OSF (project: https://doi.org/10.17605/OSF.
IO/T2JV7) to run statistical tests on the behavioral data. These tests were performed
and reported following the same Bayesian approach used in the TSP and 3SAT
analysis.
Some trials and participants were excluded due to different reasons. In the 3SAT
task, two participants were omitted from the analysis given that their performance
(close to 50%) differed significantly from the group. Additionally, 10 trials (from
9 participants) were omitted given that no answer was given. One participant was
excluded from the time-on-task analysis since they never advanced to the response
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screen before the time limit. In the TSP, one participant was excluded from the
analysis given that they did not understand the instructions. This was determined
during the course of the experiment. Additionally 9 trials (from 8 participants) were
omitted given that no answer was selected. Finally, in the knapsack task, 13 trials
(from 8 participants) were excluded in which no response was made.
4.4.6 Data and code availability
The behavioral data and the data analysis code are both available at the Open
Science Framework. The 3SAT and TSP tasks are also available there (project:
https://osf.io/tekqa/).
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Appendices
Appendix A Satisfiability and TCC
In the results section we found that TCC had a negative effect on performance.
Since we are interested in understanding what generic features make instances hard
for humans to solve, we explored whether TCC and satisfiability interact to make
instances harder. We first explore the interaction of TCC and satisfiability on per-
formance. Performance was not affected by satisfiability in low TCC instances on
all three problems (TSP: β0.5 = −0.16, HDI0.95 = [−0.85, 0.55], Table F.2 Model 4;
3SAT: β0.5 = −0.52, HDI0.95 = [−1.27, 0.11], Table F.1 Model 4; KP: β = −0.250,
P = 0.355, (Franco et al. 2020); marginal effect of satisfiability, GLMM). Moreover,
in line with the previous study on the KP, we found a negative effect of TCC on both
satisfiable and unsatisfiable instances for both problems considered (TSP: βsat0.5 =
−2.07, HDIsat0.95 = [−2.64,−1.55], βunsat0.5 = −2.16, HDIunsat0.95 = [−2.74,−1.62], Ta-
ble F.2 Model 4; 3SAT: βsat0.5 = −2.06, HDIsat0.95 = [−2.56,−1.59], βunsat0.5 = −0.77,
HDIunsat0.95 = [−1.49,−0.13], Table F.1 Model 4; the effect of TCC on performance
for satisfiable and unsatisfiable instances, respectively, GLMM). Interestingly, in
the 3SAT problem we found that the reduction in performance due to TCC was
larger for satisfiable instances (β0.5 = −1.29, HDI0.95 = [−2.11,−0.46], interac-
tion effect of TCC and satisfiability on performance, GLMM; Table F.1 Model 4).
In contrast, in the TSP, as with the KP, the size of the effect of TCC on per-
formance was similar for both satisfiable and unsatisfiable instances (β0.5 = 0.10,
HDI0.95 = [−0.65, 0.90], interaction effect of TCC and satisfiability on performance,
GLMM; Table F.2 Model 4). This suggests that unlike the KP and TSP, in the 3SAT
there is an interaction effect between TCC and satisfiability on performance, which
makes satisfiable instances with high TCC harder than the rest.
When analyzing how satisfiability affected time for different levels of TCC we
found different results across problems. In the TSP there was no interaction effect on
time between satisfiability and TCC (β0.5 = 0.002, HDI0.95 = [−0.054, 0.058], inter-
action effect of satisfiability and TCC on time-on-task, CLMM; Table F.4 Model 7),
meaning that both properties had independent effects on time-on-task. In con-
trast, in 3SAT the effect of TCC was modulated by satisfiability in such a way
that there was no effect of TCC when the instance was unsatisfiable (β0.5 = 0.022,
HDI0.95 = [−0.016, 0.063], marginal effect of TCC on time-on-task for unsatisfiable
instances, CLMM; Table F.3 Model 8). In summary, we only found an interac-
tion effect between satisfiability and TCC in the 3SAT. This was the case for both
performance and time-on-task.
Appendix B Search strategies
Generic instance-level complexity metrics are able to explain differences in per-
formance and time-spent across instances. However, it remains an open question
whether the generic properties can shed light into how humans solve problems. To
explore this question we investigated whether instance-level metrics could explain
differences in the number of clicks across instances. This analysis was performed for
TSP and 3SAT. In both tasks, participants had the opportunity to click on cities
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or literals throughout the trial, whereas in the KP clicking on items was not pos-
sible. Note that while for the TSP there was no limit in the number of clicks, in
the 3SAT participants were only allowed to make a maximum of 20 clicks per trial.
The purpose of this limit was to discourage participants from using a trial-and-error
strategy to solve the instances. Overall, the limit was reached in 11.5% of the trials.
The number of clicks is a useful metric in studying the algorithms implemented
by humans. Specifically, the number of clicks is related to the way that the problem
state-space is explored. In the 3SAT, the state-space consists of all possible on-off
switch setups (25 possible combinations) while in the TSP the state-space consists of
all possible ordered path selections (2(
20
2 ) = 2190 possible combinations). Arguably,
participants search the state-space by clicking on different state combinations in
order to decide whether an instance is satisfiable or not. Differences in the quantity
of clicks used to solve an instance can shed light into how the state-space is explored
(under the assumption that the state-space is explored by clicking on elements in
the task).
We investigated whether generic instance-level complexity metrics could capture
differences in the number of clicks. We found that participants performed more
clicks on instances with high TCC, compared to low TCC, in 3SAT and TSP (TSP:
β0.5 = 1.66, HDI0.95 = [1.01, 2.33], GLMM Table F.8 Model 1; 3SAT: β0.5 = 1.88,
HDI0.95 = [1.23, 2.54], CLMM, Table F.7 Model 1; effect of TCC on number of clicks;
Fig B.1c). Additionally, less clicks were performed on satisfiable instances compared
to unsatisfiable ones (TSP: β0.5 = −2.48, HDI0.95 = [−3.13,−1.85], LMM Table F.8
Model 2; 3SAT: β0.5 = −7.41, HDI0.95 = [−7.95,−6.88], CLMM, Table F.7 Model 2;
effect of satisfiability on number of clicks; Fig B.1b). We explored how these two
metrics jointly affected the length of search and we found that both effects were
still significant when controlling for each other in the TSP (Table F.8 Model 3;
Fig B.1b). However, in 3SAT the positive effect of TCC on the number of clicks
was only present on satisfiable instances (Table F.7 Model 3).
We then explored how the solution-space complexity metrics affected the length
of search. Among satisfiable instances a higher number of witnesses was related to
a lower amount of clicks (TSP: β0.5 = −0.41, HDI0.95 = [−0.54,−0.26], LMM Ta-
ble F.8 Model 5; 3SAT: β0.5 = −0.59, HDI0.95 = [−0.69,−0.49], CLMM, Table F.7
Model 5; effect of number of witnesses on the number of clicks; Fig B.1c). Addition-
ally, we found that a higher IC was related to lower number of clicks in the TSP and
on unsatisfiable 3SAT instances (TSP: β0.5 = −10.22, HDI0.95 = [−13.87,−6.37],
LMM, Table F.8 Model 4; 3SAT: β0.5 = −29.88, HDI0.95 = [−54.52,−6.63], CLMM,
Table F.7 Model 4); effect of IC on number of clicks; Fig B.1b). We excluded satisfi-
able 3SAT instances from the analysis since we are unable to disentangle the effect of
IC and satisfiability; all satisfiable instances have an IC = 0. In the TSP we investi-
gated the joint effect of IC and satisfiability on the number of clicks and found that
the effects were still significant when controlling for each other and that there was
no interaction effect between the variables (β0.5 = −5.95, HDI0.95 = [−13.43, 1.78],
interaction effect between IC and satisfiability, LMM, Table F.8 Model 6).
Taken together, these findings suggest that the length of search in the state-space
can be partially explained by properties of the instance, namely satisfiability and
complexity. We found that there was an positive effect of TCC on search length and
that the search was in general longer on unsatisfiable instances. Additionally, lower
values of IC and number of witnesses were related to a longer search.
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Figure B.1: Number of Clicks. (a) Satisfiability and TCC. Median number
of clicks performed while solving an instance before submitting an answer. Each
colored dot represents an instance of a problem. (b) IC. Each green and orange
shape represent the median number of clicks for each instance of TSP and 3SAT
problems. The blue lines represents the marginal effect of IC (LMM, Table F.8
Model 4, CLMM Table F.7 Model 4). Satisfiable 3SAT instances are excluded from
the 3SAT model since we are unable to disentangle the effect of IC and satisfiability.
Each black dot corresponds to the number of clicks by a single participant on a
particular instance. The range of number of clicks presented for the TSP ([10, 50])
contains more than 98% of observations. (c) Number of solution witnesses.
Each green shape represents the median time-on-task per instance. The blue line
represents the marginal effect of the number of solution witnesses (LMM, Table F.8
Model 5 and CLMM, Table F.7 Model 5). The box-plots represent the median, the
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Appendix C Summary statistics
In this section we present summary statistics of the behavioral data for each of the
tasks. These statistics exclude some observations as described in section 4.4.5.
C.1 Boolean satisfiability task
On average, participants chose the ‘YES’ option on 45% of trials (min = 28%,
max = 61%). Performance did not vary during the course of the task (β0.5 = 0.001,
HDI0.95 = [−0.008, 0.011], main effect of trial number on performance, generalized
logistic mixed model (GLMM); Table F.1 Model 1), suggesting that neither expe-
rience with the task nor mental fatigue affected task performance. However, time
spent did vary throughout the task. As the task progressed they spent on average
less time on a trial (β0.5 = −0.005, HDI0.95 = [−0.006,−0.004], main effect of trial
number on time-on-task —as a proportion of the maximum possible time—, cen-
sored linear mixed effects model (CLMM); Table F.3 Model 1). Overall, participants
reached the maximum time allotted (110 seconds) in 16% of trials.
C.2 Traveling salesperson task
On average, participants chose the ‘YES’ option on 50% of trials (min = 35%, max =
60%). Consistent with our results for the 3SAT, performance did not vary during the
course of the task (β0.5 = 0.00, HDI0.95 = [−0.003, 0.013], main effect of trial number
on performance, GLMM; Table F.2 Model 1), but participants spent less time on a
trial as they progressed (β0.5 = −0.002, HDI0.95 = [−0.003,−0.001], main effect of
trial number on time-on-task —as a proportion of maximum possible time—), linear
mixed effects model (LMM); Table F.4 Model 1). Overall, participants reached the
limit of 40 seconds in 42.9% of trials.
C.3 Knapsack decision task
On average, participants chose the ‘YES’ option in 48.1% of trials (min = 0.32,
max = 0.60, SD = 0.06). Performance did not vary during the course of the task
(β = 0.005, P = 0.196, main effect of trial number on performance, GLMM; Franco
et al. 2020).
Appendix D TCC and the number of witnesses
It is feasible that the effect of TCC on performance, on satisfiable instances, is
driven by the number of witnesses. After all, TCC is constructed from a metric of
expected constrainedness (α). We thus examined the link between these features
of an instance. As expected, we found that the number of witnesses of low TCC
instances was significantly higher than that of instances with high TCC in all three
problems (PSAT < 0.001, PTSP < 0.001, PKP < 0.001, p-values of unpaired t-tests;
Fig 4.2.3). This corroborates the link between the typical-case constrainedness (α)
and the solution-space constrainedness of satisfiable instances.
Based on the previous results, we hypothesized that the effect on performance of
TCC (on satisfiable instances) is driven by the number of witnesses. To test this hy-
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pothesis, we studied the effect of TCC on performance while controlling for the num-
ber of witnesses. In line with our conjecture, we found that once we controlled for
the number of witnesses the marginal effect of TCC on performance was not signifi-
cant on all three problems (3SAT: β0.5 = 0.47, HDI0.95 = [−0.30, 1.22]; TSP: β0.5 =
−0.12, HDI0.95 = [−0.84, 0.68]; KP: β0.5 = 0.17, HDI0.95 = [−0.57, 0.90]; marginal
effect of TCC on performance, GLMM; Table F.5 Models 2,5,8). We studied further
this relation and tested whether there was an interaction effect of TCC and the
number of witnesses on performance. The results were different across problems.
We found a significant interaction in the KP, an inconclusive result in the 3SAT and
a non-significant results in the TSP (KS: β0.5 = 0.54, HDI0.95 = [0.26, 0.81]; 3SAT:
β0.5 = 0.56, HDI0.95 = [−0.00, 1.22]; TSP: β0.5 = −0.26, HDI0.95 = [−0.66, 0.15];
interaction effect between TCC and number of witnesses on performance, GLMM;
Table F.5 Models 3,6,9). Taken together, these results suggest that the effect of TCC
on performance is, at least partially, driven by the number of witnesses. However, on
some problems, TCC might affect human performance through other mechanisms
as well.
Appendix E Instance complexity in 3SAT
Unlike TSP and KP, the IC metric takes a values of zero (IC = 0) when the instance
is satisfiable; by definition an instance is only satisfiable if the maximum number of
clauses set to TRUE is equal to the number of clauses in the instance (i.e., IC = 0).
This entails that IC would only be able to explain differences in performance on un-
satisfiable instances, which (given our sampling procedure) are half of the instances
used in the task. However, we did not find evidence for this explanation when we
restricted our analysis to unsatisfiable instances (R2 = 0.001 for unsatisfiable 3SAT
instances). For this set of instances the positive relation was not significant in the
3SAT, but significant in KP and TSP (KP: β0.5 = 13.48, HDI0.95 = [10.11, 17.30],
Table F.6 Model 3; TSP: β0.5 = 20.10, HDI0.95 = [15.39, 24.96], Table F.2 Model 8;
3SAT: β0.5 = 9.81, HDI0.95 = [−14.59, 33.94], Table F.1 Model 7; the effect of IC
on performance for unsatisfiable instances, GLMM). This suggests that the perfor-
mance variance explained by IC in 3SAT instances might be driven by satisfiability.
However, we are unable to disentangle the effect of IC and satisfiability given that
all 3SAT satisfiable instance have IC = 0. Overall, these results indicate that IC is
able to explain variance in performance across instances, but to a lesser degree in
3SAT. Moreover, the effect of IC on performance in the 3SAT might be incongru-
ously driven by satisfiability.
Appendix F Supplementary Tables
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Table F.1: Human performance in the Boolean satisfiability task. Logistic regressions with random intercept effects for participants relating
the accuracy on an instance and trial number (1), typical-case complexity (TCC) (2), constrainedness region (3), TCC and satisfiability (4), time-
on-task (5), instance complexity (IC) (6), IC on unsatisfiable instances (7) as well as satisfiability (8). Parameter estimates correspond to the median
of the posterior distribution (β0.5) and the 95% HDI credible interval (HDI0.95). ELPD denotes the expected log posterior predictive density.
Dependent variable: Human performance

















Intercept 1.95 2.99 1.41 3.33 3.15 1.51 2.99 2.84
[1.59,2.26] [2.59,3.43] [1.13,1.75] [2.73,3.97] [2.53,3.73] [1.23,1.8] [1.58,4.29] [2.43,3.22]
Observations 1398 1398 1398 1398 1335 1398 675 1398
ELPD -533.3 -493.27 -493.42 -456.8 -487.73 -505.05 -138.46 -503.36
Table F.2: Human performance in the traveling salesperson task. Logistic regressions with random intercept effects for participants relating
the accuracy on an instance and trial number (1), typical-case complexity (TCC) (2), constrainedness region (3), TCC and satisfiability (4), time-on-
task (5), satisfiability (6), instance complexity (IC) (7), as well as IC on unsatisfiable instances (8). Parameter estimates correspond to the median
of the posterior distribution (β0.5) and the 95% HDI credible interval (HDI0.95). ELPD denotes the expected log posterior predictive density.
Dependent variable: Human performance

















Intercept 1.66 3.19 1.09 3.29 5.36 1.81 0.14 0.52
[1.43,1.94] [2.83,3.58] [0.91,1.3] [2.8,3.84] [4.39,6.34] [1.59,2.03] [-0.14,0.4] [-0.21,1.29]
Observations 1575 1575 1575 1575 1575 1575 1575 787
ELPD -656.28 -578.48 -579.52 -580.43 -612.95 -656.93 -534.35 -241.48
Table F.3: Time-on-task in the Boolean satisfiability task. Censored linear regressions with random intercept effects for participants relating
the time spent on an instance and trial number (1), typical-case complexity (TCC) (2), constrainedness region (3), satisfiability (4), number of
solution witnesses (5), instance complexity (IC) (6), IC on unsatisfiable instances (7), as well as TCC and satisfiability (8). Parameter estimates
correspond to the median of the posterior distribution (β0.5) and the 95% HDI credible interval (HDI0.95). ELPD denotes the expected log posterior
predictive density.
Dependent variable: Time-on-task

















Intercept 0.68 0.51 0.65 0.74 0.59 0.45 0.77 0.73
[0.65,0.72] [0.4,0.62] [0.54,0.75] [0.64,0.84] [0.51,0.69] [0.35,0.57] [0.63,0.91] [0.62,0.83]
Observations 1335 1335 1335 1335 691 1335 644 1335
ELPD -683.08 -456.79 -268.31 -296.9 -15.46 -340.59 -128.73 -224.94
Table F.4: Time-on-task in the traveling salesperson task. Censored linear regressions with random intercept effects for participants relating
the time spent on an instance and trial number (1), typical-case complexity (TCC) (2), constrainedness region (3), satisfiability (4), number of solution
witnesses (scaled via natural logarithm) (5), instance complexity (IC) (6), as well as TCC and satisfiability (7). Parameter estimates correspond
to the median of the posterior distribution (β0.5) and the 95% HDI credible interval (HDI0.95). ELPD denotes the expected log posterior predictive
density.
Dependent variable: Time-on-task

















Intercept 0.97 0.85 0.97 1.00 0.99 1.00 0.94
[0.87,1.08] [0.75,0.95] [0.87,1.06] [0.89,1.1] [0.89,1.09] [0.9,1.11] [0.84,1.04]
Observations 1575 1575 1575 1575 788 1575 1575
ELPD -515.38 -499.04 -460.55 -459.22 -189.73 -491.96 -426.44
Table F.5: Human performance an the number of solution witnesses. Logistic regressions with random intercept effects for participants with
accuracy as dependent variable. The data included on each regression is comprised of the satisfiable instances of one of the three tasks considered:
3SAT (1-3), TSP (4-6) and KP (7-9). Regressions (1), (4) and (7) include the the number of witnesses alone as regressor (the number of witnesses
for the TSP is scaled via natural logarithm). Models (2), (5) and (8) include TCC, additionally, as regressor. Models (3), (5) and (8) include the
interaction between TCC and number of witnesses as well. Parameter estimates correspond to the median of the posterior distribution (β0.5) and the
95% HDI credible interval (HDI0.95). ELPD denotes the expected log posterior predictive density.
Dependent variable: Human performance
3SAT TSP KP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
No. of witnesses 0.62 0.7 0.63 0.26 0.29 0.11
[0.49,0.79] [0.51,0.91] [0.44,0.85] [0.19,0.34] [0.17,0.41] [-0.03,0.25]
TCC 0.47 -0.42 -0.12 2.24 0.17 -1.77
[-0.3,1.22] [-1.71,0.7] [-0.84,0.68] [-1.5,6.13] [-0.57,0.9] [-2.95,-0.44]
TCC:No. of witnesses 0.56 0.54
[0,1.22] [0.26,0.81]
No. of witnesses (ln) 0.45 0.44 0.68
[0.37,0.53] [0.33,0.54] [0.25,1.03]
TCC:No. of witnesses (ln) -0.26
[-0.66,0.15]
Intercept -0.02 -0.52 -0.21 -1.07 -0.92 -3.2 0.41 0.22 1.55
[-0.62,0.53] [-1.58,0.47] [-1.19,0.93] [-1.78,-0.46] [-2.16,0.21] [-6.83,0.73] [-0.04,0.83] [-0.7,1.22] [0.35,2.78]
Observations 723 723 723 788 788 788 716 716 716
ELPD -258.83 -259.54 -258.59 -244.8 -245.4 -245.76 -303.21 -303.92 -297.45
Table F.6: Human performance in the knapsack task. Logistic regressions with random intercept effects for participants relating the accuracy
on an instance and satisfiability (1), instance complexity (IC) (2), and IC on only unsatisfiable instances. Parameter estimates correspond to the
median of the posterior distribution (β0.5) and the 95% HDI credible interval (HDI0.95). ELPD denotes the expected log posterior predictive density.






Intercept 1.79 0.59 0.47
[1.51,2.1] [0.28,0.92] [0.08,0.92]
Observations 1427 1427 711
ELPD -637.57 -574.82 -253.01
Table F.7: Number of clicks in the Boolean satisfiability task. Censored linear regressions with random intercept effects for participants
relating the number of clicks performed on an instance and typical-case complexity (TCC) (1), satisfiability (2), TCC and satisfiability (3), instance
complexity (IC) on unsatisfiable instances (4), as well as the number of solution witnesses on satisfiable instances (5). Parameter estimates correspond
to the median of the posterior distribution (β0.5) and the 95% HDI credible interval (HDI0.95). ELPD denotes the expected log posterior predictive
density.
Dependent variable: Number of clicks









No. of witnesses -0.59
[-0.69,-0.49]
Intercept 10.43 15.15 15.11 16.4 10.09
[9.19,11.67] [13.95,16.39] [13.76,16.4] [14.19,18.82] [9.23,10.96]
Observations 1375 1375 1375 664 711
ELPD -4111.67 -3825.19 -3794.12 -1645.16 -2016.33
Table F.8: Number of clicks in the traveling salesperson task. Linear regressions with random intercept effects for participants relating the
number of clicks performed on an instance and typical-case complexity (TCC) (1), satisfiability (2), TCC and satisfiability (3), instance complexity
(IC) (4), the number of solution witnesses (transformed via natural logarithm) on satisfiable instances (5), as well as IC and satisfiability (6).
Parameter estimates correspond to the median of the posterior distribution (β0.5) and the 95% HDI credible interval (HDI0.95). ELPD denotes the
expected log posterior predictive density.
Dependent variable: Number of clicks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
TCC 1.66 0.89
[1.01,2.33] [0.05,1.83]










Intercept 24.21 26.38 26 26.29 27.31 27.2
[21.99,26.32] [24.09,28.56] [23.61,28.28] [24.04,28.61] [25.52,29.17] [24.87,29.46]
Observations 1575 1575 1575 1575 788 1575
ELPD -5236.1 -5220.82 -5207.65 -5234.03 -2544.04 -5207.35
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Lüdecke, Daniel, Mattan S Ben-Shachar, and Dominique Makowski (2020). “De-
scribe and understand your model’s parameters”. In: CRAN. doi: 10.5281/
zenodo.3731932. url: https://easystats.github.io/parameters.
MacGregor, James N. and Yun Chu (2011). “Human Performance on the Traveling
Salesman and Related Problems: A Review”. In: The Journal of Problem Solving
3.2, p. 1. issn: 1932-6246. doi: 10.7771/1932-6246.1090. url: http://dx.
doi.org/10.7771/1932-6246.1090.
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Zdeborová, Lenka and Marc Mézard (Dec. 2008). “Constraint satisfaction problems
with isolated solutions are hard”. In: Journal of Statistical Mechanics: Theory






In this chapter I present the co-authored paper titled “The dynamics of neural
correlates of complex problem-solving”. There we apply the framework presented
in chapter 3 to the study of the neural processes that support complex problem-
solving. Specifically, we perform an experiment in which human participants solve
the knapsack decision task while undergoing functional MRI and we investigate the
neural correlates of computational hardness.
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The dynamics of neural correlates of complex
problem-solving
Juan Pablo Franco, Peter Bossaerts, Carsten Murawski
Abstract
Everyday tasks involve solving a plethora of computationally complex
problems. Yet, little is known on how the human brain supports complex
problem-solving. This is particularly troublesome because intractable
problems are fundamentally different to tractable problems, thus imped-
ing direct extensions of previous approaches. In this paper we propose
a framework to study problem-solving and cognitive demand in complex
problem-solving. This framework is rooted in the notion that computa-
tional hardness of problems is an inherent characteristic of the problem
and that it is associated to generic mathematical properties of instances
of the problem. Here we investigate how these generic properties of in-
stances are related to cognitive demand as well as to subjective markers
of performance and reliability in problem-solving. To do this we per-
formed an experiment in which participants solved several instances of
the knapsack decision problem while undergoing ultra-high field func-
tional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). We find that the neural cor-
relates of computational hardness overlap with those associated to the
multiple demand system (MDS). Importantly, our results show that these
vary throughout the different stages of the task, supporting the premise
that the MDS is a heterogeneous set of regions that play a dynamic and
varying role at different stages during problem-solving. Of note, in line
with our conjecture, we find neural markers of the reliability of a so-
lution in the cingulo-opercular network. Our results extend the study
of the neural processes associated with problem-solving by providing a
framework for the study of intractable problems using a generic defini-
tion of cognitive demand. Moreover, the study of intrinsic properties of
a problem put forward in this manuscript provides a way forward in the
characterization of subjective beliefs of reliability in complex problems.
Finally, our findings complement the investigation of cognitive control by
providing a framework for the study of cognitive requirements of a task
in a task-independent way.
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5.1 Introduction
Humans face daily decisions that require them to solve complex problems. Many of
the problems people face are known to be computationally intractable in the sense
that the number of operations that need to be taken to find a solution grows quickly
to levels that makes solving these problems infeasible. Everyday life examples of
deceptively simple yet actually hard tasks include attention gating, task scheduling,
shopping, routing, bin packing, and game play (van Rooij et al. 2019; Bossaerts and
Murawski 2017). Behind the surface of these routine jobs lurk problems such as the
knapsack problem, the traveling salesperson problem, the Hamiltonian circuit prob-
lem, the graph coloring problem, and the K-SAT problems (Boolean satisfiability
problems).
Despite the relevance of complex problems in daily life, little is known about
the neural processes that underlie how agents solve these problems. This is not to
say that the neural underpinnings of problem-solving are altogether unexplored, but
that the leap from the study of tractable problems to those that are considered to
be complex (i.e., intractable, NP-hard) has not taken place. Indeed, a prominent
approach in the study of problem-solving has analyzed the neural processes involved,
by studying the neural correlates of difficulty of tractable problems (e.g., Fedorenko,
Duncan, and Kanwisher 2013; Assem et al. 2020; Duncan and Owen 2000; Duncan
2010; Crittenden, Mitchell, and Duncan 2016). For instance, in working memory
tasks, problem-solving is investigated by contrasting cases in which the amount of
information that needs to be maintained in memory is modulated (e.g., Fedorenko,
Duncan, and Kanwisher 2013; Assem et al. 2020; Duncan and Owen 2000). In gen-
eral, this framework has been successful in characterizing a set of brain regions, the
multiple-demand system (MDS), that generically correlates with difficulty across dif-
ferent tasks (Fedorenko, Duncan, and Kanwisher 2013; Assem et al. 2020; Duncan
and Owen 2000; Crittenden, Mitchell, and Duncan 2016). This system is regu-
larly considered to be composed of two networks: (1) the cingulo-opercular network
(CON), consisting of the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC) and the anterior
insula (AI), and (2) the the frontoparietal network (FPN), composed of the intra-
parietal sulcus (IPS) and specific regions from the lateral prefrontal cortex including
the inferior frontal sulcus and the middle frontal gyrus (MFG) (Crittenden, Mitchell,
and Duncan 2016; Sadaghiani and D’Esposito 2015; Jonathan D Power and Petersen
2013; Marek and Dosenbach 2019; Dosenbach, Fair, Miezin, et al. 2007; Dosenbach,
Fair, A. L. Cohen, et al. 2008; Nomura et al. 2010; Jonathan D. Power et al. 2011;
Seeley et al. 2007; Duncan 2010; Fedorenko, Duncan, and Kanwisher 2013; Critten-
den, Mitchell, and Duncan 2016).
Overall, this approach provides a framework to study the generic neural processes
involved in problem-solving. It allows for the study of commonalities in neural pro-
cesses associated with problem-solving across different problems by implicitly defin-
ing a common currency, associated with difficulty, that can be studied across tasks
provided that it reflects a real neural substrate: cognitive demand. Importantly, this
procedure minimizes confounding effects by avoiding the need to artificially produce
alternative and arbitrary benchmark tasks. This approach, however, has not been
yet used to uncover the neural processes that support complex problem-solving.
A critical difficulty in extending this framework is that there is no evident way
of defining cognitive demand in a generic way such that it can be studied across
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tasks. A principled and generic way to characterize cognitive demand of a task is to
formalize the task as a computational problem and analyze its computational hard-
ness. Characterization of computational hardness has been previously studied at a
behavioral level and alternative metrics of hardness have been shown to affect human
behavior in a limited range of complex problems (MacGregor and Chu 2011; Hirtle
and Gärling 1992; Kotovsky, Hayes, and H. A. Simon 1985; Carruthers, Masson, and
Stege 2012; Bourgin et al. 2017; Shepard and Metzler 1971; Stazyk, Ashcraft, and
Hamann 1982; Acuña and Parada 2010; Murawski and Bossaerts 2016; Guid and
Bratko 2013; De Visscher and Noël 2014). However, most of the metrics proposed
thus far are problem-specific and in many cases strategy-specific. Problem-specific
approaches are troublesome because current behavioral studies have been limited
to a narrow range of problems and it is not clear if or how these metrics could be
extended to other problems. Strategy-specific quantification of hardness is specially
problematic in complex problems because humans employ a plethora of strategies to
solve these problems (e.g., MacGregor and Chu 2011; Acuña and Parada 2010; Hirtle
and Gärling 1992; Ohlsson 2012; Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier 2011; Newell, Weston,
and Shanks 2003; Payne, Bettman, and Johnson 1993; Siegler, Adolph, and Lemaire
1996). What would be particularly desirable is a problem-independent framework
to characterize hardness, and thus cognitive demand, in complex problems. Here we
propose a methodology in which, by focusing on generic intrinsic properties of the
problem, it is possible to characterize neural invariants of complex problem-solving.
These metrics are both problem- and strategy-independent and can be applied to a
plethora of problems.
In the present paper we first examine the neural correlates of cognitive demand
in a complex problem-solving task employing a metric of generic hardness that stems
from computational complexity theory. Explicitly, we utilize a metric of hardness
that arises from the study of random ensembles of instances (i.e., random cases
of the problem). This field has characterized a source of considerable variation in
computational hardness (for instances with the same input length) and related it to
various structural properties of instances (Cheeseman, Kanefsky, and W. M. Taylor
1991; Percus, Istrate, and Moore 2006; Ian P. Gent et al. 1996; Yadav et al. 2020;
Achlioptas, Naor, and Peres 2005; Selman and Kirkpatrick 1996; Krzakala et al.
2006). Critically, this source of complexity, which we call typical-case complexity
(TCC), captures a source of generic cognitive demand associated with computational
demands that can be modulated. This generic metric of hardness has already been
shown to affect human behavior in complex (specifically NP-complete) problem-
solving tasks, including the knapsack problem (Franco, Yadav, et al. 2020; Franco,
Doroc, et al. 2021). Therefore, we hypothesized that TCC would serve as a problem-
independent metric of cognitive demand that could be used to study the generic
neural processes behind complex problem-solving.
Besides the complications that arise when quantifying cognitive demand of com-
plex problems, the exploration of these problems entail another inherent complica-
tion. Complex problems usually require more time to solve, and thus, the neural
processes that support problem-solving can no longer be modeled as a static system.
The successful characterization of the neural underpinnings of complex problem-
solving needs to take into account that this process ensues from a dynamic interplay
of neural activity that generates strategies, modulates cognitive effort, all whilst
keeping track of relevant markers of performance such as expected error (Neta,
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Steven M Nelson, and Petersen 2017; Bossaerts 2018), expected rewards (Duverne
and Koechlin 2017), level of uncertainty (Neta, Steven M Nelson, and Petersen 2017;
Neta, Schlaggar, and Petersen 2014; Bossaerts 2018), among many other possible
markers (Yoo, Hayden, and Pearson 2021; Koechlin 2016). To date, the neural in-
variants of this dynamic interplay during complex problem-solving has not yet been
investigated.
A crucial obstacle in the study of this dynamic interplay in intractable (NP-
complete) problems is the lack of a theoretical framework capable of characterizing
relevant markers. What would be ideal in order to overcome this obstacle is a the-
ory capable of delineating the intrinsic properties of the task that could give rise
to these neural markers for intractable problems. Similar to how probability theory
provides a framework to characterize task performance markers such as mean and
variance (e.g., Preuschoff, Bossaerts, and Quartz 2006; D’Acremont and Bossaerts
2016; D’Acremont and Bossaerts 2008; d’Acremont, Schultz, and Bossaerts 2013;
Christopoulos et al. 2009; O’Neill and Schultz 2013). The methodology put forward
in this study delineates a set of intrinsic properties of NP-complete problems that
could serve this purpose. Among these properties we investigated two which we
hypothesized would be related to markers of expected performance and to the relia-
bility of candidate solutions. Here we define reliability as the subjective belief of the
degree to which a candidate solution can be depended on to be accurate. Firstly, we
studied TCC, which has been shown to affect performance, and thus, is potentially
linked to markers of expected performance and effort efficacy. Secondly, we consid-
ered markers related to satisfiability, an intrinsic property of NP-complete problems.
Satisfiability is a property of decision problems (problems whose solution is either
‘yes’ or ‘no’) that represents the solution of the problem. In NP-complete prob-
lems, satisfiability captures an asymmetry that does not occur in easy (tractable)
problems. Explicitly, in order to conclude that an instance is satisfiable (solution
is ‘yes’) it suffices to find a witness (example) that satisfies all of the constraints,
this solution can then be verified quickly. In contrast, to confirm that an instance is
unsatisfiable (solution is ‘no’) requires generating a proof of non-existence. We con-
jectured that this asymmetry between satisfiable and unsatisfiable instances would
be closely related to subjective markers of reliability. Much like variance is reflected
in subjective beliefs of uncertainty in probabilistic tasks. As such, we expected to see
neural markers of satisfiability in regions that have been previously shown to encode
uncertainty, specifically in CON (Neta, Steven M Nelson, and Petersen 2017; Neta,
Schlaggar, and Petersen 2014; Bossaerts 2018; Fouragnan, Retzler, and Philiastides
2018).
Here we investigate the neural correlates of TCC and satisfiability in the knap-
sack decision problem and explore the related neural dynamics. To this end, we
performed a study in which participants solved several instances of the knapsack
decision problem while undergoing functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI).
Instances varied in their computational complexity (specifically TCC) and in their
satisfiability. Critically, in order to be able to investigate the temporal dynamics of
problem-solving at a more granular level, we employed an ultra-high field scanner
for this study. This allowed us to increase both the temporal and spatial resolution
of the neuroimaging data collected.
We first considered the neural correlates of TCC. We expected regions associated
with the MDS to show differential brain activity between instances with high and
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low TCC. We indeed found that the neural correlates of complexity overlapped with
those characterized in the MDS: CON and FPN. However, the correlates varied
across time, presenting a different picture at different stages in the task. Importantly,
we did not find neural correlates of TCC early in the task, suggesting that the effects
of complexity in calculation and control allocation are only realized later on in the
trial.
Additionally, we explored the neural correlates of satisfiability. We expected
the asymmetry between satisfiable and unsatisfiable instances to be reflected in
a different strategy use throughout the solving stage and to reflect differences in
control signals in areas that have been shown to track uncertainty. In particular,
we expected to see higher activation in CON on unsatisfiable instances during late
stages of the trial (Neta, Steven M Nelson, and Petersen 2017; Neta, Schlaggar,
and Petersen 2014; Bossaerts 2018; Fouragnan, Retzler, and Philiastides 2018). Our
findings support this hypothesis. However, we expected to see neural correlates of
satisfiability only late in the trial, given that the estimation of satisfiability corre-
sponds to solving the problem. Interestingly, and contrary to our expectations, we
found significant differences in activation from early in the trial in several regions.
Finally, we investigated how the functional connectivity between regions of inter-
est in the MDS changed during the solving stage of the task. We expected regions
in CON, which are usually associated with proactive control allocation (Shenhav,
Botvinick, and J. D. Cohen 2013; Dosenbach, Visscher, et al. 2006; Silvetti et al.
2018; Vassena, Holroyd, and Alexander 2017; Holroyd and Yeung 2012; Alexander
and Brown 2011; Sestieri et al. 2014; Aben et al. 2020; Crottaz-Herbette and Menon
2006), to have higher effective connectivity on a region strongly associated with pro-
cessing in mathematical problem-solving (IPS) (Matejko and Ansari 2018; Grabner
et al. 2009; De Smedt, Holloway, and Ansari 2011; Arsalidou and M. J. Taylor 2011;
Brannon 2006). We also expected this connectivity to be modulated by the complex-
ity of the instance. We found, in line with our hypothesis, that during the solving
stage of the task the dACC had higher connectivity to the IPS. However, contrary
to our expectations, we did not find increased connectivity between AI and IPS.
Moreover, we found no significant effect of TCC nor satisfiability on the strength of
this connectivity.
5.2 Results
Twenty participants participated in this study. Each participant was asked to solve
56 instances of the knapsack decision task while undergoing an ultra-high field MRI
brain scan. In this task participants are asked to determine whether there exists
a subset of items with predefined values and weights that exceed a minimum total
value while not exceeding a maximum total weight (Fig 5.2.1). Instances varied
in their computational hardness (TCC) and in their satisfiability (2×2 balanced
factorial design; see Materials and Methods).
Additionally, participants performed, outside the scanner, a set of complemen-
tary tasks, including the knapsack optimization task and a set of cognitive function
tasks. In this section we report the behavioral results of the knapsack decision
task, while the behavioral results from the complementary tasks are reported in
Appendix A.
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Figure 5.2.1: Knapsack decision task. (a) Paradigm description. The task
was composed of three main stages: items stage (3s), solving stage (22s) and re-
sponse stage (2s). Initially, participants were presented with a set of items of dif-
ferent values and weights. The green circle at the center of the screen indicated the
time remaining in this stage of the trial. This stage lasted 3 seconds. Then, both
capacity constraint and target profit were shown at the center of the screen. Par-
ticipants decided whether there existed a subset of items for which (1) the sum of
weights is lower or equal to the capacity constraint and (2) the sum of values yields
at least the target profit. This stage lasted 22 seconds. Finally, participants had
2 seconds to make either a ‘YES’ or ‘NO’ response using the keyboard. A fixation
cross was shown during the inter-trial interval (jittered between 8 and 12 seconds).
(b) Analysis of task stages. The imaging data was modeled using two different
approaches. We first employed a Boxcar analysis, in which the BOLD signal was
modeled by convolving a canonical HRF with Boxcar functions. The solving stage
was partitioned into four Boxcar response functions (periods S1-S4), and the items
and response stage were each modeled with a single Boxcar function for the dura-
tion of the stage. The second type of analysis was a Finite Impulse Response (FIR)
analysis. In this approach we modeled the BOLD signal directly without convolving
an HRF. The entire duration of the trial was modeled employing a set of 17 tent re-
sponse functions equally spaced every 2 seconds. These tent-parameters are aligned
to the BOLD signal.
8-12s 3s 22s 2s
ITI Items Stage Solving Stage Response 
Stage











On average, participants chose the ‘YES’ option 50% of the trials (min = 25%,
max = 68%). Mean human performance, measured as the proportion of trials in
which a correct response was made, was 0.78 (min = 0.48, max = 0.95, SD = 0.14).
Performance had a non-significant improvement as the task progressed (β0.5 = 0.009,
HDI0.95 = [−0.001, 0.021], main effect of trial number on performance, generalized
logistic mixed model (GLMM); Table C.1 Model 1). This marginal improvement
in the task performance might seem to contradict previous results which suggest
that neither experience with the task nor mental fatigue affected task performance
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(Franco, Yadav, et al. 2020). However, unlike Franco, Yadav, et al. 2020, we per-
formed the task while participants underwent scanning, thus this discrepancy could
be due to acclimatization to the scanner.
Accuracy and instance properties
We first studied the effect of TCC on human performance. This measure is based on
a prominent framework in computer science that investigates the drivers of compu-
tational hardness in computational problems by studying the difficulty of randomly
generated instances of those problems. In the knapsack problem, TCC is explicitly
connected to a set of parameters ᾱ = (αc, αp) that capture the constrainedness of the
problem: αp = p/
∑N
i=1 vi and αc = c/
∑N
i=1wi (Yadav et al. 2020; Franco, Yadav,
et al. 2020). These parameters determine the likelihood that a random instance is
satisfiable; that is, that the solution is ‘yes’. Specifically, they characterize where
typical instances are generally satisfiable (under-constrained region), where they are
unsatisfiable (over-constrained region) and where the probability of satisfiability is
close to 50% (satisfiability threshold αs). TCC is defined based on the distance of αp
to the satisfiability threshold αs. Specifically, instances with values of αp near the
satisfiability threshold have a high typical-case complexity (high TCC ) whereas in-
stances further away from it—that is, in the under-constrained and over-constrained
regions— have low typical-case complexity (low TCC ).
We hypothesized that participants would have a better performance on instances
with low TCC compared to those with high TCC; in line with the results by Franco,
Yadav, et al. 2020. As predicted, we found that TCC had a negative effect on perfor-
mance (β0.5 = −1.10, HDI0.95 = [−1.44,−0.79], main effect of TCC on performance,
GLMM; Table C.1 Model 2).
Another relevant feature of instances of decision problems, is their satisfiabil-
ity. Despite the asymmetry encoded by this property, previous results suggest that
there is no effect of satisfiability on human performance in the knapsack decision
task (Franco, Yadav, et al. 2020). Our findings findings replicate these results
(β0.5 = 0.02, HDI0.95 = [−0.30, 0.30], main effect of satisfiability on performance,
GLMM; Table C.1 Model 5). Moreover, we tested whether there was an interaction
effect between TCC an satisfiability on performance and found no significant inter-
action effect (β0.5 = 0.26, HDI0.95 = [−0.37, 0.90], interaction effect of TCC and
satisfiability, GLMM; Table C.1 Model 6).
An additional aim of this study was to reproduce the key findings presented
by Franco, Yadav, et al. 2020. We have already shown that the results regarding
TCC and satisfiability are mirrored by our data and statistical analyses. Two other
key findings in their study were related to two related solution-space metrics of
complexity: Instance complexity (IC) and number of solution witnesses (i.e., the
number subsets of items that satisfy both profit and capacity constraints). In order
to estimate these metrics, unlike TCC, the problem needs to be solved. Concretely,
harder versions of the problem require solving. For IC to be estimated, the opti-
mization variant of the knapsack problem needs to be solved, while for the number
of witnesses all of the possible sets of items that satisfy the constraints need to be
found. This makes estimating these metrics more computationally intensive than
estimation of TCC. Despite this drawback, these metrics capture the hardness of a
single instance of the problem and therefore are more precise when predicting per-
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Figure 5.2.2: Human performance in the knapsack decision task. (a) TCC.
Each dot represents an instance; human performance corresponds the proportion of
participants that solved the instance correctly. Instances are categorized according
to their constrainedness region (α) and their TCC. In the underconstrained region
(low TCC) the satisfiability probability is close to one, while in the overconstrained
region (low TCC) the probability is close to zero. The region with a high TCC cor-
responds to a region in which the probability is close to 0.5. Additionally, instances
are categorized according to their solution (satisfiability) which is represented by
their color. The box-plots represent the median, the interquartile range (IQR) and
the whiskers extend to a maximum length of 1.5*IQR (b) IC. Mean accuracy per
instance and the marginal effect of IC on human performance (GLMM; Table C.1
Model 3). Higher IC is related to lower computational hardness. Instances are
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formance for each instance compared to TCC, which captures the average hardness
of an ensemble of random instances.
Franco, Yadav, et al. 2020 showed that human performance was affected by both
IC and the number of witnesses. Here we reproduced these findings. We found
that higher values of IC were related to higher accuracy (β0.5 = 6.54, HDI0.95 =
[4.67, 8.29], main effect of IC, GLMM; Table C.1 Model 3). Similarly, among satis-
fiable instances, we found that a higher number of witnesses was related to better
performance (β0.5 = 0.20, HDI0.95 = [0.12, 0.28], main effect of number of witnesses
in satisfiable instances, GLMM; Table C.1 Model 4). It is worth noting that the
number of witnesses can only explain variability among satisfiable instances since
all unsatisfiable instances have 0 witnesses.
Overall, we find a significant effect on performance of TCC, IC and number of
witnesses. In contrast, we found no effect of satisfiability on performance. These
results replicate previous findings (Franco, Yadav, et al. 2020) and validate that the
experimentally modulated variable (TCC) successfully varied the hardness of the
task.
Finally, we investigated human performance in a set of related tasks. We studied
the effect of computational hardness in the knapsack optimization task and repli-
cated previous results (Franco, Yadav, et al. 2020). Explicitly, we found that a
previously proposed extension of TCC to optimization problems does, indeed, have
an effect on both human performance and time-on-task (See Appendix A.1). More-
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over, we explored the relation between performance in the knapsack tasks and core
cognitive abilities, including working memory, episodic memory, strategy use, as
well as mental arithmetic (see Appendix A.2). For this analysis, we utilized the
joined data set from this study together with the data collected by Franco, Yadav,
et al. 2020. Our results suggest a weak relation between these cognitive abilities and
performance in the knapsack tasks. The only significant correlation (at α = 0.05)




We explored the whole-brain neural correlates of two intrinsic generic properties
of the problem at hand: TCC and satisfiability. Additionally, we investigated the
neural correlates of response accuracy. We did this by fitting GLMs that partitioned
the solving stage into four separate periods (5.5s) with an additional response stage
modeled in the analysis (2s) (see Fig 5.2.1). Here we present the results of these
regressions.
Neural correlates of TCC We first explored the neural correlates of TCC. We
expected to see the highTCC − lowTCC contrast capture differences in BOLD
activation in regions previously correlated with cognitive demand (i.e., MDS). We
explicitly expected to find evidence for the encoding of TCC in CON from early
on during the solving stage due to its link to expected performance and reliability.
Higher TCC entails, on average, lower performance and lower reliability of finding
the solution (Fig 5.2.2). Note that the estimation of TCC early on in the trial is
feasible, because constrainedness (and thus TCC) can be potentially estimated by
performing a sum and division operations (αp = p/
∑N
i=1 vi and αc = c/
∑N
i=1wi).
We found that the neural correlates of TCC varied throughout the duration of
the solving stage. We report these results in Figure 5.2.3 and present the correspond-
ing cluster information in Table 5.2.1. Contrary to our expectations we did not find
significant correlations of TCC during the first period of the solving stage. Inter-
estingly, during the second period we did find a set of clusters that showed higher
BOLD activity on instances with low TCC. These regions include the angular gyrus
(AG) bilaterally, the SFG, the right MFG as well as regions in the orbitofrontal
cortex (bilaterally). It is worth noting that the negative pattern found in this pe-
riod might stem from a different slope in the increased task-related activation and
not from differences in the sustained level of activity (see Fig 5.2.6). This pattern
would align with previous results that support that FPN regions encode evidence
accumulation towards a particular decision (Ploran et al. 2011; C. Gratton et al.
2017). Indeed, in the knapsack task we would expect that lower TCC would be
associated with faster evidence accumulation towards a solution.
During the third period of the solving stage the TCC contrast still showed sig-
nificant clusters along FPN, but the pattern overall changed, with respect to period
2, except for the cluster in the right AG. Critically, we found that a different set of
regions within FPN now showed a positive correlation with TCC. Specifically, we
found clusters in the left SFG, left IPS, the cerebellum, as well as a cluster in the
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Figure 5.2.3: Neural correlates of TCC. Brain activation effect estimates (β) for
the high vs. low TCC contrast (βhighTCC − βlowTCC). A positive contrast represents
a higher BOLD activity on instances with high TCC compared to low TCC. Signifi-
cant cluster-wise FWE-corrected (p < 0.05) clusters (with an uncorrected threshold
of p < 0.001) are presented for each of the contrasts estimated using the Boxcar
analysis. Each panel represents a different period in the solving stage. (a) Period
S2, (b) period S3, (c) period S4. No significant clusters were found in period S1
nor in the response stage.
(a) RHLH
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right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC) in between the MFG and the SFG. In-
terestingly, the right AG kept on displaying a negative correlation with TCC during
this period.
Finally, during the fourth, and last, period of the solving stage, a new set of
clusters was identified. Markedly, this new set of clusters include regions from both
CON, FPN, as well as significant clusters in the occipital lobe. In general, the
activation in these clusters correlate positively with TCC. These include the dACC
and right AI from CON as well as the precentral gyrus and the IPS from the FPN.
The right IPS activation is segregated into two clusters, one medial and superior
that overlaps with the precuneus and one more lateral that overlaps with the AG.
The only two clusters that correlated negatively with TCC in this period are those
located in the ACC, as well as a cluster in the left SFG that overlaps with the SFG
cluster found in the second period.
We did not find any significant clusters during the response stage.
Neural correlates of satisfiability Understanding the processes that support
problem-solving is particularly difficult for complex problems because there are many
possible strategies that agents might use to solve a problem. In order to better
understand these supporting processes we propose that the intrinsic properties of
the problem can be employed as markers to capture invariants of these processes.
One such property of decision problems, is its satisfiability. This characteristic is
relevant because it encodes an asymmetry of NP-complete problems that might be
related to the implementation of different strategies. Explicitly, in order to conclude
that an instance is satisfiable it suffices to find a witness that satisfies all of the
constraints. In contrast, to derive that an instance is unsatisfiable requires a proof
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Table 5.2.1: TCC clusters. Significant cluster-wise FWE-corrected (p < 0.05)
clusters (using an uncorrected threshold of p < 0.001) from the High TCC - low
TCC contrast. Coordinates are in MNI space.
Cluster statistics Peak statistics
Stage Region Side Volume(mm3) βmean SEM βpeak x y z
S2
SFG RH/LH 4763.6 -0.17 0.001 -0.32 13 34 61
Orbitofrontal cortex RH 3878.9 -0.21 0.002 -0.37 51 44 -19
AG RH 2662.4 -0.20 0.002 -0.31 51 -55 37
AG LH 897.0 -0.21 0.002 -0.29 -58 -66 36
Orbitofrontal cortex LH 749.6 -0.20 0.003 -0.31 -51 36 -19
MFG RH 495.6 -0.16 0.002 -0.20 48 17 36
S3
IPS LH 2043.9 0.16 0.002 0.35 -11 -79 52
Cerebelum RH 938.0 0.11 0.002 0.19 0 -60 -25
SFG LH 786.4 0.14 0.002 0.19 -26 -2 52
AG RH 495.6 -0.17 0.002 -0.24 56 -60 36
MFG/SFG RH 483.3 0.12 0.002 0.17 30 -1 61
S4
Occipital Pole LH 2732.0 0.20 0.001 0.32 -10 -97 -8
Fusiform gyrus LH 1888.3 0.19 0.002 0.31 -24 -79 -14
Middle occipital gyrus LH 1503.2 0.20 0.002 0.28 -29 -78 21
AI RH 1265.7 0.21 0.003 0.30 32 28 0
Precentral gyrus LH 1163.3 0.22 0.003 0.33 -43 4 24
IPS (precuneus) RH 1044.5 0.21 0.003 0.33 13 -76 60
SFG LH 1024.0 -0.15 0.003 -0.27 -16 36 58
dACC LH/RH 901.1 0.18 0.002 0.24 -2 22 40
IPS (AG) RH 696.3 0.24 0.004 0.35 32 -65 47
Occipital pole LH 667.6 0.26 0.003 0.34 -38 -95 -6
ACC LH 475.1 -0.22 0.003 -0.29 -5 57 8
of non-existence.1
We expected the asymmetry between satisfiable and unsatisfiable instances to
not only be reflected in a different strategy use throughout the solving stage, but
also reflect differences in neural markers associated with reliability. Specifically, we
hypothesized that satisfiable instances would be associated with higher reliability,
given that once a solution witness is found, verifying that the proposed solution
is correct is straightforward (a polynomial-time operation). In contrast, for un-
satisfiable instances verifying a proof of non-existence might be more convoluted.
Therefore, we expected regions that have been linked to monitoring of uncertainty
to be more active during the trial on unsatisfiable instances compared to satisfiable
ones. In particular, we conjectured higher activation of the CON, on unsatisfiable
instances, during late stages of the trial (Neta, Steven M Nelson, and Petersen 2017;
Neta, Schlaggar, and Petersen 2014; Bossaerts 2018; Fouragnan, Retzler, and Phil-
iastides 2018). We expected to find neural correlates of satisfiability only late during
the solving stage, given that the estimation of satisfiability corresponds to solving
the problem.
We report the neural correlates of satisfiability (Unsatisfiable − Satisfiable)
in Figure 5.2.4 and present the corresponding cluster information in Table 5.2.2.
Interestingly, and contrary to our expectations, we found significant clusters from the
first period of the solving stage. Moreover, significant clusters did not extend to the
response screen, which was also in opposition to our hypothesis. Most of the clusters
during the solving stage showed a lower BOLD activity for unsatisfiable instances.
These clusters extended from period one to period four of the solving stage. Notably,
the posterior cingulate showed a lower sustained activation on unsatisfiable instances
1Conceptually, this asymmetry reflects the conjectured null intersection between complexity
classes NP-complete and co-NP-complete.
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throughout the solving stage (periods S2, S3 and S4). Similarly, different clusters in
the SFG had significant clusters throughout the solving stage. Additionally, similar
to the clusters found for the TCC contrast, the AG showed bilateral activation
during the second period of the solving stage. Interestingly, a bigger AG cluster
was found on the left hemisphere compared to the right, in contrast to the right
laterality predominance of AG found in the TCC contrast.
Figure 5.2.4: Neural correlates of satisfiability. Brain activation effect estimates
(β) for the unsatisfiable vs. satisfiable contrast (βunsatisfiable−βsatisfiable). A positive
contrast represents a higher BOLD activity on unsatisfiable instances. Significant
cluster-wise FWE-corrected (p < 0.05) clusters (with an uncorrected threshold of
p < 0.001) are presented for each of the contrasts estimated using the Boxcar anal-
ysis. Each panel represents a different period in the solving stage. (a) Period S1,
(b) period S2, (c) period S3 and , (d) period S4. No significant clusters were found
in the response stage.
(a) RHLH
Period S1 Period S3 Period S4Items ResponsePeriod S2
No Clusters
(b) RHLH (c) RHLH





The two clusters that showed a higher activity on unsatisfiable instances were
the right AI and the occipital superior cortex, both present only during period four
of the solving stage. The significant cluster found in the AI is in line with our
hypothesis that unsatisfiable instances are related to higher markers of uncertainty.
A signal which we expected to find in CON. However, in disagreement with our
hypothesis, we did not find a significant satisfiability cluster in the the dACC. This,
however, coincides with alternative views that suggest a dissociation between the
role of AI and dACC, where the AI is involved in monitoring of control signals
or alerting, whilst the dACC is associated with task switching and active control
allocation (Han, Eaton, and Marois 2019; Billeke et al. 2020).
Neural correlates of accuracy It has been hypothesized that FPN as well as
CON regions encode task signals related to error detection and error expectation
(Neta, Steven M Nelson, and Petersen 2017; Neta, Schlaggar, and Petersen 2014;
Dosenbach, Visscher, et al. 2006). Although participants did not receive any feed-
back during the task, we expected to see error related signals during later stages of
the trial. Although these signals would not represent the integration of novel ex-
ogenous information (since there was no feedback) we conjectured that participants
would represent a subjective belief on the expected accuracy (or reward) of their
answer (e.g, Duverne and Koechlin 2017).
We found only one significant cluster during the solving stage (in period one)
(Fig 5.2.5a; Table 5.2.3). The other significant clusters were identified during the
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Table 5.2.2: Satisfiability clusters. Significant cluster-wise FWE-corrected (p <
0.05) clusters (using an uncorrected threshold of p < 0.001) from the Unsatisfiable-
Satisfiable contrast. Coordinates are in MNI space.
Cluster statistics Peak statistics
Stage Region Side Volume(mm3) βmean SEM βpeak x y z
S1
SFG LH 1876.0 -0.14 0.002 -0.23 -3 38 42
Supramarginal gyrus RH 1740.8 -0.13 0.002 -0.25 54 -46 56
Supramarginal gyrus LH 1425.4 -0.12 0.001 -0.17 -42 -47 40
Inferior occipital cortex LH 1159.2 -0.13 0.002 -0.22 -61 -65 -12
MFG LH 905.2 -0.15 0.001 -0.20 -48 18 28
Caudate LH 880.6 -0.17 0.002 -0.24 -8 2 -1
MFG RH 868.4 -0.12 0.003 -0.23 37 30 53
Cerebellum LH 667.6 -0.12 0.002 -0.18 -38 -79 -49
Precuneus LH 516.1 -0.19 0.003 -0.26 -2 -65 44
Frontal pole RH 450.6 -0.14 0.002 -0.18 29 58 -9
Caudate RH 450.6 -0.17 0.003 -0.23 8 4 0
S2
AG LH 2523.1 -0.19 0.002 -0.29 -62 -60 29
Posterior cingulate RH 696.3 -0.20 0.003 -0.25 2 -25 40
AG RH 585.7 -0.18 0.003 -0.28 62 -57 34
SFG LH 577.5 -0.23 0.004 -0.40 -38 62 -8
Posterior cingulate LH 479.2 -0.16 0.002 -0.19 -10 -41 37
S3
SFG LH 1511.4 -0.15 0.002 -0.22 -21 36 55
Anterior cingulate LH 708.6 -0.21 0.003 -0.30 -5 52 4
Supramarginal gyrus RH 696.3 -0.14 0.002 -0.20 64 -28 39
Frontal pole RH 692.2 -0.14 0.002 -0.21 13 58 31
Anterior cingulate LH 593.9 -0.15 0.002 -0.24 -6 46 12
Posterior cingulate LH 577.5 -0.17 0.002 -0.22 -2 -28 45
Posterior cingulate LH 487.4 -0.18 0.004 -0.28 -2 -44 28
S4
Posterior cingulate RH 1384.5 -0.22 0.003 -0.33 0 -18 34
SFG RH 1306.6 -0.18 0.002 -0.26 14 50 42
AI RH 901.1 0.25 0.003 0.36 32 28 0
AG LH 659.5 -0.24 0.003 -0.30 -48 -68 44
SFG LH 647.2 -0.17 0.004 -0.26 -14 52 40
Precuneus LH 581.6 -0.19 0.005 -0.27 -5 -57 31
Occipital superior cortex RH 544.8 0.17 0.005 0.27 29 -63 36
SFG / Frontal pole LH 512.0 -0.24 0.003 -0.34 -3 65 16
Orbitofrontal cortex LH 454.7 -0.23 0.003 -0.33 -46 28 -20
Supramarginal RH 438.3 -0.12 0.002 -0.18 54 -33 32
response stage (Fig 5.2.5b; Table 5.2.3). In line with out hypothesis, we found that
activity in both FPN and CON was positively correlated with erring. Specifically, a
higher activity was found for incorrect trials in the AI (bilaterally), dACC, left MFG
and the right inferior frontal gyrus. In addition to the regions commonly associated
with the MDS, we also found significant activation in the SFG (bilaterally), ACC
and paracingulate gyrus.
ROI dynamics
Three ROIs were selected (see section 5.4.9) to investigate more closely the neural
dynamics of complex problem-solving and the interplay of this process with mon-
itoring of control signals and proactive allocation of control. We included in our
analysis the dACC due to its proposed involvement in the allocation of control
(Shenhav, Botvinick, and J. D. Cohen 2013; Dosenbach, Visscher, et al. 2006; Sil-
vetti et al. 2018; Vassena, Holroyd, and Alexander 2017; Holroyd and Yeung 2012;
Alexander and Brown 2011), as well as the right AI because of its involvement in
encoding control signals and uncertainty in particular (Neta, Steven M Nelson, and
Petersen 2017; Neta, Schlaggar, and Petersen 2014; Bossaerts 2018; Fouragnan, Ret-
zler, and Philiastides 2018). Additionally, we selected a processing unit associated
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Figure 5.2.5: Neural correlates of accuracy. Brain activation effect estimates (β)
for the correct vs. incorrect contrast (βcorrect− βincorrect). A positive contrast repre-
sents a higher BOLD activity on instances that were answered correctly. Significant
cluster-wise FWE-corrected (p < 0.05) clusters (with an uncorrected threshold of
p < 0.001) are presented for each of the contrasts estimated using the Boxcar analy-
sis. Each panel represents a different period in the trial. (a) Period S1, (b) response
stage. No significant clusters were found in the contrasts during periods S2-S4 of
the solving stage.
(a) RH








No Clusters No Clusters No Clusters
with mathematical calculations, the right IPS (Matejko and Ansari 2018; Brannon
2006; Arsalidou and M. J. Taylor 2011).
The BOLD activation associated with each of the ROIs is presented in Fig-
ure 5.2.6. The effect estimates βFIR correspond to 2× 2 FIR analysis performed for
the factors TCC and satisfiability (see section 5.4.9 for details). We found a similar
patterns for AI and dACC. Overall, in both ROIs the activity rose throughout the
task and quickly decreased around the time the solving stage ended. The activity
pattern in the IPS showed a different pattern to that of CON regions. In this region,
the activity increased quickly early on in the trial and was sustained until it started
decreasing later on. The moment at which the decrease started was modulated by
TCC and satisfiability.
Interestingly, there seemed to be an interaction between satisfiability and TCC.
Specifically, satisfiable instances with low TCC started showing a decrease in activity
from early on in the trial in all three regions (Fig 5.2.6 green line). Conversely,
unsatisfiable instances with high TCC showed a positive slope in both AI and dACC
until late in the trial (orange line).
When contrasting the effect of TCC on each of the ROIs, we find that there
is a significant positive effect of TCC from mid-way through the trial in the right
IPS/AG (Fig 5.2.6 second row of panels). This differs from the results obtained
from the whole brain analysis, which might be due to the increased power in ROI
analyses. Similarly, when estimating the effect of satisfiability (Fig 5.2.6 third row of
panels), the results marginally differ from those of the whole-brain analysis. Firstly,
the ROI analysis reveals that there is an effect of satisfiability on all three regions
late in the solving-stage. Secondly, the effect of satisfiability starts in the AI and
dACC mid-way through the trial. Interestingly, the effect of TCC seems to precede
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Table 5.2.3: Accuracy clusters. Significant cluster-wise FWE-corrected (p < 0.05)
clusters (using an uncorrected threshold of p < 0.001) from the Correct-Incorrect
contrast. Coordinates are in MNI space.
Cluster statistics Peak statistics
Stage Region Side Volume(mm3) βmean SEM βpeak x y z
S1 Occipital cortex RH 569.3 0.21 0.003 0.31 10 -100 8
Response
AI RH 2146.3 -0.22 0.002 -0.33 30 23 -8
AI LH 2048.0 -0.26 0.002 -0.40 -48 18 -12
dACC LH 1953.8 -0.24 0.002 -0.38 -2 22 40
SFG RH 1007.6 -0.18 0.003 -0.28 2 23 60
MFG LH 974.8 -0.19 0.002 -0.27 -27 50 16
SFG LH 684.0 -0.18 0.003 -0.26 -2 10 60
Inferior frontal gyrus RH 602.1 -0.22 0.003 -0.29 50 17 31
ACC LH 520.2 -0.18 0.002 -0.25 -3 31 26
Paracingulate gyrus LH 491.5 -0.24 0.004 -0.31 -5 9 50
Figure 5.2.6: Temporal dynamics of regions of interest. Mean effect estimate
(β) of each ROI against time in trial. The effect at each time point represents
the mean βFIR over all of the voxels from each ROI: right AI (a), dACC (b), and
right IPS cluster extending to the angular gyrus (c). In the top row of figures,
the βFIR’s characterize the coefficients of the FIR regression with four conditions:
satisfiability×TCC. The βFIR parameters are aligned to the BOLD signal, which
has a lag with respect to the task time. To correct for this, the gray vertical lines
represent the task-events by assuming a 5 seconds BOLD signal lag. In the second
row, the TCC contrast (βhigh − βlow) is presented. The bottom row shows the
satisfiability contrast (βunsat − βsat). Red asterisks represent significance at a 0.05
significance level. Significance levels in the gray shaded regions are suggestive only;
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that of satisfiability in the IPS, whereas in the dACC the effect of satisfiability seems
to precede that of TCC.
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Altogether, these results suggest that both satisfiability and TCC correlate with
activity in all three regions, but that their effect might have different neural temporal
signatures. Importantly, the sign of the effect was in line with our hypothesis; a
higher signal in these regions was generally related to high TCC and unsatisfiability.
The only exceptions happen briefly early in the trial, which might be related to
evidence accumulation acting in these regions (see Discussion).
Psychophysiological interactions (PPI)
We were interested in studying the functional connectivity in the brain during
problem-solving. Moreover, we wanted to assess the effect of the intrinsic proper-
ties of the problem on functional connectivity. To investigate these effects, we first
conducted PPI analysis to gauge the functional synchronization between regions
in the brain and each of the ROIs described in the previous section. Explicitly,
we performed whole-brain PPI analyses employing the three relevant ROIs (dACC,
rAG and rAI) as seed regions. For these regressions we modeled the task (items
and solving stages together) with two boxcar functions of equal length (12.5s) (See
Fig 5.2.7). This allowed us to study PPI task interactions separately for an early
period (PPI-1: first 12.5 seconds of the trial) and a late period (PPI-2: last 12.5
seconds). We first explored the effect of each of these two task periods on the con-
nectivity to each of the ROIs. We found a similar pattern of connectivity in all three
ROIs, and both periods, when contrasting the PPI effect compared to baseline (see
Fig C.1). Overall, these connectivity results show a reliable synchronization between
each of the three seed ROIs with FPN and CON, during both periods. This suggest
that the task has a similar effect on the BOLD synchronization pattern of all three
regions.
Additionally, we investigated the differences between connectivity patterns for
different types of instances. When comparing the connectivity between instances
high TCC and low TCC we found one significant cluster with differential connec-
tivity. This cluster, located along the rAG and the supramarginal gyrus, showed
a change in connectivity to the rAI (seed region) between high and low TCC in-
stances during the second PPI period (Fig 5.2.7a; Table 5.2.4). We then explored the
differences in the PPI connectivity between unsatisfiable and satisfiable instances.
We observed, a significant PPI effect of satisfiability between the right IPS/AG
(seed) and the left MFG, as well as with the left AG, during the second PPI period
(Fig 5.2.7b; Table 5.2.4). Overall, these results suggest that instance properties have
an effect on the synchronicity between the ROIs and a limited collection of clusters.
However, this effect is only significant during the later stage of the trial.
Table 5.2.4: PPI clusters. The effect of instances’ properties on connectivity.
Significant cluster-wise FWE-corrected (p < 0.05) clusters (using an uncorrected
threshold of p < 0.001). Coordinates in MNI space.
Cluster statistics Peak statistics
Contrast Region Side Volume(mm3) βmean SEM βpeak x y z
TCC AG/Supramarginal G. RH 573.4 0.26 0.004 0.36 61 -50 36
Satisfiability
MFG LH 499.7 0.300 0.007 0.475 -43 18 59
AG LH 483.3 0.266 0.006 0.432 -54 -65 47
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Figure 5.2.7: PPI results. The effect of instances’ properties on connectivity:
(a) TCC, (b) Satisfiability. The left panel represents the seed region used for
the analysis (dACC, rAG or rAI). The right panel shows the clusters that display a
significant PPI connectivity effect for a particular seed region and period. Significant
cluster-wise FWE-corrected (p < 0.05) clusters (with an uncorrected threshold of





































PPI analysis provides a description of the functional connectivity (synchronization)
between regions based on correlations between simultaneous activity across regions.
As such, this analysis is insensitive to temporal directionality in the time series.
In contrast, Granger causality (GC) is defined based on Vector Auto Regression
(VAR) models, whereby a vector of ROI signals is driven by a finite number of lags
of itself. This allows for gradual excitatory (or inhibitory) impact of one region
onto another, that might suggest temporal directionality. This directional effect can
be summarized by GC, which emerges when the presence of lags of one variable
significantly improves the fit (maximum likelihood value) of another variable.
Critical for this study, we expected the underlying neural processes of complex
problem-solving to be internally driven. Specifically, we expected the connectivity
patterns to be linked to neural processes whose timing could vary stochastically
across trials and participants (e.g., the burst of neural activity does not have to
coincide with an experimental intervention such as initial display of items). In order
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to explore these connectivity patterns we performed a GC analysis on the three
ROIs. For this, we ran a VAR model on the ROI time series augmented with the
series during the solving stage only, and determined incremental GC of one series on
another during problem-solving. This allowed us to estimate effective connectivity
GC tests at baseline as well as the GC changes from baseline during the solving
stage.
We found a significant bidirectional connectivity between all the ROIs at baseline
during the experiment (See Fig 5.2.8a). Additionally, during the solving stage we
found that there was a significant increase in GC from dACC to rAG. In other words,
the dACC (lagged time series) Granger-causes activation in rAG during the solving
stage more intensely than elsewhere during the trial and inter-trial interval. More-
over, we found that during the solving stage there was an increased self-activation
effect in the dACC and rAG; that is, the lagged time series of each of these two
ROIs Granger-cause themselves (See Fig 5.2.8b).
We were also interested in the effect of instance properties on the effective con-
nectivity between the 3 ROIs. To do this, we augmented our GC analysis to test
for differences in connectivity between instances with varying intrinsic properties.
Specifically, we compared connectivity across levels of TCC and satisfiability cate-
gory. We did not find any significant changes in the effective connectivity between
high and low TCC instances nor between unsatisfiable and satisfiable instances. A
note of caution is due here since these results could be due to lack of statistical
power.
Figure 5.2.8: Granger causality results. Effective connectivity estimated via
Granger causality between each of three ROIs: dACC, rAI and rAG. (a) Represents
the baseline connectivity between the regions. (b) Represents the changes in effec-
tive connectivity during the solving stage compared to baseline. Only three effects
survive multiple comparisons correction: An increased connectivity from dACC to
rAG and a higher self-modulatory effect on both dACC and AG. P-values correspond
to the GC test uncorrected for multiple comparisons. Asterisks represent significant
GC effects FWE-corrected at significance threshold of 0.05.
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5.3 Discussion
The study of the neural underpinnings behind problem-solving has, to date, been
centered on tractable problems. This line of research has led to the characterization
of networks and processes associated with problem-solving. However, it remains an
open question whether these results can be extended to complex problems. More
fundamentally, it is not clear if and how the current theoretical framework can be
used to study these problems. A critical complication in this gap is the difficulty
of characterizing cognitive demand, which is particularly problematic in complex
problems because of the plethora of strategies that might be employed (e.g., Mac-
Gregor and Chu 2011; Acuña and Parada 2010). In the present paper we propose a
methodology to study the neural invariants of problem-solving in which, by focusing
on the intrinsic properties of a problem, it is possible to characterize the cognitive
demand of a task associated with computational hardness.
Employing this theoretical framework, we empirically studied the neural under-
pinning of complex problem-solving in the knapsack decision task using ultra-high
field fMRI. Our findings shed light into the neural processes supporting problem-
solving. Firstly, our findings not only extend but solidify the research on the neural
correlates of cognitive demand by exploring the processes associated with one spe-
cific dimension of cognitive demand: computational hardness. Importantly, our
results extend the study of the neural underpinnings of problem-solving by provid-
ing a framework for the study of intractable problems using a generic definition for
cognitive demand. Secondly, the study of intrinsic properties of a problem and their
connection to neural processes in problem-solving have significant implications for
the understanding of how people solve these problems. In particular, using this
approach is is possible characterize relevant neural markers of a task such as TCC
and satisfiability. These markers might have significant implications on how people
approach computational tasks, just like risk and variance have been shown to affect
decisions in probabilistic tasks. Finally, the results presented here complement the
investigation of cognitive control by providing a framework that can be employed
to extend previous findings to tasks that involve intractable problems. Critically,
cognitive control involves the dynamic allocation of cognitive resources that stem
from an interaction between the cognitive requirements of a task and the resources
available. The framework put forward here provides a theoretical foundation for the
characterization of the former.
5.3.1 Neural correlates of cognitive demand
Extensive research has studied the neural correlates of cognitive demand. This
program has characterized a MDS; a network of regions that respond to cognitive
demand irregardless of the task at hand (Fedorenko, Duncan, and Kanwisher 2013;
Assem et al. 2020; Duncan and Owen 2000; Crittenden, Mitchell, and Duncan 2016).
This has been done using several tasks including perceptual target detection, mem-
ory retrieval, among many others. Notably, most of the tasks employed to date have
been based on tractable problems. Moreover, many of the tasks employed modulate
cognitive demand of the task by tuning the amount of processing needed on one
specific dimension of cognitive processing. For instance in perceptual tasks signal
to noise ratio is modulated (e.g., Aben et al. 2020; Dubis et al. 2016; Hanks and
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Summerfield 2017; Ploran et al. 2011), alternatively, in memory retrieval tasks, the
amount of information to be stored/retrieved is tuned (e.g., G. Gratton et al. 2018;
Fedorenko, Duncan, and Kanwisher 2013).
The lack of a generic (problem-independent) definition of cognitive demand hin-
ders the generalization of this approach to new problems. Importantly, the level of
cognitive demand might be highly related to the strategies used. For instance, multi-
plication operations can be performed using different strategies such as the standard
multiplication algorithm or alternatives such as the Japanese visual method and the
Vedic method (Garain and Kumar 2018). These different strategies would generate
different landscapes of cognitive demand in multiplication problems depending of
the algorithm used. Critically, when leaping into tasks that are more complex, and
especially those that involve problems that are intractable, the limitations of this
approach become more apparent. The increase in complexity brings along an in-
crease in strategies available to solve the problem and this makes the determination
of a single metric of cognitive demand even more troublesome.
A proper quantitative (cardinal) study of the neural underpinnings of cognitive
demand requires a proper generic definition of cognitive demand that can be quanti-
fied across problems and, ideally, across strategies. Such characterization would be
grounded in the assumption that hardness is, at least partially, an intrinsic charac-
teristic of the problem at hand. Here we take this approach and present a framework
that builds on computational complexity theory and is able to categorize problems
in a generic way according to their intrinsic computational hardness. We show that
computational hardness, as so defined, can be used to study to the neural correlates
of cognitive demand.
We empirically studied and identified the neural correlates of computational
hardness in the knapsack decision task. Specifically, we found that the neural cor-
relates of TCC overlapped with those associated to the MDS. In particular, the
positively correlated clusters (higher activation in high TCC instances) in the FPN
and CON resembled those of the MDS. Notably, we found clusters in the AI, the
dACC, the precentral gyrus and the IPS, which are ascribed to the MDS (Fedorenko,
Duncan, and Kanwisher 2013). Moreover, we found clusters in the occipital lobe.
Although occipital regions are not generally assigned to the MDS, they do show
a differential activation when modulating cognitive demand in several tasks (Fe-
dorenko, Duncan, and Kanwisher 2013). Importantly, our results display a dynamic
process in which the neural correlates of TCC vary throughout the different stages
of the task. These clusters varied in their location and their correlation with TCC.
Specifically, the positively correlated clusters were found only from halfway through
the solving stage. This suggests that the effects of computational hardness on cal-
culation and control allocation are only realized late in the trial. Moreover, activity
in these clusters did not show a sustained significant correlation with TCC; they
changed throughout the late stages of the trial. Of note, the effect size of the cor-
relation with TCC and the three ROIs considered changed between period three
and four of the solving stage. This suggests that the MDS can be construed as a
heterogeneous set of regions that play a dynamic and varying role at different stages
in problem-solving.
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5.3.2 Task-related neural markers
Here we extend the study of the neural underpinnings of problem-solving to a canon-
ical intractable (NP-hard) problem: the knapsack problem. Importantly, we do this
by exploring the link between generic properties of the problem and their link to
neural processes. In the previous section we hinted at a direct effect of cognitive
demand on the neural computations needed to solve the problem. A related effect of
these properties on neural processes is through the encoding of relevant task markers
that could be employed during problem-solving (Yoo, Hayden, and Pearson 2021;
Koechlin 2016).
These neural markers include markers of performance such as expected error
(Neta, Steven M Nelson, and Petersen 2017; Bossaerts 2018), variance in this expec-
tation (uncertainty) (Neta, Steven M Nelson, and Petersen 2017; Neta, Schlaggar,
and Petersen 2014; Bossaerts 2018), as well as markers that encode the evidence
towards a particular response (Ploran et al. 2011; C. Gratton et al. 2017) or even
the merit of alternative strategies (Duverne and Koechlin 2017; Donoso, Collins,
and Koechlin 2014). Critically, we hypothesized to see markers of performance, re-
lated to TCC, from early on in the trial. Additionally, we conjectured we would see
markers of reliability in regions shown to encode uncertainty. Finally, we expected
to find neural correlates of accuracy late in the trial, which would be associated to
expected performance.
We expected to see neural correlates of TCC from early on in the trial. TCC
is a feasible metric that can be related to markers of performance and efficacy of
effort from early on in the trial because it stems from constrainedness, which can
be potentially estimated from early on during the solving stage. Indeed, estimation
of constrainedness by the agent is feasible without the need to know the solution to
the problem because constrainedness (and thus TCC) can be potentially estimated
by performing a sum and division operations (e.g., αp = p/
∑N
i=1 vi). Moreover,
this metric has been demonstrated to be correlated to human performance. We
specifically, expected to see markers of TCC in the CON (Shenhav, Botvinick, and
J. D. Cohen 2013; Bossaerts 2018; Neta, Schlaggar, and Petersen 2014). However,
contrary to our expectations, we only found significant clusters in the CON starting
from the third period of the solving stage. These might reflect markers of expected
performance, but other explanations cannot be excluded. For instance, this effect
might reflect differences in time-on-task between TCC conditions (Grinband et al.
2011). This explanation, however, would still allow these activation patterns to rep-
resent differences in neural markers such as reliability and expected performance.
This follows from the fact that time-on-task is an endogenous variable of the sys-
tem. That is, the agent decides when to stop, and as such, this decision would
follow from a subjective belief on how well they can expect to perform given the
current candidate solution. Therefore, differences in time-on-task between high and
low TCC instances would probably entail differences in subjective beliefs of both
expected performance and reliability.
Besides the reported clusters that correlated positively with computational hard-
ness, we found a set of clusters that correlated negatively with TCC. These clusters
are concentrated in the second period of the solving stage, but are also found on
the third and fourth periods of the solving stage. These results might be explained
by the encoding of evidence accumulation signals (Ploran et al. 2011). Arguably,
evidence toward a solution can be accumulated faster in low TCC compared to high
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TCC instances. This would imply that regions that encode evidence accumulation
would show a higher activation on low TCC instances early in the trial, in accordance
to the pattern found on the second period of the solving stage.
In addition to studying markers linked to TCC, we explored the correlates of
satisfiability during problem-solving. We expected to see activation related to sat-
isfiability in regions previously associated with uncertainty encoding; specifically in
the CON. In line with our hypothesis we found a significant positive relation be-
tween unsatisfiability and activity in the CON that started halfway through the
trial. Contrary to our expectations we found several regions that displayed an in-
crease in activity during satisfiable instances from early on in the solving stage.
This result is perplexing because knowing the satisfiability of the problem equates
to having solved the problem, which would not be expected early on in the trial.
A possible explanation for this is that the clusters found encode evidence accumu-
lation (Ploran et al. 2011; C. Gratton et al. 2017) and that accumulating evidence
towards the solution in satisfiable instances occurs at a different rate than in un-
satisfiable instances. Relatedly, these activation patterns might reflect the use of
different strategies. However, this account would still require participants to be
implementing different strategies, based on satisfiability, as early as during the first
few seconds of the solving stage.
Additionally, we studied error related signals by studying the effect of accuracy
on the neural activation throughout the task. It has been shown that the FPN and
CON encode task signals related to error detection and error expectation (Neta,
Steven M Nelson, and Petersen 2017; Neta, Schlaggar, and Petersen 2014; Dosen-
bach, Visscher, et al. 2006). Although participants did not receive any feedback
during the task, we expected to see error related markers during late stages of the
trial. Although these signals would not represent the integration of novel exogenous
information, we hypothesized that participants would represent a subjective judg-
ment on the perceived correctness of their solution (Duverne and Koechlin 2017).
The results of this analysis confirm our hypothesis by outlining a set of regions in
both FPN and CON that encode errors during the response stage. In contrast, this
analysis did not result in any other clusters during the solving stage that correlated
negatively with accuracy. The lack of negative correlation during the late periods of
the solving stage could be due to variability in the signal during the solving stage.
Indeed, during this stage participants might be updating their accuracy expectation
as well as their candidate response. Since our accuracy contrasts is based on the
answer provided during the response stage, it stands to reason that our analysis
does not capture accuracy markers during the solving stage because we do not have
a measure of accuracy during this period. It is worth noting that we found one
significant cluster during the solving stage (in period one) that correlated positively
with accuracy in the occipital cortex. This could reflect attentional differences, early
on in the trial, which affect performance in the trial.
Taken together, the framework put forward here provides a way to study neural
markers associated to subjective beliefs during complex-problem-solving. Impor-
tantly, this is done using a generic framework that allows for the characterization of
markers across problems without the need to consider the strategies implemented.
Overall, we found evidence that suggests the existence of neural markers related
to computational hardness, reliability and performance during complex problem-
solving. Importantly, we find markers of computational hardness and reliability by
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analyzing the intrinsic features of the task. In line with our conjecture, we found
that the neural markers of the reliability overlap with regions that encode proba-
bilistic uncertainty. This suggests that reliability and uncertainty might constitute
analogous constructs that are encoded similarly across tasks and that could serve a
generic role in decision-making.
5.3.3 Computational hardness and cognitive control in
problem-solving
The generic framework put forward in this manuscript is particularly valuable in
the study of allocation of control during problem-solving given the robustness of
this process. The human brain has limited cognitive resources, yet is capable to
reuse and reallocate resources in order to successfully perform plethora of cognitive
tasks. Critically, it is able to perform tasks that involve solving problems that are
deemed hard or complex. A true understanding of the human brain and its neural
processes would require a generic model capable of generalizing across the specifics of
a task. In this line, several proposals have been put forward in which the allocation
of limited cognitive resources is modeled as a mechanism in which a generic currency
of cognitive demand is estimated and effort (or control) is consequently allocated
based on this characterization (e.g., Shenhav, Botvinick, and J. D. Cohen 2013;
Verguts, Vassena, and Silvetti 2015; Westbrook and Braver 2015). Such currency
would probably need to be characterized from generic features of the task such that
the agent is able to estimate cognitive demand across tasks. Here, we define a
potential component of this currency: computational demand. This dimension of
cognitive demand captures the amount of computations needed to solve a problem
based on insights from computational complexity theory. Importantly, this approach
is readily generalizable to several other complex problems (Cheeseman, Kanefsky,
and W. M. Taylor 1991; Percus, Istrate, and Moore 2006; Ian P. Gent et al. 1996;
Yadav et al. 2020; Franco, Doroc, et al. 2021) without the need to assume a particular
procedural strategy used to solve a problem. This can inform the study of cognitive
resource allocation in order to generalize patterns across problems and idiosyncratic
strategies.
In order to explore the dynamics related to control during complex problem-
solving we analyzed the functional interaction during problem-solving of three ROIs.
Two associated with cognitive control (i.e., CON) and one region associated with
processes that were deemed highly relevant for the task at hand (i.e., IPS). We
studied synchronization of signals (employing a PPI analysis) and explored their
effective connectivity (using GC analysis).
PPI results showed a generalized change in signal synchronization during the
solving stage compared to baseline. Moreover, when exploring the link between in-
stance properties and synchronicity between regions we found a few clusters whose
connectivity was modulated by either satisfiability or TCC. These effects were only
present late in the trial. Specifically, we found that TCC modulated the synchronic-
ity between the rAI and the rIPS. Additionally, satisfiability modulated the func-
tional connectivity between the right IPS and two clusters in the left hemisphere,
one in the AG and one in the MFG. Overall, these results suggest a differential
recruitment of regions during the task that is, partially, modulated by task proper-
ties late in the trial. Interestingly, the significant clusters identified in this analysis
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have been implicated in the performance of mathematical calculations (Arsalidou
and M. J. Taylor 2011; Grabner et al. 2009), suggesting that they could support
moment-to-moment implementation of strategies. Further work would be needed
in order to asses whether the relation, found here, between instance properties and
functional synchronization is associated to the implementation of different strategies.
Additionally, we explored the effective connectivity between the three ROIs de-
scribed. We found that there was higher effective connectivity from dACC to IPS
during the solving stage of the task. These results extend those previously found in
perceptual tasks (Aben et al. 2020), in which regions relevant for the task at hand
showed a higher functional connectivity to the dACC during the task. Overall, this
result further supports previous research that assign the dACC a central role in
the allocation of control (Shenhav, Botvinick, and J. D. Cohen 2013; Dosenbach,
Visscher, et al. 2006; Silvetti et al. 2018; Vassena, Holroyd, and Alexander 2017;
Holroyd and Yeung 2012; Alexander and Brown 2011; Sestieri et al. 2014; Aben
et al. 2020; Crottaz-Herbette and Menon 2006).
Interestingly, we did not find a significant increase in the effective functional
connectivity between rAI and rIPS during the solving stage. This finding matches
previous research that support a dissociation between dACC and AI (Han, Eaton,
and Marois 2019; Steven M. Nelson et al. 2010; Vinod Menon and Uddin 2010; Wu
et al. 2019). However, these results seem to be contrary to those found by Sestieri et
al. 2014, who found increased functional connectivity between AI and task-relevant
regions in perceptual and episodic memory tasks. Several possible explanations
could be put forward to account for this discrepancy. For instance, the nature of the
functional connectivity between rAI and task-relevant regions might be task-specific.
Specifically, it has been suggested that AI is predominantly involved in processing
of internal visceral and motivational information involved in autonomic behavior
(Steven M. Nelson et al. 2010). This type of processing might be more relevant
in perceptual and episodic memory tasks compared to the knapsack task, in which
mathematical calculations might be more pertinent. Alternatively, other possible
explanations for the lack of significant effective connectivity between rAI and rIPS
include the lack of statistical power in this analysis, as well as discrepancies in the
ROI definition.
Another significant aspect considered was the link between effective connectivity
and the intrinsic properties of the instance at hand. Our results suggest that the
effective connectivity pattern was impervious to the level of computational demand
and satisfiability. Of particular relevance, we found that the effective connectivity
between dACC and IPS was not modulated by TCC. This suggests that the effect of
TCC on control, if any, occurs by generating differential levels of activity within the
regions of interest and not via modulation of the functional connectivity between
these regions. Of course, this failure to reject the null hypothesis could be due to
a lack of power or the exclusion of relevant ROIs from the analysis. We leave it
to future research to explore how whole brain connectivity patterns are affected by
computational demand.
Overall, the framework presented in this paper allows for the study of control in
complex problem-solving. Here we applied this framework to a complex problem and
explored how it could be used to elucidate our understanding of cognitive control.
Notably, we showed that the CON and the IPS are synchronized with a several
regions during task performance. Moreover, we found that dACC had a higher
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directional connectivity with a task-relevant region (IPS) during problem-solving.
Our approach differs in many ways with the more commonly used tasks in the
study of cognitive control. Notably, commonly used tasks in cognitive control are
highly process specific. That is, problem-solving in these tasks involve precise sub-
processes, thus sacrificing environmental validity for specificity. Consider, for in-
stance, four prominent categories of tasks used to study and manipulate the level of
cognitive control: task switching tasks, conflict tasks, inhibition tasks and working
memory tasks (see G. Gratton et al. 2018 for a review). In each of these tasks,
the neural correlates of cognitive demand are associated to a particular sub-process
such as memory retrieval (e.g., N-back task), withholding of a prepotent tendency
(e.g., Stroop task, go/no go task) or switching between task-sets. The approach in-
troduced in this manuscript presents a way forward to include into the scope of the
analysis the interplay of these sub-processes by using more environmentally valid
tasks.
It is worth highlighting that we are not arguing for the proposed framework
to replace other methodological approaches in the study of cognitive control. In-
stead, we assert that both approaches complement each other. Critically, complex
tasks involve the interplay of several computational processing units such as working
memory, logical operations, processing of numerical magnitudes among many others.
Our approach, as it stands, is not able to differentiate among these sub-processes. A
proper understanding of complex problem-solving requires both the study of these
sub-processes independently, like in more classical approaches (G. Gratton et al.
2018), as well in tandem, like done in this paper.
5.3.4 Directions for future research
In the present paper we propose a methodology through which, by focusing on the
intrinsic characteristics of a complex computational task, it is possible to characterize
neural invariants of complex problem-solving. This resembles prominent approaches
in the study of problem-solving in other types of tasks. Notably, in perceptual tasks
the neural underpinning have been explored by studying the difference in neural
processes with respect to intrinsic features of the task. For instance, many tasks
explore the neural processes behind perceptual identification of a target. Neural
processes are identified by contrasting the neural activity between conditions with
varying levels of perceptual signal strength (e.g., Dubis et al. 2016; Hanks and
Summerfield 2017; Ploran et al. 2011). Relatedly, in probabilistic tasks, invariants
are captured by studying the neural processes linked to intrinsic characteristics such
as mean, variance and related stochastic metrics (e.g., Preuschoff, Bossaerts, and
Quartz 2006; D’Acremont and Bossaerts 2016; D’Acremont and Bossaerts 2008;
d’Acremont, Schultz, and Bossaerts 2013; Christopoulos et al. 2009; O’Neill and
Schultz 2013).
By applying this framework to the study of complex tasks, we identified neural
invariants of problem-solving in a generic way. That is, like in perceptual and prob-
abilistic tasks, the relevant features (e.g., computational hardness) can be studied
across tasks. Indeed, TCC has previously been shown to affect human behavior
in tasks involving other NP-complete problems (Franco, Doroc, et al. 2021). This
framework represents a new approach in the study of problem-solving, by character-
izing a scale of cognitive demand that can be compared across problems. This allows
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for the study of the generic (across problems) neural substrates of problem-solving
associated to computational demand. Future work should extend the results, be-
yond the knapsack problem, to other complex problems in order to characterize a
truly task-independent core of controllers and processors supporting complex com-
putations in the brain.
In this paper, we studied how neural processes were affected by modulating one
significant dimension of cognitive demand: computational hardness. We specif-
ically explored the computational hardness associated to the constrainedness of
an instance. This dimension is a fundamental source of cognitive demand when
solving complex problems. Not only has it been shown to be associated with the
computational requirements of solving problems by several algorithms (Cheeseman,
Kanefsky, and W. M. Taylor 1991; Achlioptas, Naor, and Peres 2005; Selman and
Kirkpatrick 1996; Yadav et al. 2020; Ian P Gent and Walsh 1996; Ian P. Gent et al.
1996), but it has been shown to affect human decision quality in the knapsack deci-
sion problem and other NP-complete problems (Franco, Yadav, et al. 2020; Franco,
Doroc, et al. 2021). Notwithstanding its relevance, this source of cognitive demand
is not unique. Other sources of cognitive demand have been identified to affect hu-
man problem-solving. Notably, it has been shown that the quality of the solution
decreases as the size of the problem increases (e.g., Carruthers, Masson, and Stege
2012; MacGregor and Chu 2011; Dry et al. 2006; van Opheusden and Ma 2019;
Stazyk, Ashcraft, and Hamann 1982; De Visscher and Noël 2014). Additionally,
it has been demonstrated that problem-specific and strategy-specific features of an
instance affect the quality of decisions (e.g., Murawski and Bossaerts 2016; MacGre-
gor and Chu 2011; Basso, Bisiacchi, et al. 2001; Basso and Saracini 2020). Further
work in this area is needed to understand the interaction between different sources
of cognitive demand on human problem-solving.
We have investigated complex problem-solving by employing a theoretical frame-
work that examines the computational hardness of random ensembles of instances
of NP-hard problems. TCC quantifies average complexity over a set of random in-
stances conditional on a fixed property (α). This is particularly relevant for the
study of cognition because it is a metric that can be estimated without the need to
solve the problem. In contrast, many alternative metrics of difficulty require knowl-
edge of the solution, which makes them computationally expensive. This includes
IC, the number of solution witnesses, as well as other strategy-specific metrics such
as Sahni-K (Murawski and Bossaerts 2016; Sahni and Sartaj 1975). Despite the
advantages of TCC with regards to its computational feasibility, it is contingent on
a random generation process. Here we sampled instances, specifically, from a uni-
form distribution. Future work could aim at characterizing real-life distributions of
instances and whether the findings presented here are robust to these distributions.
In this study we studied the neural correlates of the knapsack decision task, a
task associated to an NP-complete problem. In general, the theoretical framework
presented here is applicable to decision problems, whereas many tasks encountered in
real life might involve optimization problems. It has been shown that this framework
can be extended to optimization problems in which finding the exact optimum is
required (Franco, Yadav, et al. 2020). However, finding the exact solution might
not always be essential in the real-world. In many cases, finding an approximate
or ‘good enough’ solution might suffice. The framework put forward in this paper
provides a direct way for studying the computational demands of the latter. Indeed,
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several accounts of decision-making, model humans as satisficing agents. That is,
an agent whose objective is not to find the optimum (e.g., find items that maximize
value in the knapsack), but to reach a target with ‘good enough’ value (e.g., find
a selection of items that reaches a target profit) (Herbert A Simon 1956; Bossaerts
2018). Future research could investigate whether the results found in this study can
be extended to other types of approximation schemes.
Since many of the decision-making tasks faced on a daily basis involve solving
complex problems, it follows that the understanding of real life human decision-
making requires a comprehensive understanding of how people solve these problems.
This is particularly relevant for the investigation of real-life cognitive deficiencies
and the closing of the gap between deficiencies reported in lab settings (tractable
problems) and those present in real-life (intractable) situations (see Bielak, Hatt, and
Diehl 2017 for a review of this gap in the context of aging). Our results showing a lack
of significant correlations between the measured cognitive abilities and performance
in the knapsack tasks alludes to this gap. Further research could, for instance,
utilize this framework to investigate how compensatory mechanisms identified during
cognitive decline (e.g., López-Góngora et al. 2015; Kaufmann et al. 2009; Sala-
Llonch, Bartrés-Faz, and Junqué 2015) support complex problem-solving as well as
when and how they cease to work. The increased ecological validity of complex
problems could provide insights into when cognitive decline is expected to hinder
real-life decisions.
Humans are constantly solving problems. From perceptual tasks, such as motion
detection and face recognition, to more complex tasks such as choosing an investment
portfolio. Understanding the neural processes involved in this core function of the
brain is one of crucial importance for the understanding of human decision-making.
Here we presented a framework that allows for the study of human complex problem-
solving. We applied this framework to the study of the neural underpinnings of
problem-solving and identified a dynamic set of regions that respond to cognitive
demand when performing complex tasks. Overall, the findings from this manuscript
provide support for the premise that computational hardness, as described in this
paper, is a fruitful characterization of cognitive demand of complex problems for
neuroscience. This calls for a closer collaboration between cognitive neuroscientists
and computer scientists for the successful advancement of the field of problem-solving
in both human and electronic computers.
5.4 Materials and methods
5.4.1 Ethics statement
The experimental protocol was approved by the University of Melbourne Human
Research Ethics Committee (Ethics ID 1749616.3). Written informed consent was
obtained from all participants prior to commencement of the experimental sessions.
Experiments were performed in accordance with all relevant guidelines and regula-
tions.
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5.4.2 Participants
Twenty right-handed volunteers from Melbourne University and the surrounding
community took part in the study (14 female, 5 male, 1 other; age range = 18-
35 years, mean age = 26.6 years). Inclusion was based on age (minimum = 18
years, maximum = 40 years) and on right-handedness. Each participant performed
the knapsack decision task in the scanner and performed outside the scanner the
knapsack optimization task, a mental arithmetic task and a set of basic cognitive
function tasks.
5.4.3 Knapsack decision task
In this task, participants were asked to solve a number of instances of the (0-1)
knapsack decision problem (Fig 5.2.1). In each trial, they were shown a set of items
with different values and weights as well as a capacity constraint and a target profit.
Participants had to decide whether there exists a subset of those items for which
(1) the sum of weights is lower or equal to the capacity constraint and (2) the sum
of values yields at least the target profit.
Each trial had four stages. In the first stage (items stage; 3 seconds), only the
items were presented. Item values, in dollars, were displayed using dollar bills and
weights, in grams, were shown inside a black weight symbol. The larger the value of
an item, the larger the dollar bill was in size. Similarly, the larger the weight of an
item, the larger its weight symbol was in size. At the center of the screen, a green
circle indicated the time remaining in this stage. In the second stage (solving stage;
22 seconds), target profit and capacity constraint were added to the screen inside
the green timer circle. In the third stage (response stage; 2 seconds), participants
saw a ‘YES’ and a ‘NO’ button on the screen, in addition to the timer circle, and
made a response using the keyboard (Fig 5.2.1). Finally, a jittered inter-trial rest
period of 8, 10 or 12 seconds was shown before the start of the next trial.
Participants completed 56 trials (7 blocks of 8 trials), each showing a different
instance of the knapsack decision problem. The order of instances was randomized
across participants. The side of the ‘YES’ and ‘NO’ buttons was also randomized.
Instance properties and complexity
In the present paper, we examine the neural correlates of cognitive demand in a
complex problem-solving task employing a metric of generic hardness that stems
from computational complexity theory. A notable approach in this theory studies
computational hardness by analyzing the difficulty of randomly generated instances
of decision problems. That is, those problems whose answer is either ‘yes’ or ‘no’.
The study of random ensembles of instances has characterized a source of consider-
able variation in computational hardness for instances with the same input length
(Cheeseman, Kanefsky, and W. M. Taylor 1991; Percus, Istrate, and Moore 2006;
Ian P. Gent et al. 1996; Yadav et al. 2020). This variability in hardness has been
related to various structural properties of instances. In particular, it has been shown
that for several NP-complete problems there exist a set of parameters ᾱ that cap-
tures the constrainedness of an instance; that is, the likelihood that the problem
is satisfiable (i.e., the solution to the problem is ‘yes’) (Cheeseman, Kanefsky, and
W. M. Taylor 1991; Ian P. Gent et al. 1996; Ian P Gent and Walsh 1996; Yadav et al.
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2020). This line of research has found that there is a threshold αs such that random
instances around these threshold are harder than instances further away from it
(Cheeseman, Kanefsky, and W. M. Taylor 1991; Krzakala et al. 2006; Ian P Gent
and Walsh 1996; Achlioptas, Naor, and Peres 2005; Selman and Kirkpatrick 1996;
Krzakala et al. 2006). We call this source of complexity, typical-case complexity
(TCC).
In the knapsack problem, TCC is explicitly connected to a set of parameters







(Yadav et al. 2020; Franco, Yadav, et al. 2020). These parameters de-
termine the likelihood that a random instance is satisfiable. Specifically, they char-
acterize where typical instances are generally satisfiable (under-constrained region),
where they are unsatisfiable (over-constrained region) and where the probability of
satisfiability is close to 50% (satisfiability threshold αs). TCC is defined based on
the distance to the satisfiability threshold. Specifically, instances with values of
αp near the satisfiability threshold have a high typical-case complexity (high TCC )
whereas instances further away from it—that is, in the under-constrained and over-
constrained regions— have low typical-case complexity (low TCC ). Importantly for
our study, TCC has been shown to affect human behavior in the knapsack task
(Franco, Yadav, et al. 2020).
In our analyses, we also explored the effect of two other intrinsic properties of
instances of the knapsack decision problem: satisfiability and instance complexity
(IC). Satisfiability refers to the solution of an instance; explicitly, if the solution
to an instance is ‘yes’ it is satisfiable, otherwise it is unsatisfiable. This property,
affects how a problem can be solved. On the one hand, to prove that an instance is
satisfiable, a single solution witness needs to be found that satisfies both capacity
and value constraints. On the other hand, to demonstrate that an instance is un-
satisfiable all possible item combinations must be shown to be unable to satisfy the
constraints. This can be done, for instance, via exhaustive search or logical pruning
of alternatives.
The other intrinsic property, IC, is defined as the distance between the level
of the profit constraint (target profit) and the maximum value attainable in the





∣∣∣ = ∣∣αp − α?p∣∣, (5.1)
where p is the target profit of the decision instance and p? is the maximum value
achievable in the corresponding optimization instance, that is, the maximum value
that can be packed into the knapsack given the same set of items I and the same
capacity constraint c. αp and α
?
p denote the normalized values of target profit and
optimum value, respectively.
Note that both TCC and IC capture the hardness related to constrainedness.
However, they do so at two different levels of analysis. TCC, on the one hand, is a
metric that captures the expected (average) difficulty of an ensemble of instances.
On the other hand, IC is a metric of complexity of a single instance. Critically,
while TCC can be estimated from the features of the problem alone, in order to
estimate IC the optimization variant of the problem needs to be solved first. In that
regard, TCC is a feature-space ex-ante metric (can be estimated before solving the
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problem) whereas IC is an ex-post solution-space metric that can only be estimated
after the problem has been solved. It is worth noting, however, that while TCC
is less computationally intensive, it depends on the random generation process of
instances.
5.4.4 Instance sampling
Sampled instances generate a 2×2 balanced factorial design of TCC (high vs. low)
and satisfiability (satisfiable vs. unsatisfiable) with 18 instances in each condition.
Instances selected were a sub-sample of the instances used by a previous be-
havioral study (Franco, Yadav, et al. 2020). Instances in their study were selected
such that αc was fixed (αc ∈ [0.40, 0.45]) and the instance constrainedness var-
ied according to αp. 18 instances were selected from the under-constrained region
(αp ∈ [0.35, 0.4]; low TCC ) and 18 from the over-constrained region (αp ∈ [0.85, 0.9];
low TCC ). Additionally, 18 satisfiable instances and 18 unsatisfiable instances were
sampled near the satisfiability threshold (αp ∈ [0.6, 0.65]; high TCC ). Half of the
instances with high TCC were forced to have high/low computational requirements
(top/bottom 50%), according to an algorithm-specific ex-post complexity measure
of a widely-used algorithm (Gecode ;Gecode Team 2006). All instances in the ex-
periment had N = 6 items and wi, vi, c and p were integers.
In the current study we randomly selected 56 of the 72 instances sampled in
Franco, Yadav, et al. 2020. Sub-sampling without replacement was done ensur-
ing that the same number of instances were selected across TCC and satisfiability
conditions. Moreover, instances with high TCC were balanced to require high/low
computational requirements according to the same algorithm-specific complexity
measure employed in their study (i.e., Gecode propagations).
5.4.5 Complementary tasks
Participants were presented a set of complementary tasks outside of the scanner.
They were asked to solve a number of instances of the (0-1) knapsack optimization
problem. Similar to the knapsack decision task, participants were shown a set of
items with different weights and values as well as a capacity constraint. However,
unlike the decision variant, no target profit was presented. Participants had to find
the subset of items that maximized total value subject to the capacity constraint
(see Appendix A.1).
Additionally, we tested participants’ performance on five aspects of cognitive
function that we considered relevant for the knapsack tasks, namely, working mem-
ory, episodic memory, strategy use, processing and psychomotor speed, as well as
mental arithmetic. To do so, we first administered a set of tasks from the Cambridge
Neuropsychological Test Automated Battery (CANTAB; see Appendix A.2). Specif-
ically, we asked participants to perform the Reaction Time (RTI), Paired Associates
Learning (PAL), Spatial Working Memory (SWM) and Spatial Span (SSP). In ad-
dition, to test arithmetic abilities, participants were presented with a set of mental
arithmetic problems (see Appendix A.2).
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5.4.6 Procedure
Participants were asked to fill in an MRI screening form before attending the exper-
iment. Once at the experiment, participants were presented with a plain language
statement and a consent form. After reading these and providing written informed
consent, participants were instructed in the tasks and completed a practice session
of the knapsack decision task. Participants then underwent an MRI safety check
and debriefing.
Before being scanned, participants solved the CANTAB RTI task outside of the
scanner. This was followed by the scan session in which they performed the knapsack
decision task. Afterwards, outside of the scanner, they completed the CANTAB
RTI task again, followed by the knapsack optimization task. Subsequently, they
completed the remaining CANTAB tasks in the following order: PAL, SWM and
SSP. Finally, they performed the mental arithmetic task and completed a set of
demographic and debriefing questionnaires. Altogether, the experimental session
lasted around three hours.
Participants received a show-up fee of A$10, as well as monetary compensation
based on performance. They earned A$1.2 for each correct answer in the knapsack
decision task and for each correct answer in the knapsack optimization task.
5.4.7 Behavioral statistical analyses
The R programming language was used to analyze the behavioral data. All of the
linear mixed models (LMM), generalized logistic mixed models (GLMM) and cen-
sored linear mixed models (CLMM) included random effects on the intercept for
participants (unless otherwise stated). Different models were selected according to
the data structure. GLMM were used for models with binary dependent variables,
LMM were used for continuous dependent variables and CLMM were used for cen-
sored continuous dependent variables (e.g., time-on-task).
All of the models were fitted using a Bayesian framework implemented using the
probabilistic programming language Stan via the R package ‘brms’ (Bürkner 2017).
Default priors were used. All population-level effects of interest had uninformative
priors; i.e., an improper flat prior over the reals. Intercepts had a student-t prior with
3 degrees of freedom and a scale parameter that depended on the standard deviation
of the dependent variable after applying the link function. The t-student distribution
was centered around the mean of the dependent variable. Sigma values, in the case of
Gaussian-link models, had a half student-t prior (restricted to positive values) with
3 degrees of freedom and a scale parameter that depended on the standard deviation
of the dependent variable after applying the link function. Standard deviations of
the participant-level intercept had a half student-t prior that was scaled in the same
way as the sigma priors.
Each of the models presented was estimated using four Markov chains. The
number of iterations per chain was by default set to 2000. This parameter was
adjusted to 4000 on some models to ensure convergence, which was verified using
the convergence diagnostic R̂. All models presented reach an R̂ ≈ 1.
Statistical tests were performed based on the 95% credible interval estimated
using the highest density interval (HDI) of the posterior distributions calculated via
the R package ‘parameters’ (Lüdecke, Ben-Shachar, and Makowski 2020). For each
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statistical test we report both the median (β0.5) of the posterior distribution and its
corresponding credible interval (HDI0.95).
No participant nor trial was excluded from the data analysis of the knapsack
decision task.
5.4.8 MRI data acquisition
We collected the fMRI images using a 7 Tesla Siemens MAGNETOM scanner lo-
cated at the Melbourne Brain Centre (Parkville, Victoria) with a 32-channel radio
frequency coil.
The BOLD signal was measured using a multiband echo-planar imaging sequence
(TR = 800 ms, TE = 22.2 ms, FA = 45°). We acquired 84 interleaved slices (thick-
ness = 1.6 mm, gap = 0 mm, FOV = 208 mm, matrix = 130x130, multi-band factor
= 6, voxel size=1.6×1.6×1.6mm3) per volume. 380 volumes were acquired on each
run while recording cardiac and respiratory traces.
After five functional runs (one resting state run followed by four task runs), a high
resolution (0.7 mm isotropic) anatomical image was acquired using an MP2RAGE
pulse sequence (TR=5000 ms, TE=3.07 ms, TI1 = 700ms, FA1 = 4°, TI2 = 2700ms,
FA1 = 5°, matrix=330×330, voxel size=0.73×0.73×0.73mm3, FOV=240 mm, 224
slices, slice thickness = 0.73). Afterwards, another three functional runs were
performed, followed by a diffusion weighted imaging (DWI) multi-band sequence
(TR=7000 ms, TE=72.4 ms, FA =90°, FoV = 210 mm, matrix = 170x170, slice
thickness =1.24, voxel size = 1.24m3, 128 slices, multi-band factor =2).
5.4.9 Imaging statistical analyses
Preprocessing
Initial preprocessing of the data was performed using AFNI (Cox 1996) and the
Advanced Normalization Tools (ANTs) software. For each subject, pulse and car-
diac noise was regressed out from the functional scans. These were then slice-time
corrected and the volumes were motion-corrected by registering them to the first vol-
ume of the first functional run. The mean image of the first run was co-registered
to the anatomical scan (down-sampled) and this transformation was applied to all
of the functional volumes. Afterwards, each participant’s anatomical scan was used
for calculation of transformation parameters to normalize the functional images into
the Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) space (see Appendix B for more details).
Whole-brain analysis (boxcar)
Whole-brain analyses were performed by fitting generalized linear models (GLM)
using AFNI (Cox 1996). Before the regressions were implemented, we spatially
smoothed the functional volumes with a 4.8mm FWHM Gaussian kernel. Addi-
tionally, volumes with motion or signal outliers were censored from each of the
regressions.
We performed GLM regressions to explore three contrasts of interest. Specifi-
cally, we tested the neural correlates of TCC (high TCC vs. low TCC), satisfiability
(unsatisfiable vs. satisfiable) and accuracy (correct vs. incorrect). In each of the
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βL0i L0 × boxSi + βL1i L1 × boxSi
]
+ βL05 L0 × boxresp+
βL15 L1 × boxresp + β6boxitems + βLLeft+ βRRight
where L0 and L1 correspond to the different levels of interest (e.g., high TCC
and low TCC respectively) and boxSi, boxresp, boxitems correspond to the boxcar
functions of the solving, response and items stages, respectively. Left and Right
correspond to the button pressed by the participant.
Group level analyses were performed using mixed effects multilevel modeling
(Chen et al. 2012). All whole-brain analysis results are reported with a clusterwise
threshold of p < 0.05 corrected for multiple comparisons across the whole brain,
using an uncorrected voxelwise threshold of p < 0.001.
ROI specification
We were particularly interested in how control and subjective beliefs of cognitive
demand and reliability were involved in complex problem-solving. To study these
dynamic processes we selected three regions of interest (ROIs) that have been im-
plicated in the processes of interest. Firstly, we included in our analysis the CON
(dACC and AI) due to its proposed involvement in the allocation of control (Shen-
hav, Botvinick, and J. D. Cohen 2013; Dosenbach, Visscher, et al. 2006; Silvetti et al.
2018; Vassena, Holroyd, and Alexander 2017; Holroyd and Yeung 2012; Alexander
and Brown 2011) and uncertainty encoding (Neta, Steven M Nelson, and Petersen
2017; Neta, Schlaggar, and Petersen 2014; Bossaerts 2018), which we conjectured
would be highly related to encoding of reliability. Secondly, we included a region
that has been involved in moment-to-moment processing operations during problem-
solving. We expected the knapsack task to engage processing units associated with
number processing and mathematical calculations. Therefore, we selected a region
that has been widely connected to ‘processing’ in mathematical problem-solving,
the right IPS (Matejko and Ansari 2018; Brannon 2006; Arsalidou and M. J. Taylor
2011).
The three ROIs were selected from the clusters found when contrasting high and
low TCC in the last boxcar during the solving stage (period S4). We chose the
contrast for the fourth boxcar for a few reasons. We expected that during this last
period of the solving stage we would be able to see a marked differentiation in the
cognitive demand between instances with high and low TCC. We expected instances
with low TCC to require less computational time and thus, we hypothesized that,
on average, participants would be still making calculations during the period S4 for
high TCC instances, but not for low TCC instances. This was further indicated by
a parallel pilot study that found that participants spent on average 17.9s solving
an instance with low TCC and 21.2s on those with high TCC (period S3 ends at
19.5s of solving stage). Importantly, we believed that these differences in cognitive
demand would be reflected, as well, in a differentiation in the control activity in
the system. Therefore, we expected that significant clusters found in this period
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would capture differences in neural markers associated to control. Critically, we
expected the monitoring of control variables such as expected performance would
differ between types of instances. For instance, we expected the subjective markers
of performance would converge to actual performance levels in the late stages of
the solving stage (Franco, Yadav, et al. 2020; Fig 5.2.2), which would imply higher
subjective beliefs of expected performance for low TCC. Additionally, we expected
that this contrast would allow us to control for task-set signals (Dosenbach, Fair,
Miezin, et al. 2007). We conjectured that the task-set signals would be maintained
during the whole solution-stage, so the proposed contrast would not capture task-set
signals encoding goals nor the underlying structure of the task.
Among the significant clusters found around the right IPS, we chose the IPS
(AG) cluster (peak: x=32, y =-65, z=47) because of its overlap with the regions
that were found to be associated with mathematical calculations in the meta analysis
by Arsalidou and M. J. Taylor 2011.
ROI temporal dynamics
We explored the dynamics in these ROIs by fitting generalized linear models (GLM)
using AFNI (Cox 1996). Analogous to the whole brain GLM analysis (i.e., boxcar
analysis), we spatially smoothed the signal and censored outliers from the regression.
In this case, in contrast to the whole brain analysis GLMs, we modeled the trial time
using a Finite Impulse Response (FIR) approach, in which each trial was modeled
using 17 simple basis functions (tents; Fig 5.2.1). This approach allowed us to take
advantage of the short TRs (0.8s) used for the functional acquisition sequence, which
were possible due to the ultra-high-field MRI used in the experiment. Modeling
the BOLD signal using FIR allowed us to obtain 17 beta estimates βFIR for each
voxel for each of the conditions considered. Note that these estimates model the
hemodynamic response directly and, therefore, they do not factor in the lag of the
BOLD signal. In order to link each βFIR to a time in the trial, we assumed a lag of
5 seconds in the hemodynamic response.
We obtained a 2x2 βFIR-estimates for the factors TCC (high and low) and sat-
isfiability (satisfiable and unsatisfiable). We explored the dynamics of each ROI by
estimating the average βFIR over all of the voxels from each ROI for each condition.
The ROI signal aggregation was performed using python 3.7 and the nilearn library.
Connectivity analysis
Connectivity analysis was performed over the three ROIs. To remove non-neural
sources from the neural signal, the motion parameters were regressed out before
extracting the relevant ROI signals. We then performed connectivity analysis using
two separate approaches.
Psychophysiological interaction (PPI) We performed generalized PPI analy-
ses using AFNI. We ran two separate regressions for each ROI; one for satisfiability
and one for TCC. Each PPI regression was estimated according to the following:
y =β0 + β1SROI + β3L0 × boxPPI1 + β4L1 × boxPPI1 + β5L0 × boxPPI2+
β6L1 × boxPPI2 + β7L0 × boxPPI1 × SROI + β8L1 × boxPPI1 × SROI+
β9L0 × boxPPI2 × SROI + β10L1 × boxPPI2 × SROI
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where L0 corresponds to low TCC (or satisfiable) condition and L1 corresponds to
high TCC (or unsatisfiable) condition. SROI is the neural signal of the seed region
and boxi corresponds to a boxcar function that separates the items and solving
stages, together, into two boxcar functions (PPI-1 and PPI-2) of the same duration
(12.5s each; Fig 5.2.7). Note that these boxcar functions are different in duration
to the ones used for the boxcar GLM analysis. The contrasts of interest (β7, β8, β9
and β10) captured the PPI effects; that is, the task-dependent connectivity to the
ROIs for each of the two periods considered. Additionally, we tested whether there
were regions that showed a differential connectivity to an ROI between conditions
(i.e., high vs. low TCC, unsatisfiable vs. satisfiable). Explicitly, we performed
group level analysis using mixed effects multilevel modeling (Chen et al. 2012) on
the contrasts corresponding to L1−L0 (β8− β7 and β10− β9). Results are reported
with a clusterwise threshold of p < 0.05 corrected for multiple comparisons across
the whole brain, using an uncorrected voxelwise threshold of p < 0.001.
It is worth noting that the interaction between box-car functions and the seed
region (box × S) was estimated via deconvolution. That is, the BOLD time series
of each seed region was deconvolved with a canonical HRF (AFNI: BLOCK(0.1,1))
and then multiplied with the psychological boxcar function. This was convolved
back with the same HRF to form a predicted PPI time series at the hemodynamic
response level (BOLD), at which the regression takes place.
Granger causality Additionally, we performed Granger Causality (GC) analysis
on the three ROIs. To do this, we first fitted a DCM to the BOLD time series of these
ROIs and estimated GC on the residuals of the model. This was done to ensure that
the DCM captured all the task-relevant events and controls not strictly related to
the internal solving process itself (e.g., onset of decision screen). We report the exact
specification of the DCM in Appendix B.2. We then extracted the residual series of
the DCM model for each region. We refrained from deconvolving the BOLD residuals
(in accordance with Seth, Chorley, and Barnett 2013) because deconvolution is a
smoothing operation that introduces spurious lead-lag relationships.
GC emerges when lagged outcomes of a variable correlate significantly with val-
ues of another variable. As such, GC is closely linked to cross-autocorrelations.
Typically, GC is analyzed in the context of a Vector Auto Regression (VAR), i.e.,
a model whereby a vector of outcomes is driven by a finite number of lags of itself.
GC emerges when the presence of lags of one variable significantly improves the
fit (maximum likelihood value) of another variable. If this is the case, the former
“Granger causes” (GCs) the latter. We ran a VAR on the time series augmented
with the time series during the solving stage only, and determined incremental GC
of one series on another during problem-solving.
In order to reach a GC statistic at the group level we carried out the following
procedure. We first ran a VAR for each subject. Each subject’s VAR maximum lag
was determined by comparing AIC (Akaike Information Criterium) for lags up to 10.
From each regression we extracted 5 GC statistics for each ROI: 2 GCs from lagged
time series of each of the other two ROIs and 3 GCs (one for each ROI) from the
lagged time series of the solving stage. This process generates 15 GC statistics per
subject. To correct for multiple comparisons among these we performed standard
Bonferroni correction.
To determine statistical significance at the group level, a standard binomial test
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was then employed to determine the significance of the frequency of rejections (of
no GC) across the 20 participants. A p level of was 0.05 used. FWE correction was
applied using Holm-Bonferroni correction over the 15 tests.2
The Matlab method gctest was used to implement the Granger Causality esti-
mations.
5.4.10 Data and code availability
The data analysis code and the behavioral data will be made available upon pub-
lication at the Open Science Framework (OSF). The software for the knapsack
decision task will be made available there as well. The anonymized neuroimag-
ing data will be made available (in BIDS format) upon publication. The soft-
ware for the knapsack optimization task and mental arithmetic task correspond to
those employed by Franco, Yadav, et al. 2020 and are available at the OSF (DOI
10.17605/OSF.IO/T2JV7).
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Appendices
Appendix A Complementary tasks
A.1 The knapsack optimization task
In this task, participants were asked to solve a number of instances of the (0-1)
knapsack optimization problem (Fig A.1(a)). In each trial, they were shown a set of
items with different weights and values as well as a capacity constraint. Participants
had to find the subset of items that maximized total value subject to the capacity
constraint. This means that while in the knapsack decision task, participants only
needed to determine whether a solution existed, in the knapsack optimization task,
2Significance is determined as follows: order p values from small (k = 1) to large (k = 15);
the kth test value is deemed to be significant at the level α if p(k) ≤ α/(m + 1 − k) where m is
the number of hypotheses to be tested; here: m = 15. If α = 0.05 then the smallest p should be
≈ 0.0033 for the corresponding test (i.e., the test with smallest p value) to reject.
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they also needed to determine the nature of the solutions (i.e., the items in the
optimal knapsack).
The task consisted of a single solving stage (60 seconds) and an inter-trial interval
(fixation cross for 10 seconds). During the solving stage the items and the capacity
constraint were presented in the same way as in the knapsack decision task. Unlike
in the decision task, however, there was no target profit and participants were able
to add and remove items to/from the knapsack by clicking on the items. An item
added to the knapsack was indicated by a halo around it (Fig A.1). Participants
could submit their solution before the time limit was reached. If participants did
not submit within the time limit, the items selected at the end of the trial were
automatically submitted as the solution. Participants were then shown a fixation
cross (10 seconds) before the start of the next trial.
Each participant completed 18 trials (2 blocks of 9 trials with a rest period of 60
seconds between blocks). Each trial presented a different instance of the knapsack
optimization problem with varying levels of computational complexity. The order
of presentation of instances in the task was randomized for each participant.
Figure A.1: Knapsack optimization task. (a) Experimental design. Partici-
pants were presented with a set of items of different values and weights together with
a capacity constraint shown at the center of the screen. The green circle at the center
of the screen indicated the time remaining in this stage of the trial. Participants had
to find the subset of items with the highest total value subject to the capacity con-
straint. This stage lasted up to 60 seconds. Participants selected items by clicking
on them and had the option of submitting their solution before the time limit was
reached. After the time limit was reached or they submitted their solution, a fixa-
tion cross was shown for 10 seconds before the next trial started. (b) TCCO and
human performance. Human performance corresponds to mean computational
performance on each instance. (c) TCCO and time-on-task. Mean time spent
before skipping to the response screen. Each dot represents an instance and is cate-
gorized according to its TCCO. The box-plots represent the median, the interquartile
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For this task we aimed at replicating the results found by Franco, Yadav, et al.
2020. In particular, we expected to find an negative effect of optimization TCC
(TCCO) on performance and a positive effect on time-on-task. TCCO is defined as
the TCC of the decision of determining whether the optimal profit (α∗p) is attainable
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given the capacity constraint.
We employed the same instances of the knapsack optimization problem used in
Franco, Yadav, et al. 2020. In their study, 12 instances were selected to have high
TCCO and 6 instances were selected to have low TCCO. All instances had N = 6
items and wi, vi, c, p were integers.
We investigated participants’ ability to find the optimal solution of an instance.
We do this by estimating a metric of computational performance that is defined as
a binary variable that is equal to 1 if the participant obtained a value equal to the
maximum value obtainable in the instance, and 0 otherwise. Mean computational
performance was 69.6% (min = 0.18, max = 1, SD = 0.25). Participants were al-
lowed to select any set of items, irrespective of the capacity constraint, which implied
that they could submit candidate solutions that exceeded the capacity constraint.
However, the capacity constraint was only violated in 3.9% of instances.
Additionally, we explored the time-on-task. In contrast to the decision variant,
the optimization task was self-paced and, as such, participants were allowed to
submit their answer before the time limit (60s) was reached. We recorded the time
participants spent in the solving stage before submitting their candidate solution.
Participants spent on average 41.0 seconds on an instance (min = 21.0, max = 55.8,
SD = 8.1).
We first analyzed the effect of trial number on the task. We found that perfor-
mance did not change throughout the task (β0.5 = 0.03, HDI0.95 = [−0.02, 0.09],
main effect of trial number on computational performance, GLMM; Table A.1
Model 1), nor did the time-on-task per instance (β0.5 = −0.02, HDI0.95 = [−0.03, 0.22],
main effect of trial number on time-on-task, CLMM; Table A.1 Model 3). These
results suggest, in line with previous results (Franco, Yadav, et al. 2020), that nei-
ther experience with the task nor mental fatigue affected the quality and speed of
finding the a solution.
We expected that performance in instances with high TCCO (instances whose
solutions have a corresponding decision problem with high TCC) would be lower
than in instances with low TCCO (instances whose solutions have a corresponding
decision problem with low TCC). We, indeed find this effect on both computa-
tional performance and time-on-task. Mean computational performance was lower
in instances with high TCCO, relative to those with low TCCO (β0.5 = −0.75,
HDI0.95 = [−1.35,−0.14], main effect of TCCO on performance, GLMM; Fig A.1b;
Table A.1 Model 2). Similarly, we found a negative relation between time-on-task
and the probability of finding the solution (β0.5 = 8.78, HDI0.95 = [6.45, 10.97],
main effect of TCCO on time-on-task, CLMM; Fig A.1c; Table A.1 Model 4). These
results replicate those found by Franco, Yadav, et al. 2020.
A.2 Cognitive function
In a previous study we tested participants’ performance on five aspects of cognitive
function that we considered relevant for the knapsack tasks (Franco, Yadav, et al.
2020). Explicitly, we assessed working memory, episodic memory, strategy use, pro-
cessing and psychomotor speed, as well as mental arithmetic. We were interested in
finding links between these cognitive capacities and the ability to solve the knapsack
task. A complex task that would arguably require the deployment of these, more
basic, cognitive abilities. Our original study lacked the power to identify reliably
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Table A.1: Computational performance and time-on-task in the knapsack
optimization task. Models on computational performance represent logistic re-
gressions with random intercept effects for participants. Regression parameters
relate performance to trial number (1), and optimization typical-case complexity
(TCCO) (2). Models on time-on-task represent censored linear regressions (with
random intercept effects for participants) relating time spent on an instance to trial
number (3), and optimization typical-case complexity (TCCO) (4). Parameter es-
timates correspond to the median of the posterior distribution (β0.5) and the 95%




(1) (2) (3) (4)




Intercept 0.84 1.61 41.21 35.12
[0.05,1.7] [0.74,2.45] [36.51,45.47] [30.98,39.98]
Observations 359 359 323 323
ELPD -184.19 -181.54 -1228.64 -1199.62
correlations between performance in these cognitive tasks and performance in the
knapsack tasks.
In this study we tested participants on the same five aspects of cognitive function
with the aim of increasing the power of these exploratory tests. For this purpose, we
aggregated the data collected in this study with that collected by (Franco, Yadav,
et al. 2020) and estimated the same correlations presented in our previous study.
Following the approach by Franco, Yadav, et al. 2020 we administered a set of
tasks from the Cambridge Neuropsychological Test Automated Battery (CANTAB;
Cognition 2017). Specifically, we asked participants to perform the Paired Asso-
ciates Learning (PAL), Spatial Working Memory (SWM) and Spatial Span (SSP).
Additionally, participants solved a set of mental arithmetic problems (Cappelletti,
Butterworth, and Kopelman 2001). Below we describe each of the tests performed:
Paired Associates Learning (PAL) Boxes are displayed on the screen and open
one by one in a randomized order to reveal patterns hidden inside. The patterns
are then displayed in the middle of the screen, one at a time, and the subject must
touch the box where the pattern was originally located.
Spatial Working Memory (SWM) The test begins with colored boxes being
shown on the screen. The aim of this test is that, by touching the boxes and using
a process of elimination, the subject should find one ‘token’ in each of the boxes
and use them to fill up an empty column on the right hand side of the screen. The
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computer will never hide a token in the same colored box, so once a token is found
in a box the participant should not return to that box to look for another token.
Spatial Span Task (SSP) White squares briefly change color in a variable se-
quence. The participant must remember the sequence and then touch the squares
in that same order. The sequence length increases through the test. There are up
to 3 attempts at each sequence length and the test terminates if all three are failed.
Mental Arithmetic Task Participants were asked to answer a set of 33 mental
arithmetic problems. They were given 13 seconds to solve each problem. The task
involved addition and division of numbers, as well as questions in which they were
asked to round to the nearest integer the result of an addition or division operation.
From performance in these tasks we estimated five metrics of cognitive capaci-
ties and estimated their correlation with participant’s performance on the knapsack
decision and optimization tasks. Results are presented in Table A.2. We found,
after correcting for multiple comparisons using Holm-Bonferroni correction, a sig-
nificant positive effect between performance in the knapsack optimization task and
performance in the mental arithmetic task (ρ = 0.617 at FWE-corrected α = 0.05).
Additionally, we found (at FWE-corrected α = 0.10) a negative correlation between
the strategy use metric and performance in the knapsack decision task (ρ = −0.421).
The SWMS metric encodes the number of times a subject begins a new search pat-
tern from the same box they started with previously in the SWM task. Therefore,
a lower score is interpreted as higher strategy use (1 = they always begin the search
from the same box). These results suggest that participants that use a planned
strategy in SWM perform better in the knapsack decision task.
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Table A.2: Pearson correlations between performance in the knapsack
tasks and cognitive abilities. Performance in the knapsack decision task is
characterized by accuracy and in the knapsack optimization task is characterized
by computational performance. The cognitive abilities measured used were mental
arithmetic, episodic memory (PALFAMS28), working memory (SSPFSL), strategy
use (SWMS) and spatial working memory (weighted SWMTE, with errors on easier
tasks being weighted more). P-values are shown without multiple comparisons cor-
rection. Note: FWE significance ∗ <0.1; ∗∗ <0.05; ∗∗∗ <0.01 is assessed employing
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Appendix B fMRI analysis
B.1 fMRI preprocessing
Raw images were organized and converted to the relevant format according to the
(BIDS) standards. The subsequent preprocessing steps are depicted in Figure B.1
and described below.
Figure B.1: fMRI data preprocessing pipeline. Depiction of the preprocessing
steps used prior to the statistical analyses performed on the functional data. The
preprocessing steps, up to outlier detection, are shared across all types of analyses.
Afterwards, preprocessing steps differ between GLMs and functional connectivity
models.
Outlier Detection (AFNI)
Signal outliers were identified (>0.1). Motion outliers were identified (>0.3)
Normalisation (ANTS) 
T1 was co-registered to MNI Template and then the transformation was applied to all EPI's
Co-registration (ANTS)
Mean image of run 1 was co-registered to T1 and transformation was applied to all EPIs
Motion Correction (AFNI)
Images were registered to the first EPI volume of run 1.
Slice Timing Correction (AFNI)






4.8 FWHM Gaussian kernel
Connectivity analysis
Regress-out motion parameters (AFNI)
Regress motion parameters and derivatives
Pulse and cardiac noise were regressed out from the functional scans using
RETROICOR. These were then slice-time corrected and the volumes were motion-
corrected by registering to the first volume of the first functional run. The anatomi-
cal (T1) image was down-sampled to the functional EPI resolution (1.6mm3) and the
mean BOLD volume of the first run was co-registered to the down-sampled anatom-
ical scan. This transformation was applied to all of the BOLD volumes. Afterwards,
each participant’s anatomical scan was used for calculation of transformation pa-
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rameters to normalize the functional images into the Montreal Neurological Institute
(MNI) space.
Whole-brain analyses were performed by fitting generalized linear models (GLM)
using AFNI (Cox 1996). Before the regressions were implemented, we spatially
smoothed the functional volumes with a 4.8mm FWHM Gaussian kernel. Each
voxel’s signal was then scaled (per run) to have the same mean (100). Additionally,
volumes with motion or signal outliers were censored from each of the regressions.
Regressions were performed using the 3dREMLfit algorithm in AFNI. Group level
statistical tests were performed using mixed effects multilevel modeling (Chen et al.
2012).
In the connectivity analyses the volumes were not smoothed, but motion pa-
rameters were regressed out before extracting the relevant ROI signals. Whitened
(ARMA(1,1)) residuals were used in the subsequent analyses.
B.2 DCM specification
Additional to the preprocessing steps presented in the previous section we fitted
a dynamic causal model (DCM) before Granger causality (GC) analysis. This
was done in order to remove signals of no interest related to perceptual processes
related to screen and stage changes. The model was fit using the SPM12 soft-
ware (https://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/software/spm12/) and the residuals of the
resulting model were then used to fit the VAR model and test for GC (see sec-
tion 5.4.9). In this section we describe the DCM used.
Let z denote a vector of neural activity in 3 regions, indexed i (= rAI, rAG, dACC).
Let vj denote conditions; they reflect stages in the task. The variable is a dummy
variable that takes the value of 1 when the j condition is ON the screen:
• j = 1: items stage and solving stage (25s).
• j = 2: response stage (2s).
Additionally, let oj denote onsets of conditions; that is, when a stage becomes
visible on the screen.
We follow SPM’s notation to describe the model employing three different types
of matrices. Matrix A specifies the baseline effective connectivity. Matrix B(j)
denotes the modulation of effective connectivity due to experimental condition j.
Finally, C(j) captures the change of the neural response due to the onset of condition
j.




= −0.5 exp (ArAG +B(1)rAG(u1)) zrAG +
(B
(1)











= −0.5 exp (ArAI +B(1)rAI(u1)) zrAI +
(B
(1)









= −0.5 exp (AdACC +B(1)dACC(u1)) zdACC +
(B
(1)






It is worth noting the asymmetries between regions in our specification. These
are found in the burst of activity in the model (C matrix). Specifically, we expected
the AG to be a processing unit with activity starting quickly from the items stage
in the task; this is reflected in the CrAG,1o1 term in the rAG equation. In contrast,
we expected the AI and dACC to present burst activity related to control and mon-
itoring signals at the moment the solving stage ends (i.e., CrAI,2o2 and CdACC,2o2).
Besides this asymmetry, the model allows for a symmetric inter-connectivity between
ROIs during the items and solving stages of the task.
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Appendix C Tables and Figures
Table C.1: Human performance in the knapsack decision task. Logistic
regressions, with random intercept effects for participants, relating the accuracy
in an instance with trial number (1), typical-case complexity (TCC) (2), instance
complexity (IC) (3), the number of witnesses (4), satisfiability (5), as well as TCC
and satisfiability (6). Parameter estimates correspond to the median of the posterior
distribution (β0.5) and the 95% HDI credible interval (HDI0.95). ELPD denotes the
expected log posterior predictive density.
Dependent variable: Human performance




[-1.44, -0.79] [-1.66, -0.79]
IC 6.54
[4.67, 8.29]
No. of Witnesses 0.20
[0.12, 0.28]
Satisfiability 0.02 -0.14
[-0.30, 0.30] [-0.61, 0.37]
TCC:Satisfiability 0.26
[-0.37, 0.9]
Intercept 1.24 2.05 0.60 0.65 1.41 2.13
[0.83,1.66] [1.61,2.52] [0.14,1.03] [-0.02,1.33] [1.00,1.81] [1.63,2.67]
Observations 1120 1120 1120 560 1120 1120
ELPD -546.77 -523.90 -516.67 -237.33 -548.05 -525.37
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Figure C.1: PPI supplementary results. The effect of the task on the connectiv-
ity to each of the three seed regions used for the analysis (dACC, rAG and rAI). Each
column shows the PPI effect for a different seed region. Each row displays the pe-
riod of the task considered. Activation patterns represent the significant PPI-effect
estimates in instances with low TCC. The effect for instances with high TCC is not
displayed. The only significant differences between high and low TCC conditions
are presented in figure 5.2.7a. Significant cluster-wise FWE-corrected (p < 0.05)
clusters (with an uncorrected threshold of p < 0.001) are presented.











-2 -1 0 1 2
PPI Effect Estimates
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of brain networks in aging: a review of functional connectivity studies”. In: Fron-
tiers in Psychology 6. issn: 1664-1078. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00663. url:
www.frontiersin.org.
Seeley, William W. et al. (Feb. 2007). “Dissociable intrinsic connectivity networks
for salience processing and executive control”. In: Journal of Neuroscience 27.9,
pp. 2349–2356. issn: 02706474. doi: 10.1523/JNEUROSCI.5587-06.2007.
Selman, Bart and Scott Kirkpatrick (Mar. 1996). “Critical behavior in the computa-
tional cost of satisfiability testing”. In: Artificial Intelligence 81.1-2, pp. 273–295.
issn: 0004-3702. doi: 10.1016/0004-3702(95)00056-9.
Sestieri, Carlo et al. (2014). “Domain-general signals in the cingulo-opercular net-
work for visuospatial attention and episodic memory”. In: Journal of Cognitive
Neuroscience 26.3, pp. 551–568. issn: 15308898. doi: 10.1162/jocn{\_}a{\_
}00504.
Seth, Anil K., Paul Chorley, and Lionel C. Barnett (Jan. 2013). “Granger causality
analysis of fMRI BOLD signals is invariant to hemodynamic convolution but not
downsampling”. In: NeuroImage 65, pp. 540–555. issn: 10538119. doi: 10.1016/
j.neuroimage.2012.09.049.
Shenhav, Amitai, Matthew M. Botvinick, and Jonathan D. Cohen (2013). “The ex-
pected value of control: An integrative theory of anterior cingulate cortex func-
tion”. In: Neuron 79.2, pp. 217–240. issn: 08966273. doi: 10.1016/j.neuron.
2013.07.007. url: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neuron.2013.07.007.
Shepard, Roger N. and Jacqueline Metzler (Feb. 1971). “Mental rotation of three-
dimensional objects”. In: Science 171.3972, pp. 701–703. issn: 00368075. doi:
10.1126/science.171.3972.701.
Siegler, Robert S., Karen E. Adolph, and Patrick Lemaire (1996). “Strategy choices
actoss the lifespan”. In: Implicit memory and metacognition. Erlbaum Press,
pp. 79–121.
Silvetti, Massimo et al. (Aug. 2018). “Dorsal anterior cingulate-brainstem ensem-
ble as a reinforcement meta-learner”. In: PLoS Computational Biology 14.8,
e1006370. issn: 15537358. doi: 10.1371/journal.pcbi.1006370.
Simon, Herbert A (1956). “Rational choice and the structure of the environment”.
In: Psychological Review 63.2, pp. 129–138. issn: 0033295X. doi: 10.1037/
h0042769.
Stazyk, Edmund H., Mark H. Ashcraft, and Mary S. Hamann (1982). “A net-
work approach to mental multiplication”. In: Journal of Experimental Psychol-
ogy: Learning, Memory, and Cognition 8.4, pp. 320–335. issn: 02787393. doi:
10.1037/0278-7393.8.4.320.
177
CHAPTER 5. NEURAL CORRELATES OF COMPUTATIONAL HARDNESS
Van Opheusden, Bas and Wei Ji Ma (2019). Tasks for aligning human and machine
planning. doi: 10.1016/j.cobeha.2019.07.002. url: https://doi.org/10.
1016/j.cobeha.2019.07.002.
Van Rooij, Iris et al. (Apr. 2019). Cognition and Intractability. Cambridge University
Press. doi: 10.1017/9781107358331.
Vassena, Eliana, Clay B. Holroyd, and William H. Alexander (2017). “Computa-
tional models of anterior cingulate cortex: At the crossroads between prediction
and effort”. In: Frontiers in Neuroscience 11.JUN, pp. 1–9. issn: 1662453X. doi:
10.3389/fnins.2017.00316.
Verguts, Tom, Eliana Vassena, and Massimo Silvetti (Mar. 2015). “Adaptive effort
investment in cognitive and physical tasks: A neurocomputational model”. In:
Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience 9, p. 57. issn: 16625153. doi: 10.3389/
fnbeh.2015.00057.
Westbrook, Andrew and Todd S Braver (2015). “Cognitive effort: A neuroeconomic
approach.” In: Cognitive, affective & behavioral neuroscience 15.2, pp. 395–415.
issn: 1531-135X.
Wu, Tingting et al. (2019). “Anterior insular cortex is a bottleneck of cognitive
control”. In: NeuroImage 195, pp. 490–504. issn: 10959572. doi: 10.1016/j.
neuroimage.2019.02.042. url: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.
2019.02.042.
Yadav, Nitin et al. (2020). “Is Hardness Inherent In Computational Problems? Per-
formance Of Human And Digital Computers On Random Instances Of The 0-
1 Knapsack Problem”. In: 24th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence
(ECAI 2020).
Yoo, Seng Bum Michael, Benjamin Yost Hayden, and John M Pearson (2021). Con-





In this manuscript, I adapted and tested a theoretical framework for the study of
computational hardness in human cognition. Using insights from computing theory,
I introduced a set of metrics that characterize the intrinsic computational hardness
of instances of problems in a generic way. I then tested their applicability to the
study of human computation at the behavioral and neural level in a set of human
laboratory experiments.
In chapter 2, I adapted the metrics commonly used in the study on computa-
tional hardness of random ensembles in computer science to the study of cognition.
In particular, I defined two metrics: typical-case complexity (TCC) and instance
complexity (IC). These metrics characterize the hardness of instances of decision
problems. While TCC captures hardness at the level of a random ensemble of in-
stances, IC characterizes hardness of an individual instance.
In chapter 3, we explored the effect of these metrics on human performance in
the knapsack problem. We found that these metrics predict decision quality in the
knapsack decision task. Moreover, in this chapter we provided a generalization of
the TCC metric to optimization problems (TCCO) and showed that this metric
of computational hardness predicts performance and time-on-task in the knapsack
optimization task, too.
In chapter 4, we showed that TCC and IC are indeed generic metrics of compu-
tational hardness. Specifically, we extended and compared our previous results for
the knapsack problem to two other canonical computational problems: the traveling
salesperson problem and the Boolean satisfiability problem (3SAT). We found that
the proposed metrics predict human performance and time-on-task across different
tasks in a similar way.
Finally, in chapter 5, we applied the framework to the study of the neural pro-
cesses associated with complex problem-solving. Specifically, we conducted an ex-
periment in which participants solved the knapsack decision task while undergoing
ultra-high field fMRI and explored the neural correlates of computational complex-
ity. We showed that the set of brain regions where activity is correlated with com-
putational hardness overlaps with the multiple demand system (MDS). Moreover,
we provided evidence that the study of intrinsic properties of intractable problems
can be employed to characterize neural invariants of human problem-solving.
The work presented here introduces a novel theoretical framework for the study of
cognition. The corresponding experimental results provide support for the premise
that a new level of analysis is warranted in the study of cognition: instance-level
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complexity, that is, a level of analysis of computational hardness that captures the
generic intrinsic hardness of instances of problems in a way that is task- and strategy-
independent. Instance-level complexity can delineate the boundaries of human com-
putation by characterizing the effect of computational hardness of a task on human
behavior. This can then be used to explicitly study the way people’s computations
adapt to the hardness of an instance of a task. This would provide an avenue for
refining algorithmic-level theories such as the heuristics program, where it is still an
open question how people select which heuristic to use for any given instance of a
task. Moreover, it can shed light on the dynamics of neural processes of problem-
solving and cognitive resource allocation.
6.1 Future directions
In this thesis, I put forward a research program that aims at characterizing instance-
level complexity and its effects on human computation. However, the work presented
here is but one milestone in this program that opens a plethora of questions and
possibilities. In what follows, I present several of these potential directions for future
research.
6.1.1 Dimensions of computational hardness
In this thesis, I investigated one dimension of computational hardness related to
the constrainedness parameter. This dimension has been investigated in computer
science, where it was found to capture a source of hardness that makes instances
with particular values of constrainedness hard for algorithms (and heuristics) to
solve. This analysis, however, is performed for fixed values of instance size. The
latter is, undeniably, another dimension of the structural properties of instances
that affect human problem-solving (Hirtle and Gärling 1992; Dry, Lee, et al. 2006;
Stazyk, Ashcraft, and Hamann 1982; De Visscher and Noël 2014; van Opheusden
and Ma 2019). Future research should study the interaction between these two
source of complexity in order to characterize how constrainedness and instance size
jointly affect human computation.
Importantly, the framework put forward here is based on a line of research in
which the the computational requirements commonly investigated are related to time
complexity. That is, instances are generally categorized as hard depending on the
number of computational steps (or time) needed by algorithms to solve an instance.
Nonetheless, there exists another dimension which might be particularly relevant for
research in cognition: memory requirements. It is not clear how memory require-
ments (i.e., space complexity) are affected by the features of the instance. Future
work could study how generic properties of instances affect memory requirements
and how these are related to human computation. Note that these requirements
might impose even tighter constraints on the algorithms that can be implemented
by humans, thus they shed additional light on the characterization of human com-
putable algorithms (Blum and Vempala 2020).
The dimensions of computational hardness discussed thus far have been generic
sources of hardness. Their generality has several advantages to which I have referred
to extensively (section 1.1). However, there might also be sources of hardness that
stem from the idiosyncratic structure of a problem or from the features of a single
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strategy. For instance, in chapter 4, we found that human performance in the
3SAT was distinctively affected by the satisfiability of the instance. Further work
would be needed in order to reach a proper characterization of the multidimensional
construct of computational hardness. This would provide an insightful mapping
from the features of an instance to the reliability of human problem-solving and the
underlying computations.
6.1.2 Approximating optimality: Linking efficiency and re-
liability
Several computational-level theories of decision-making model humans as agents
that optimize (e.g., Samuelson 1938; Nash 1950). However, most of these approaches
fail to consider computational feasibility (Bossaerts and Murawski 2017; van Rooij,
Blokpoel, et al. 2019). Theories have presented a way forward by proposing that
agents approximate the computational-level descriptions of optimality. For instance,
it has been proposed that agents satisfice, that is, instead of optimizing, agents target
a particular level of a target criterion and aim to reach that level (Simon 1956). This,
however, is in itself a computational problem whose computational hardness has not
been analyzed systematically. Alternatively, at the algorithmic-level, heuristics have
been proposed to model the implementation of computational-level optimization
problems. Nevertheless, their ability to approximate the relevant solutions (i.e., their
reliability) has not been systemically analyzed either. Nor has their computational
hardness been formally studied in order to justify their existence as fast-and-frugal
effective procedures (Gerd. Gigerenzer and Selten 2001; Otworowska et al. 2018;
Rich et al. 2019). Overall, the notions of approximation reliability and its associated
computational hardness have been treated rather informally. This raises the question
about how to formally approach the investigation of each of these two notions, both
independently and, perhaps more importantly, jointly.
Approximation reliability and computational hardness present a trade-off be-
tween the computational requirements of reaching an approximate solution and the
quality of the approximation. However, the details of this trade-off remain an open
question that is currently lacking a principled theoretical framework allowing a thor-
ough investigation of the issue. The approach put forward here could provide such
a framework. For example, the metrics presented here could directly characterize
the computational hardness of satisficing models, since they can be expressed as
computational decision problems. Moreover, this approach can be extended to op-
timization problems, as shown in chapter 3 for the knapsack problem. Importantly,
the generalization proposed can also be employed to characterize the hardness of
approximating the optimum by explicitly defining the target approximation relia-
bility. Future work could employ this framework to study the trade-off between
selecting an objective and the hardness of reaching said objective. This can shed
light on strategy selection and, more specifically, on the question of how adaptation
to hardness could drive heuristic selection (Lieder and Griffiths 2017).
6.1.3 Allocation of cognitive resources
The generic framework put forward in this manuscript is particularly valuable for
the study of allocation of control during problem-solving given the generality of
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this process. The human brain has limited cognitive resources, yet is capable of
reusing and reallocating resources in order to successfully solve different problems.
Critically, it is able to solve problems that are deemed hard or complex. A true un-
derstanding of human cognition would require a generic model of cognitive resource
allocation capable of generalizing across several tasks. To this end, several propos-
als have been put forward in which the allocation of limited resources is modeled
as a trade-off between the costs and benefits of expending cognitive resources in a
task (e.g., Shenhav, M. M. Botvinick, and J. D. Cohen 2013; Verguts, Vassena, and
Silvetti 2015; Westbrook and Braver 2015). The estimation of these costs would
require the characterization of cognitive demand.This would probably need to be
characterized from generic features of the task such that the agent is able to esti-
mate cognitive demand across tasks. The framework presented here characterizes
one component of these costs: computational demand. This dimension of cognitive
demand captures the number of computations needed to perform a task based on
insights from computational complexity theory. Importantly, this approach is read-
ily generalizable to a plethora of complex problems without the need to assume a
particular procedural strategy used to solve a problem. This can inform the study
of cognitive resource allocation in order to generate a truly generic model of com-
putational resource allocation. We provided a first exploration on this process by
investigating the neural markers of computational hardness and other generic struc-
tural properties. Further work is needed in order to assess the generality of these
markers across problems and how they are involved in the allocation of cognitive
resources during problem-solving.
6.1.4 Fixed-parameter tractability (FPT)
FPT-cognition theory employs problem complexity theory to specify for which mod-
els of cognition there could exist strategies that always solve the problem within a
reasonable amount of time (van Rooij, Blokpoel, et al. 2019). As such, it is able
to characterize the ex-ante feasibility of computational-level theories of cognition.
Whilst FPT can be studied mathematically detached from human performance,
the framework presented in this manuscript aims at predicting human performance
based on intrinsic hardness. Despite this difference, this framework may suggest
future avenues of research for FPT.
Our approach identifies a number of features of instances that could help charac-
terizing sources of hardness in FPT. Indeed, the TCC metric presented here stems
from research in which an underlying aim has been to identify the structural prop-
erties that make instances more likely to be hard. In other words, TCC has been
identified as a source of average-case asymptotic complexity. Analogously, the FPT
approach provides a theoretical framework to characterize the features of instances
that are sources of intractability, that is, sources of worst-case asymptotic complex-
ity (van Rooij, Stege, and Kadlec 2005). Future work could study the connection
between worst-case and average-case sources of hardness, and especially, whether
TCC is a source of hardness in the worst-case sense.
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6.1.5 TCC vs. IC
In this thesis, I introduced two metrics of hardness: TCC and IC. They both stem
from the study of random ensembles of instances. However, they capture hardness
at two different levels. TCC characterizes the expected computational hardness
of an instance sampled from a random ensemble of instances with a given level of
constrainedness. IC, on the other hand, captures the computational hardness of a
single instance. Together, they facilitate the investigation of human computation
at two different levels. Firstly, they can both be used to investigate the effect of
computational hardness on human performance and effort in computational tasks.
Secondly, TCC can be employed to characterize subjective beliefs of task difficulty.
The latter is possible because of the characteristics of TCC, which is a measure
that can be estimated without the need to solve an instance, thus making it less
computationally intensive. Despite their relation to each other, and to canonical
definitions of typical-case complexity in computer science (chapter 2), it remains an
open question whether hardness is driven by distance from the satisfiability thresh-
old (αsat), as captured by TCC, or by the distance from the maximum satisfiable
constrainedness (α∗), as captured by IC. This analysis is problematic because both
metrics capture hardness at different levels. One possible way of exploring this is by
comparing TCC with IC’s corresponding ensemble metric: expected instance com-
plexity (EIC). Further studies could disentangle their effect on human behavior by
testing their distinct predictions. Indeed, although both metrics (TCC and EIC)
predict a mapping between the satisfiability probability and computational hardness,
the details of this mapping differ. Therefore, a more granular mapping between the
satisfiability probability and human performance could disentangle their effect.
6.1.6 Landscape analysis
The study of TCC, as it names implies, is an average measure of complexity. This
means that it captures the complexity, not of a specific instance, but the expected
complexity of a random ensemble. This involves making assumptions about the
relevant sampling procedures, which raises a question about the external validity
of these procedures. At this point, this question is difficult to answer given that
the distribution of real life instances of problems is an open question and very little
is known about it (Bogdanov and Trevisan 2006). An alternative approach that
avoids the specification of a sampling procedure comes from a line of research in
operations research: fitness-landscape analysis. This framework can also be used
to characterize the computational requirements of individual instances in a generic
way.
The principal goal of landscape analysis has been to determine which algorithm
would be best suited for solving a particular problem (Moser, Gheorghita, and Aleti
2017). In order to accomplish this, individual instances of a problem are represented
as a landscape in which each location has a corresponding fitness value. The objec-
tive is to reach a particular location that maximizes the fitness value based on an
operator function that defines the feasible moves that can be employed to search the
landscape. Importantly, the topology of the fitness landscape has been shown to af-
fect the efficacy of several search algorithms and heuristics (Moser, Gheorghita, and
Aleti 2017; Tavares, Pereira, and Costa 2008). In other words, structural properties
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of this topology are able to capture intrinsic computational hardness of instances1.
This representation of a problem is rather generic and can be used to study
combinatorial optimization problems such as the knapsack optimization problem
(Tavares, Pereira, and Costa 2008) and the traveling salesperson problem (Cicirello
2019; Schiavinotto and Stützle 2007). It is worth noting, however, that this ap-
proach has some limitations with regards to its generality and its applicability to
the study of human cognition. Firstly, the landscape representation of a problem
is not unique (e.g., Cicirello 2019; Tavares, Pereira, and Costa 2008). Critically,
the operator function can be described in different ways. This entails a different
topology of the landscape representation of the instance, which in turns would im-
ply a different level of computational hardness. Secondly, the topological structure
of an instance, and thus its hardness, is computationally intensive to estimate. In
order to calculate the topology of an instance, the target location usually needs to
be known, which requires solving the problem. Moreover, several other estimations
need to be performed in order to characterize landscape metrics of hardness for a
particular instance.
In this thesis, I focus my analysis on the study of TCC and related generic metrics
of hardness on human cognition. This vantage point allowed me to investigate two
things: (1) how computational hardness affects decision quality and (2) how agents
adapt to complexity. Landscape analysis might not be suitable for the study of the
latter since the estimation of these metrics is computationally intensive. Therefore,
it appears unlikely that agents can estimate these metrics to adapt to the hardness
of a task. However, landscape analysis can provide an alternative approach to
study how people search for solutions and how reliable this can be. Future work
should explore whether this framework can be used to capture invariants of human
performance and strategy use in a generic way.
* * *
Overall, the work presented here provides a multidisciplinary approach to the
study of computational hardness in human cognition. This calls for a closer col-
laboration between psychologists, neuroscientists and computer scientists. Impor-
tantly, the insights from this interdisciplinary approach can inform the development
of public policies that aim at minimizing the detrimental effects of computational
complexity on decisions. Indeed, in cases where the cognitive demands of a task sub-
stantially exceed decision-makers’ capacities, there is a need to prevent harm. One
way to do so could be AI-powered applications that support people in making com-
plex decisions. Another approach could involve regulatory interventions imposing
limits on the complexity of products and/or require product and service providers
to generate mechanisms to overcome complexity in the cases where an agent’s cog-
nitive capabilities are not sufficient to guarantee a good decision. However, before
such mechanisms can be developed and implemented, a well-founded characteriza-
tion of the complexity of these tasks is needed. In this thesis, I introduced a research
program capable of filling this gap.
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